Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE1224
2004-05-19 12:54:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) - IRANIAN

Tags:  PARM AORC IR OPCW CWC CBM 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 THE HAGUE 001224 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR AC/CB, VC/CCB, AND NEA/NGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2014
TAGS: PARM AORC IR OPCW CWC CBM
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) - IRANIAN
ANSWERS TO U.S. QUESTIONS

REF: A. A) THE HAGUE 812

B. B) STATE 59960

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits, Permanent Representative to t
he OPCW. Reasons: 1.5 (B, D).

This is CWC-62-04.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 THE HAGUE 001224

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR AC/CB, VC/CCB, AND NEA/NGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2014
TAGS: PARM AORC IR OPCW CWC CBM
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) - IRANIAN
ANSWERS TO U.S. QUESTIONS

REF: A. A) THE HAGUE 812

B. B) STATE 59960

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits, Permanent Representative to t
he OPCW. Reasons: 1.5 (B, D).

This is CWC-62-04.


1. (C) On May 17, Gholamhossein Dehghani and S. Ali
Mohammad Mousavi of the Iranian delegation to the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons met with
the U.S. delegation to provide Tehran's answers to the U.S.
questions passed to the Iranian delegates on the margins of
the March 23-26 Executive Council session. Dehghani noted
that Tehran included some questions of its own for the U.S.
and welcomed a U.S. reply in the near future. The U.S.
questions, Iranian answers, and Iranian questions have been
E-mailed and DHLed to AC/CB:


2. (S) Begin text.

Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Duinweg 24, The Hague

In the Name of God

17 May 2004

Ambassador Eric M. Javits
United States Permanent Representative to the OPCW

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

In response to your letter dated 19 March 2004, regarding
U.S. queries about Iran's CWC declarations, please find
attached the responses recently received from the National
Authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The answer to
each question posed has been written in italic under each
question. I hope this supplementary clarification, would
suffice to alleviate U.S. concerns about Iran's CWC
Declarations.

In a separate section (VII),authorities in Tehran, seeking
U.S.'s clarification to resolve some matters of concern to
the I.R of Iran, have raised some compliance-related
questions from your government.

Looking forward to receive your government's responses to our
requested clarification and questions.

Yours sincerely,
Hossein Panahi Azar
Ambassador and Permanent Representative
Of I.R. Iran to OPCW

Enclosure: As attached

RESPONSE BY THE I.R. OF IRAN TO QUESTIONS BY THE U.S.


I. Undeclared CW Stocks and Storage Facilities

Q: Iran has acknowledged the existence of a past chemical

weapons (CW) program and the production of chemical weapons.
Iran declared that its past production - amounting to 20
metric tons of sulfur mustard and four metric tons of
nitrogen mustard agent - was destroyed before the CWC entered
into force (EIF). States Parties to the CWC are obligated to
submit declarations associated with the possession of CW
stockpiles not later than 30 days after entry into force of
the Convention. In the "A-2 Form" submitted in 2001, Iran
claimed that it did not possess any CW. In order to
alleviate continuing U.S. concerns about Iranian CW-related
activities, provision of additional information is thus
important. We therefore request that Iran provide
clarification regarding the stockpiling and disposition of
its chemical weapons stocks, including:

A: As it has been stated in initial declaration (1999) Iran
has produced 20 MT of Sulfur mustard and 4 MT of Nitrogen
Mustard, and destroyed them all before EIF. Iran does not
possess any CW as declared in A2 form. In the spirit of
cooperation with member states responses to the questions are
as follows

Q: Where were Iranian CW stocks located, how were they
stored and during what time periods?

A: Sulfur Mustard was stored in Imam Hossein facility since
the beginning of its production in September 1987 till the
deactivation of that facility in 1988 then the stocks were
transferred to Ali Abad facility for safety reasons. As it
was necessary to destroy these chemicals through
hydrolization using the same equipment in Imam Hossein
facility, those chemicals were transferred back to Imam
Hossein facility in several stages.

Nitrogen Mustard was stored in Ali Abad facility since its
production (1987) till end of its destruction (Feb. 1991)

The produced chemical agents had been stored in barrels.

Q: When, where, and how did Iran dispose of its CW stocks to
include its declared 24 metric tons of chemical weapons agent?

