Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04TELAVIV6387
2004-12-16 10:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

SHARON AND CODEL HAGEL/BIDEN: COMMITMENT TO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 006387 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2014
TAGS: PREL OREP PTER KPAL IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: SHARON AND CODEL HAGEL/BIDEN: COMMITMENT TO
WORKING WITH NEW PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP

Classified By: DCM Gene A. Cretz for reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 006387

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2014
TAGS: PREL OREP PTER KPAL IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: SHARON AND CODEL HAGEL/BIDEN: COMMITMENT TO
WORKING WITH NEW PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP

Classified By: DCM Gene A. Cretz for reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Sharon told Codel Hagel/Biden
that he was fully committed to making peace with the
post-Arafat Palestinian leadership, but that there would be
no compromise on holding the the new leadership accountable
for actions to combat the terrorist infrastructure. While
recognizing that Syria, Iran, and Hizbollah could undermine
the new leadership, Sharon nonetheless offered little by way
of understanding or sympathy toward the leadership's
challenge. Some in the Codel challenged Sharon to seize this
unique opportunity to help Israel (and the international
community) combat a major cause of international terrorism
(the Israeli-Palestinian dispute) and rising anti-Semitism.
Sharon reiterated concerns about Iran, thought Egypt could do
more against smuggling, lauded the bilateral relationship
with Jordan and argued that the USG should ratchet up
pressure against Syria to stop its support for Iran and
Hizbollah. The Prime Minister said that Israel was prepared
to take positive steps toward the new Palestinian leadership
after the elections and believed that Europe and others also
had important roles to play on the economic support front.
End Summary.


2. (C) Prime Minister Sharon led off his November 30 meeting
with Codel Hagel/Biden (accompanied by Charge) by asserting
that bilateral ties with the U.S. had never been stronger,
reflected best in close strategic cooperation. Acknowledging
he faced challenges on the internal political front, Sharon
nonetheless pledged that Israel was prepared to make genuine
compromises for real peace with the new Palestinian
leadership if that new order put a stop to terror. He was
fully committed to making peace despite major domestic
struggles characterized by a "left" which has no power and a
"right" which was totally opposed to his initiative. The PM
saw the current timeframe as a window of opportunity and
reiterated Israeli acceptance of all of President Bush's
initiatives and bilateral agreements over the past few years

regarding the future of the region. He noted that Israel had
not openly interfered with the process of choosing
presumptive Palestinian leaders and that secret contacts
continued. He asserted that Israel was prepared to help the
Palestinians through the elections and that open talks would
occur soon after. Sharon had no "personal" problems with Abu
Mazen or Abu Ala'a; everything depended on the steps they
would take against terror. As he did throughout the
discussion, Sharon noted the dangers presented "from the
outside" by the Iran/Syria/Hizbollah nexus and the impact it
could have on the future, despite the best of Palestinian
intentions and potential actions.


3. (C) In response to a Codel member's comment that progress
towards Israeli-Palestinian peace would have a dramatic
impact on ending regional and international terrorism, Sharon
quickly stated that Israel should not be held responsible for
terrorism, asserting that it was the target of terror even
prior to June 1967. It was not correct to believe that
terror would disappear if the Israeli-Palestinian dispute
were solved. The only thing that Israel was "responsible"
for, he maintained, was defending its people. Sharon went on
to defend Israel's actions saying that there would have been
more progress on the roadmap had there been a Palestinian
partner. Now, with Arafat's passing, a new opportunity had
arisen to implement the alternative Gaza disengagement with
cooperation with the Palestinian Authority. Sharon could now
envision cooperation between the security services against
terror and cooperation to ensure that the Israeli population
move from the West Bank settlements and Gaza did not take
place under fire. Sharon asserted that with the tens of
thousands of armed people under the Palestinian Authority,
they should be able to do what they need to do to oppose the
terrorism in their midst. Israel, in any case, will not bow
or give in to pressure. Subsequent to a successful Gaza
disengagement, the roadmap could be implemented in stages.


4. (C) On Iran, Sharon said the GOI watched the situation
closely and was in close touch with the EU and USG. Israel
did not have to lead the effort, it should be an
international one culminating in the UNSC. While monitoring
of Iranian nuclear facilities might postpone the timing of
weaponization, the Iranians continued "to work" and Tehran
had no desire to stop. While praising the efforts of the UK,
Germany, and France to craft the agreement with Iran, the PM
believed the matter needed to be brought to the UNSC. While
moderate Iranians may exist, the religious element was
overwhelming and the goal of the Iranian regime remained the
elimination of Israel and the destruction of the Jewish
people.


5. (C) Sharon warned of the continuing dangers posed by
Syria, Iran, and Hizbollah. A Hizbollah armed with 13,000
rockets, bolstered by a recalcitrant Syrian regime continuing
to support Iran and refusing to expel Hamas and PIJ
leaderships, made for a dangerous situation to which USG
pressure needed to be brought to bear. Sharon asserted that
most of the terrorism in the Palestinian territories was
carried out by the Tanzim on orders from Damascus or
Hizbollah. The situation has quieted down because Israel has
become more efficient, he said, but the danger continues.


6. (C) Regarding Egypt, Sharon said that Cairo could do more
to stop the smuggling of arms into Gaza, including anti-tank
rockets allegedly coming into the Sinai via Lebanon. The
Egyptians were doing more than before on that score but they
neglected the situation for so many years that the
well-developed smuggling routes went on. Neither Egypt nor
the Europeans had a role now to help in furthering
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. If
"balance" were needed the U.S. would provide it.


7. (C) Relations with Jordan were close, even strategic, said
Sharon. The Jordanians are active in acting against terror.
The bilateral cooperation was a direct result of how peace
had changed the situation.


8. (C) Senator Biden agreed that Sharon was now in a unique
position of leadership vis-a-vis his own government to help
Abu Mazen who faced two major problems: he lacked a natural
constituency and, by Sharon's own admission, he faced
external forces not of his doing that could undermine his
authority. Biden asserted that Sharon was well-placed to
help on the electoral process and on cooperation on Gaza
disengagement at a minimum to enhance Abu Mazen's
credibility. Biden also asked what the U.S. could do to
help. Sharon believed that Washington could help in
minimizing the external challenges to Abu Mazen by warning
Syria, Iran and Hizbollah to stop any actions that undermine
Abu Mazen. Damascus was feeling pressure already on Lebanon
and Iraq; that needed to be ratcheted up significantly to
make sure Assad got the point. Sharon also thought that the
international community should do its part by helping Abu
Mazen and Fayyad through infrastructure projects, not just
the provision of cash, which would "disappear." For its
part, Israel would help by continuing to be discreet in steps
it took in support of Abu Mazen before the election. Once
that election took place, Israel was ready to help on the
humanitarian side by lifting roadblocks and checkpoints (as
long as steps were taken against the movement of terrorists)
and in other cooperative agreements such as the one reached
between the two tourism ministers on cooperating for the
upcoming holiday season.


9. (C) Senator Feinstein told Sharon that he now had the
partner he had been seeking and needed to deal positively and
proactively with the new Palestinian leadership not only for
Israel's security sake, but to combat the rise of virulent
anti-Semitism in Europe. She also expressed the hope that
the USG should also be playing a more active role in pushing
the sides toward a solution. Sharon replied by asserting
that anti-Semitism attributed to Israeli actions is mere
cover and convenience. He noted that one easy step the
Palestinians could take now even before tackling the more
difficult task of dismantling the terrorist infrastructure
would be to stop the incitement against Israel.


10. (U) Codel staff cleared this message.

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