Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE1256
2004-05-24 15:25:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

DOE Second Line of Defense Megaport Initiative -

Tags:  ENRG OTRA ETTC MNUC PARM PREL NL 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001256 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG OTRA ETTC MNUC PARM PREL NL
SUBJECT: DOE Second Line of Defense Megaport Initiative -
Completion of Dutch Brinker Project in Rotterdam Port

Summary
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001256

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG OTRA ETTC MNUC PARM PREL NL
SUBJECT: DOE Second Line of Defense Megaport Initiative -
Completion of Dutch Brinker Project in Rotterdam Port

Summary
--------------


1. A U.S. DOE team managed by David D. Martin, Deputy
Director of the DOE/NNSA/Office of the Second Line of
Defense (SLD),completed successful installation, testing,
training and handover of radiation detection equipment to
screen incoming and outgoing cargo containers at the Port of
Rotterdam. This two-year project represents the first
installation of radiation detection equipment to combat
nuclear smuggling in Western Europe and at a world
"Megaport." Approximately 48% of containers shipped from
Rotterdam to the U.S. will now be screened for illicit
nuclear and radiological material. Extension of the project
to the rest of Rotterdam Port, covering an additional 45-50%
of U.S.-bound shipments, is expected by 2006, bringing the
total coverage to 93-98%. End Summary.

History
--------------


2. Rotterdam is the largest port in Europe, handling an
estimated 40% of all European shipments bound for the U.S.
through four dedicated terminals. In 2002, against a
background of growing concerns about international
terrorism, discussions began between the Dutch Ministry of
Finance and U.S. Department of Energy about installing U.S.
equipment at Rotterdam to prevent illicit trafficking in
nuclear and other radioactive materials (the DOE Second Line
of Defense Megaport Initiative). While the Dutch valued
improving port security and counterterrorism (CT) measures
in general, they had serious reservations about the
proposal: 1) EU accusations of creating an unfair
competitive edge for Rotterdam could arise as happened when
the Dutch were first to implement DHS/CBP Container Security
Initiative (CSI); 2) installation and operation of the
equipment would slow the flow of commerce; 3) operations
would require burdensome staff increases; 4) the political
climate in the Netherlands decried the perception of Dutch
being too ready to acquiesce to U.S. law enforcement and CT
requests; and 5) sharing information generated by the
equipment with the U.S. would violate Dutch and/or EU
privacy laws and standards.


3. Through close coordination among DOE, DHS/CBP CSI
office, Embassy The Hague, the Dutch Customs Service, and
Ministries of Finance, Health (VWS) and Environment (VROM),
each of these concerns were met and resolved. Technical,
staffing and operational concerns were allayed during a
visit to D.C. by the head of the Dutch Customs Service where
she was able to meet with experts and use simulation
equipment. The parties agreed to a compromise creating
limited phases of the project and allowing Dutch ownership
and control over all but the start-up phase where U.S.
expertise and training was most critical. The Dutch agreed
to accept DOE equipment, installation and training for one
key Port terminal and to equip the remainder of the Port at
their own expense through EU bid processes drawing on
experience and knowledge gained from the U.S. installations.
Calling the project the "Brinker Project" and emphasizing
local CT protections also encouraged Dutch buy-in.


4. On August 13, 2003, U.S. Secretary of Energy Abraham and
Dutch State Secretary of Finance Joop Wijn signed a Mutual
Declaration of Principles ("MDP") reflecting the agreement
and allowing closer cooperation between the two countries.

Information Sharing and CSI Plus
--------------


5. The installed radiation detection systems will allow
Dutch Customs to target for search, detect and interdict
illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials.
U.S. DHS CBP, already in place in Rotterdam for CSI, wanted
notification of all alarms and seizures of nuclear or
radioactive materials made with this equipment. To meet
concerns about information sharing standards, the MDP refers
to established agreements to which the U.S. and Netherlands
are signatories: the Agreement between the European
Community and the United States of America on Customs
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters of 28
May 1997 and the Agreement on Mutual Administrative
Assistance for the Proper Application of Customs Law and for
the Prevention, Investigation and Combating of Customs
Offenses between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the
United States of America of 28 October 1996. These
agreements were sufficient to get the Dutch to allow the CSI
Team in Rotterdam to be notified in near-real-time of
containers entering or exiting the Port that cause a
radiation alarm.
Construction Summary
--------------