A: The time period for the destruction of the chemical agent
produced in Imam Hossein facility was from Sep. 1991 till
Feb. 1992. Sulfur Mustard agent was destroyed through
hydrolization and the wastes were poured into a well in Ali
Abad area.

The period of destruction of the chemical agent (Nitrogen
Mustard produced in Ali Abad facility was from September 1990
till February 1991. Nitrogen Mustard was destroyed in Ali
Abad area through neutralization using Calcium Hypochloride.

Q: Which part (or parts) of the Iranian government was
responsible for the destruction of Iran's chemical weapons
stockpile?

A: CW stockpiles were destroyed by MoD.

Q: Who was responsible for procuring precursor chemicals?
Handling and maintaining CW stockpiles and/or munitions?

A: Procurement of precursors was carried out by former
Ministry of Sepah and MoD.

With regard to munitions it should be stated that the CW
agents were never weaponized.

Q: The United States recognizes that Iran is not formally
obligated under the CWC to provide some of the information
requested above in its initial declarations. However, our
concerns about the fundamental issue of how much CW agent
Iran produced and stockpiled are quite acute, and our request
for information is entirely consistent with Article IX of the
CWC, which encourages States Parties to "resolve, through
exchange of information and consultations among themselves,
any matter which may cause doubt about compliance with this
Convention." The United States has provided similar
questions and requests for information to other States
Parties, which in many cases have led to the successful
resolution of our compliance concerns.

A: The Islamic Republic of Iran hopes that these
consultations would address the existing concerns completely.

II. Inaccurate Declaration of Chemical Weapons Production
Facilities

Q: The United States has concerns that Iran's declaration of
its chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) does not
accurately reflect the activities conducted at these
facilities. Iran identified two CWPFs in its declaration.

In 2002, Iran informed the United States that CW activities
at the Imam Hossein and Ali Abad facilities ceased in 1988,
and that the buildings were sealed until 1999 when - in the
presence of OPCW inspectors - the buildings were completely
destroyed. In your declaration regarding the Imam Hossein
facility, however, Iran indicates that the Imam Hossein
facility was dismantled and destroyed in June 1992 and the
Ali Abad facility in January 1992. This contradictory
information raises questions about the accuracy of both
declarations.

Does Iran intend to amend its declaration by providing to the
OPCW Technical Secretariat the precise dates of destruction
of these two facilities? The United States encourages Iran
to clear up this discrepancy between the two dates of when
destruction was completed.

A: The dates provided in initial declarations are accurate
and for following reasons there is no need to amend them:
1- Production activities of Imam Hossein and Ali Abad
facilities ceased in 1988 and equipment dismantled by cutting
pipes, separating pumps, reactors and other equipment in

1992. This method was named under paragraph 19 of CWP2.1
forms of declaration of these facilities as "destruction",
however the complete destruction of the building and
equipment was carried out at the presence of the OPCW
inspectors in 1999;
2- Deactivated facilities were sealed from EIF for the I.R.
of Iran till the date of complete destruction in 1999;
3- Imam Hossein facility's equipment was transferred to Ali
Abad facility. They were destroyed completely in Ali Abad
facility at the presence of the OPCW inspectors in 1999.

As it has been mentioned in declarations, the destruction of
facilities in 1992 means; dismantling of equipment,
separation of pumps and reactors and cutting pipes which has
been verified by the OPCW inspectors.

Q: Can Iran explain in its response to U.S. questions what
is meant by the term "closed and sealed?" What kind of
activities occurred at the Imam Hossein and Ali Abad
facilities between 1992 and 1999?

A: "closed and sealed" means that the equipment was removed
from the building of Imam Hossein facility in 1992, and the
evacuated building after decontamination remained
deactivated, and from EIF for the I.R. of Iran till 1999 it
was sealed and was not used at all.

Ali Abad CWPF has been closed (deactivated) from 1992 till
the EIF for the I.R. of Iran and since then till 1999, the
building was closed and sealed and not used at all.

Q: The United States believe that some buildings and/or
structures directly connected to the Ali Abad facility may
have been associated with CW activity, but were not declared.
Can Iran please clarify the past and current use and purpose
of other such buildings that are adjacent to the Ali Abad
facility, and why they were not declared? Additionally,
there is information indicating that after the United States
first inquired about these other buildings in 2001, Iran
conducted dismantlement activities at these locations. Can
Iran please provide a list of the buildings dismantled and
explain the nature of activities that occurred at these
facilities?

