Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04TELAVIV6658
2004-12-30 12:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

SNAPSHOT OF A BORDER CROSSING AND HOPES THAT ABU

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 006658 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2009
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG GZ IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: SNAPSHOT OF A BORDER CROSSING AND HOPES THAT ABU
MAZEN WILL BRING IMPROVEMENT


Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 006658

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2009
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG GZ IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: SNAPSHOT OF A BORDER CROSSING AND HOPES THAT ABU
MAZEN WILL BRING IMPROVEMENT


Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Gaza-based NYT stringer Taghreed el-Khodary
told the Ambassador December 22 that Gazans are even more
interested in having Abu Mazen elected than are West Bank
Palestinians -- not from any great love of Abu Mazen, but
rather from the positive experience they remember from his
brief tenure in 2003. Hamas, according to el-Khodary, will
hold out for a mutual cease-fire with Israel and for
positions in any post-election PA as its price for halting
attacks. Other militant groups would be inclined to cease
attacks if the PA offers them jobs, most likely in the
security structures. If not brought in to the governing
structures in a manner it considers sufficient, Hamas members
with whom el-Khodary has spoken told her they "will turn (the
situation) into hell." El-Khodary said she believes that if
Hamas is actually brought into the government, however, "they
will behave." After an almost seven-hour ordeal at Erez as
she tried to cross into Israel, el-Khodary said that she had
witnessed firsthand the anger of average Palestinians -- the
citizenry and the PA security personnel -- at both the
treatment they receive at the hands of the Israeli soldiers
and what she termed the arrogance demonstrated by PA
officials who "breeze through" the checkpoints ahead of sick
people who wait hours to cross into Israel for medical
treatment. End Summary.

--------------
Erez Crossing
--------------


2. (SBU) In a meeting December 23, Gaza-based NYT stringer
Taghreed el-Khodary gave the Ambassador a snapshot of views
gathered during a time-consuming journey into Israel from
Gaza City via the Erez Crossing. El-Khodary's journey
through the Erez Crossing took a total of seven hours,
despite the Embassy's assistance and receipt of clearances in
advance from the IDF and the Office for Coordination and
General Administration in the Territories (COGAT).
El-Khodary characterized her trip as a learning experience,
where she experienced firsthand what the average Palestinian
-- of the few who are fortunate enough to receive a permit --

goes through in order to exit the Gaza Strip. The day began
at 0700 hours when el-Khodary received word that her permit
was approved; she was told to be at the crossing at 1000
hours to collect it and enter Israel. The permit was
eventually ready only at 1300 hours, after numerous phone
calls from the Embassy to spur issuance. In the interim,
el-Khodary cooled her heels at the Palestinian checkpoint
several hundred meters from the crossing area. She
eventually received her corrected permit -- the first one
authorized her travel to the wrong city on the wrong day --
at approximately 1630 hours.

-------------- --------------
Why Should I Protect Them When They Treat Me Like This?
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) El-Khodary said that as she waited, she chatted
with, among others, a PA security officer, who confessed to
being angry and humiliated with how the IDF soldiers that he
worked with daily treated him. Why should I protect them, he
said, when they show me no respect? One of these days, I
probably won't, he concluded. El-Khodary watched as PA
officials "breezed through" the crossing, leaving average
Palestinians -- some of whom were ill and had permits to
enter Israel that day for medical treatment -- languishing on
the Gaza side. The resentment was palpable, el-Khodary said,
particularly when only five of the 25 medical cases were
eventually allowed to cross, and then only near the end of
the day. The rest were told to go home and reapply to cross
another day. Both the GOI and the PA need to realize, she
commented, that they do themselves no favors in the eyes of
the population by giving PA officials preferential treatment.
The behavior of IDF soldiers is "turning moderates into
extremists," in el-Khodary's opinion.


4. (SBU) The Ambassador said that the GOI has plans to
transfer control over checkpoints to civilian companies after
disengagement, in order to address the current situation,
which he agreed is bad for both the soldiers and the
Palestinians. Progress on this and a host of other
disengagement-related issues will be easier after the
elections January 9 when, by all indications, the GOI and the
PA will be better able to work together directly rather than
in parallel through the World Bank.

-------------- -
High Expectations from an Abu Mazen Government
-------------- -


5. (SBU) Gazans, el-Khodary said, want Abu Mazen in power
even more than do West Bankers. Not that they like him all
that much, she added, but people in Gaza wistfully recalled
the "100 days" of Abu Mazen's 2003 premiership during which
there was a cease-fire and free passage through the Abu
Khouli checkpoint that divides Gaza in half just north of
Khan Yunis. Gazans want Abu Mazen to get more workers into
Israel or otherwise ensure jobs; that is concern number one,
according to el-Khodary. The Ambassador said that the United
States is ready and willing to work with Abu Mazen, but that
the USG should not be put in the position of acting as a
substitute for him. The fact that Abu Mazen has said openly
that Palestinians should turn away from guns is very good,
but he needs to take visible steps. No one is asking him to
go after militants right away, but it is imperative that the
immediate need for law and order be addressed. The
Ambassador noted that if Abu Mazen begins to address
security, even incrementally, Israeli officials have said
that they will refrain from assassinations of militant
leaders and hot pursuit attacks, with the exception of
freedom to go after so-called ticking bombs.


6. (C) The Ambassador said that United States has also
developed a package of proposals that it can rapidly deliver
to help the expected Abu Mazen government show results to the
Palestinian people in the first 90 days following the
election. These proposals are in addition to the larger
projects and budgetary support offered to the PA at the AHLC
meeting in Oslo earlier in December. While it will be
difficult to coax the GOI to commit to once again allow
Palestinian workers into Israel, the U.S. has pressed Israel
to keep an open mind on the subject, leaving open the
possibility of a more positive GOI position should some of
Abu Mazen's plans bear fruit.

--------------
And What About Hamas?
--------------


7. (C) El-Khodary, who has wide-ranging contacts among many
of the factions, said that Hamas wants to stop the attacks,
but is holding out for a mutual cease-fire with Israel as
well as positions (a "large piece of the cake," as el-Khodary
put it) in any post-election PA. Other militant groups, in
el-Khodary's opinion, would be inclined to cease attacks if
the PA would offer them jobs, most likely in the security
structures. Contacts in Hamas, el-Khodary said, have told
her that the organization, if not brought into the governing
structures in a manner it considers sufficient, "will turn
(the situation) into hell." El-Khodary conjectured that, if
Hamas is actually brought into the government, either through
elections or through appointments to ministries, "they will
behave."

--------------
International Observers
--------------


8. (SBU) El-Khodary questioned whether the international
community would send observers into Gaza post-disengagement,
either to deter conflicts or to investigate them afterwards.
The Ambassador cautioned that such efforts, although
well-intentioned, could easily go awry if, for example, the
observers were used by militants as cover from which to
launch attacks. Another problem, the Ambassador continued,
is that observers, by definition, do not have much authority
to take action beyond filing a report -- something that
experience in south Lebanon has shown loses its punch over
time.




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