6. On September 12, 2003, the engineering work began to
equip the ECT Delta Terminal in the Maasvlakte (the largest
of Rotterdam's four terminals which ships an estimated 87%
of all of Rotterdam's U.S.-destined cargo) with four monitor
control points. This terminal handles 2.5 million TEUs/year
of container throughput. After local authority review of
the designs and permitting, construction began on November
19, 2003. By early February 2004, three of the four control
points had been equipped and tests began on the sensors
themselves to establish functionality and the baseline for
types of normal cargo (ceramic tile, fertilizer, etc.)
causing alarms because of naturally occurring radiation. In
late February and March, the communication system to alert
officials offsite of alarms was installed, tested and
upgraded. By mid-April 2004, all four sites in the ECT
Delta Terminal were functioning and had been tested allowing
turnover to the Dutch Government on April 21, 2004.

Training
--------------


7. The U.S. provided three training classes to 50 Dutch
Customs officers at the HAMMER Facility in Richland,
Washington as well as ad hoc training on the equipment at
the Port. Members of the Environment Ministry (VROM) also
participated in the training. Dutch Customs officers were
required by VROM to be tested for their proficiency in basic
radiation health and safety before traveling to the United
States. The Dutch organized their own ongoing training
program as well as "Red-Team" systems tests to keep their
response officers proficient. Response procedures for
discovery of illicit materials specific to the Netherlands
were developed with input from DOE, Dutch Customs, VROM and
the Ministry of Health.

Follow-On
--------------


8. The Dutch are proceeding to procure equipment,
architectural and engineering services, and communications
systems and services to equip the rest of Rotterdam Port
with similar radiation detection systems. An estimated 31
additional radiation detection portal monitor sets will be
procured and installed under this project. Dutch Customs
estimates the project will continue until the end of 2006.
An ongoing dialogue on training issues, consultations about
equipment specifications with Los Alamos National Laboratory
radiation detector expert Dr. Rob York, and general nuclear
smuggling issues will continue. DOE and Embassy The Hague
continue to work with the Dutch as they develop equipment
specifications to ensure efficacy in detection and
compatibility with American monitoring standards.


9. Private and official representatives of other countries
- French, Belgian, Russian, Canadian, Germans and British -
have recently visited Rotterdam to view the equipment in
action and are considering developing similar systems to
protect their own boundaries.

Lessons Learned
--------------


10. While at times Dutch concerns seemed insurmountable,
acceptable compromises were reached through constant and
open communication. For posts that may be engaged in
similar land or water border protection projects, we offer
the follow tips:

-- Engage the host nation at several levels from the
Ambassador down to the working level and maintain that
engagement in order to ensure that bureaucratic
concerns/impediments are understood and dealt with and that
a high level of focus on the project is sustained to
completion.

-- Look seriously at broader regional considerations of
importance to the host country, such as EU regulations and
directives.

-- Seeing and touching real equipment and speaking with
actual operators and analysts made all the difference in
resolving technical and staffing concerns. After seeing
actual monitors, viewing computer simulations of alarm data
and talking with designers and technicians in D.C., the Head
of Dutch Customs said the radiation detection monitors were
as simple as airport magnetometers for passengers and
baggage. Her concerns of staffing needs and inspection and
alarm obstructions to flow of trade were allayed.

-- The training provided in the U.S. for Dutch staff was
extremely valuable in making the staff comfortable with the
equipment and appreciative of its capabilities. Initial
plans were to send only 2 officials for training at U.S.
cost. After seeing its value, the Dutch sent an additional
48 on training with U.S.-Dutch cost sharing.

-- The project only succeeded because the Dutch understood
the mutual benefit of protecting all our borders from
illicit trafficking in radiological material. This is the
key to starting any discussion. After that point, Dutch
ownership of the project - from giving the project a Dutch
name to designing a Dutch controlled and financed phase-in
schedule for the balance of the port - met Dutch needs to
manage port security on their terms.

SOBEL