A: All buildings related to Ali Abad CWPF (including
production and utility buildings) were destroyed at the
presence of the OPCW inspectors. Adjacent buildings to Ali
Abad facility were being used for producing an inorganic
chemical. This factory was never involved in any activity
related to the declared Ali Abad CWPF or precursors for CW.
Therefore there was no obligation to declare it.

The DG and OPCW inspectors were also granted access to this
factory while inspecting Ali Abad.

This factory for not having economic justification was closed
down in 2002 and its equipment was dismantled. It is
intended to use the area (which is a historical place) for
non-productive purposes.

Q: In our efforts to further clarify our concerns in this
area, the U.S. requested Iranian authorization to allow the
OPCW Technical Secretariat to release inspection reports on
these facilities. In the 2002 response to this request, Iran
stipulated its readiness to act in accordance with the
provisions of the Convention. In the spirit of cooperation,
and the right under Article IX (2) to arrange by mutual
consent any procedures to clarify and resolve any matter
which may cause doubt about compliance, the United States
would therefore like Iran to authorize the TS to permit the
United States to view inspection reports for these
facilities. This step may help allay some of our concerns.

A: The I.R. of Iran will consider release of inspection
reports on these facilities.

III. Ministry of Defense Production of Scheduled Chemicals

Q: The Iranian Ministry of Defense (MOD) controls the
declared Schedule 3 facility at Raja Shimi, the Discrete
Organic Chemical (DOC) facility at Sadr Shimi. In 2002, Iran
informed the United States that the Ministry of Defense (MOD)
carried out civilian projects where the private sector had
not taken the lead. Iran further stated that it was pursuing
privatization of these facilities.
The U.S. is concerned that these facilities remain
subordinate to the Ministry of Defense (MOD),are located on
military installations, and seem suitable for the production
of toxic chemicals for CW purposes.

-- If the purpose of the facilities described above is purely
commercial, why do they remain on military installations
under the control of the Ministry of Defense?

A: The Ministry of Defense has expressed its readiness to
transfer the ownership of these facilities to private sector
in accordance with the governments privatization policy.
Q: What scheduled or other chemicals have been or are
planned to be produced for use in these facilities?

A: Raw materials for Raja Shimi are TMP and PCL3 which are
produced in the same factories but the raw materials for Sadr
Shimi are not produced in this facility.

Q: If scheduled or other chemicals have been or are being
procured for use in these facilities, what are they being
used to produce?

A: Raja Shimi factories produce Glyphosate and Sadr Shimi
factories produce Fungicides, especially Mancozeb, Zineb, and
Maneb.

Q: If products are produced at these facilities, what are
the markets for the products produced, and what are the
quantities sold or distributed?

A: All Sadr Shimi products are purchased by Ministry of
Agriculture. Raja Shimi also has sale contract with the same
Ministry.

Q: Does Iran intend to privatize or transfer ownership of
these facilities? If so, when and under what conditions?

A: Answer to this question is positive and the explanation
was provided before.

Q: We continue to seek the precise location and number of
plants that are declared at Raja Shimi and Sadr Shimi as
required by Part VIII, paragraphs 6 and 7, of the
Verification Annex. In Iran's declaration, there is no
specific latitude and longitude, or address provided. Can
Iran please provide this information as required by the
Convention?

A: According to the provisions of the Convention, there is
no obligation to provide geographical coordinates for such
facilities. However, the address of Raja Shimi is:
Thehran Province, Shahriar, Bidgeneh village, Raja Shimi
Industrial Factories (approximately 35 kilometers to the west
of Tehran). This address has been quoted in the declaration
and verified by the OPCW inspectors.

The address for Sadr Shimi is: Fars Province, Km. 20
Shiraz-Esfehan Rd., Sadr Shimi Industrial Factories. This
address has been quoted in the declaration.

There are 3 plants in Raja Shimi Plant Site that 2 of them
have been declared and 1 plant yet falls below the declarable
threshold and there is only 1 declared plant in Sadr Shimi
Plant Site.

Q: Does the Ministry of Defense Control any other facilities
for the production of scheduled or other organic chemicals?
If yes, please indicate the location and chemicals produced.

A: Ministry of Defense has no scheduled chemicals and
declarable DOC production facilities other than what has been
declared.

IV. Transfer of Specialized Equipment for the Production of
Chemical Weapons

Q: In 2002 Iran informed the United States that all
"specialized" equipment located at the Imam Hossein CWPF was
dismantled and transferred to the Ali Abad CWPF, where it was
checked by the OPCW inspectors and destroyed in their
presence.

-- When did this transfer from Imam Hossein to Ali Abad take
place?

A: Dismantled equipment of Imam Hossein facility was
transferred to Ali Abad facility in 1992.

Q: Can Iran explain why was it necessary to transfer such
equipment to Ali Abad if (1) both Ali Abad and Imam Hossein
ceased activities in 1988; and (2) both such facilities were
dismantled, decontaminated, and remained closed and sealed
until 1999?

A: Imam Hossein facility was located in a private land and
therefore dismantled equipment could not remain there,
specifically despite the decontamination of the equipment,
there was a risk of remaining pollution. Thus for safety
reasons it was necessary to transfer them to Ali Abad
facility which belonged to military sector.

Q: Why did Iran not use OPCW inspectors to verify the
destruction of the specialized equipment while it was still
located at the Imam Hossein facility?

A: The US is reminded that the OPCW was not established in
1992, therefore presence of the OPCW inspectors to verify the
destruction of equipment (as defined before) is out of
question.


V. Production of Chemical Weapons Precursors for CW Purposes

Q: Iran has not fully satisfied its obligations to declare
production of the precursors it used to make chemical
weapons. Iran indicated in its initial CWC declaration that
it at one point produced chemical weapons (nitrogen mustard)
at the Ali Abad CWPF using thionyl chloride, a schedule 3
chemical. Iran later informed the United States that the CW
precursors used for producing nitrogen mustard were obtained
from the "domestic market," even though Iran declared no
associated thionyl chloride production facility.

The Convention, in Part VIII (A),paragraph 9 of the
Verification Annex, states that each State Party shall, not
later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force for
it, declare all plant sites comprising plants that produced
at any time since 1 January 1946 a Schedule 3 chemical for
chemical weapons purposes. Therefore, production and use of
thionyl chloride in Iran, used in the production of nitrogen
mustard must be declared, along with the associated plant
sites used for thionyl chloride production.

-- To date, we have not received any indication that Iran
declared a facility for thionyl chloride production as
required under VIII (A) paragraph 9, nor provided the
subsequent information required in paragraph 10 of the
Verification Annex.

A: Thyonil Chloride has never been produced in Iran,
therefore there has not been any facility to be declared
under Paras. 9 and 10 of Section A of Part VIII of the
Verification Annex.

Q: We would like Iran to provide more specific information
about the thionyl chloride in question. How much was used to
make CW? Where did it come from? Was it produced by a
government-owned facility or by a commercial facility? Was it
purchased directly or through an agent or distributor?

A: Approximately thirteen MT of Thyonil Chloride was
consumed for production of four MT of Nitrogen Mustard. This
amount was purchased from a domestic importing trader.

Q: Why has Iran not declared a thionyl chloride production
facility? If this was omitted, when does Iran plan to amend
its declaration?

A: As stated before there has been no Thionyl Chloride
production facility in Iran.

VI. Production of Nerve Agent

Q: Iran has marketed itself as a world leader in the
development of individual protective equipment and chemical
sensors for the detection of chemical agents, including nerve
agents. This has been advertised in open literature and
catalogs published by Iran. Marketing materials from the
Iranian Special Industries Group advertise products said to
be effective against nerve agents. Iran has declared a
facility for producing Schedule 1 chemicals for purposes not
prohibited under the CWC, but the declaration covers the
production of sulfur mustard, not nerve agents.

-- In order for Iran's claims about protective equipment to
be credible, such products would seem to require actual
testing with nerve agent in order to validate performance.
How are such protective items tested and, if nerve agent was
used for this purpose, where was this nerve agent produced,
and what is the present this position of the nerve agent?
How much nerve agent was produced/spent in testing/remains?

-- Declaration of the production of Schedule 1 chemicals for
protective purposes is required under Part VI, section D, of
the Verification Annex.

A: The Islamic Republic of Iran has never marketed itself as
a world leader in development of IPE and chemical sensors,
but considers itself as the biggest victim of chemical
weapons. Those parts of protective equipment products which
require testing with nerve agent are tested by simulants,
including DMMP according to existing standards which are
mainly based on military standards which are also observed by
the US. This was verified by the OPCW inspectors in 2002 and
2003 inspections at Iran's Other Facility. The need to
synthesize new agents is declared in the Anticipated
Declaration.

Notwithstanding the I.R. of Iran, despite being the first
victim of extensive application of nerve agent in the world,
never produced and stockpiled any nerve agent. We hope with
this clarification and in the spirit of cooperation under
article IX of the CWC this issue is not propagated in future.

VII: Questions to the US

The Islamic Republic of Iran is concerned that CW stockpiles
by possessor states, are not timely, according to the CWC
destroyed. The fact that the US will not be able to fulfill
its commitment under the CWC to destroy all of its CW
stockpiles within the time line envisaged by the Convention,
is a great source of concern. Therefore we would like the US
to clarify the following questions by providing adequate
information:

- I.R. of Iran has concern that declarations of the US on its
CW activities do not accurately reflect the factual status,
in particular with regards to declarations and verification
of the destruction of its CW stocks. Could the US please
provide the information on the latest development regarding
the destruction of each of the remaining CW, including the
future time schedules and detailed plans for complete
destruction?

- According to the decisions taken by the EC and CSPs of the
OPCW, the I.R. of Iran is aware of the requests by some
States Parties for the extension of the deadline for
destruction of CW mainly due to financial or other
constrains. The I.R. of Iran joined consensus to grant
extension of the deadline for the US, despite ambiguities
about the real justification of such a request by the US as
reflected in our intervention at the EC at the time, with the
expectation of receiving well justified clarification in due
course. Does the US intend to retain such stocks for
inter-alia; security, deterring and defensive purposes?

- As far as we know the US has had extensive program for
production of binary CW. According to the US annual
destruction plan 1997-2002 submitted to the OPCW, the US has
not fully satisfied its obligation to destroy its Binary
Components and after several times of postponing these
destructions, has announced that it would expect to destroy
all Binary Components by April 2007. This would be a matter
of concern. We would like to know which kind of plans the US
has for the fulfillment of its obligations under the CWC for
the destruction of binary/multi component CW? Could the US
provide us the detail technical information on destiny of the
key-components?

- To the best of our knowledge the US has not yet provided
complete information on carriers and launchers which were
planned to be used for its CW program. Could the US provide
such information and the plan for their destruction?
- It is known that the US has programs for production of
non-lethal weapons, including anti-plant, riot control and
anti-terrorism and the same for novel agents. Could the US
provide information in this regard and specify legitimacy of
such programs under the CWC and its other international
undertakings? If such program exist which part of the US
government is in charge of it and what production facilities
are involved?

- Based on our information the US has actively used toxic
chemicals in covert operations in the past. Could the US
please inform the I.R. of Iran of its past CW offensive
activities including covert operations using CW? We wonder
if the use of the use of toxic chemicals in such operations
is still in the agenda of the US National Security plans?
- Would the US please provide a list of schedule and discrete
organic chemicals, which are produced or ordered by MoD or
military sector and their inspection reports, if any?

- We have found that paragraphs (b) of Sec. 229, (a) of Sec.
302, (a) of Sec. 303, (f)(1) Sec. 304, (b)(2)(E) of Sec. 305,
(c)(f) of Sec. 404 of the US National Legislation are
inconsistent with paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article I and
paragraphs 21 to 34 and 58 of part II, para. 12 of part X, 22
of part VII, 51 of part VIII, 12 of part IX of the
Verification Annex and paragraph 4 of Annex on
Confidentiality of the CWC. Could the US set a date to amend

SIPDIS
its legislation to render it consistent with the CWC
obligations?

- Would the US allow the TS to provide the latest copy of the
reports of inspections carried out in the US's schedule 1
production facilities to the I.R. of Iran?

- Furthermore taking into account that the US has exported
scheduled chemicals to the Middle East, would the US please
provide a list of export of schedule 1 chemicals and their
precursors to other countries (specially Iraq and Israel)
since 1980 onward.

END TEXT.


3. (U) Javits sends.
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