SHARON'S LIKUD REFERENDUM LIKELY TO STYMIE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 001953

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPAL IS GOI INTERNAL GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: SHARON'S LIKUD REFERENDUM LIKELY TO STYMIE
WITHDRAWAL OPPONENTS

REF: A. TEL AVIV 1941


B. TEL AVIV 1906

C. TEL AVIV 1741

D. TEL AVIV 808

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer for reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: PM Sharon's decision to take his unilateral
disengagement plan to a referendum of the full 200,000-strong
Likud membership, a body more moderate than its leadership,
reinforces his hand in dealing with Likud and other-party
ministers and Knesset members who oppose withdrawal. The
action also staves off for the anticipated six-week
referendum preparation period any leftist or other demands
for visible action toward withdrawal, and leaves Sharon time
both to pursue USG assurances and to build a public relations
bulwark against possible indictment on bribery charges
(reftels). In the unlikely event that the Likud referendum
goes against his plan, Sharon will be able to say that he
made every effort to work for peace and security. If he wins
by a narrow margin, Sharon could put off both the immense
logistical challenge of settlement dismantlement by calling
for a national referendum, a process that would require new
legislation and would eat up additional months before the
first settler leaves Gaza. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Sharon's 14 Likud cabinet ministers and the remaining
nine other-party ministers are clearly divided, with
positions ranging from full support for withdrawal, to
support with major conditions attached, to solid opposition
(Ref C). Among Likud ministers and Knesset members, a solid
show of rank-and-file Likud support would be extraordinarily
difficult to ignore, as noted by Likud Education Minister and
withdrawal opponent Limor Livnat right after Sharon's
announcement of the party referendum.


3. (C) A Likud referendum also allows the rightist coalition
parties, the National Union and the National Religious Party,
to put off their threatened departures from the coalition,
and a pro-withdrawal vote could well prompt them to realize
that an ever more confident Sharon will be justifiably deaf
to their threats. Among Labor, such a Likud vote is likely
to convince at least some of the many skeptical rank and file
and party leaders that Sharon means business, thus providing
the political cover for a Likud/Labor unity government (Ref
A).


4. (C) Among the broader public, the referendum will likely
confirm polls showing widespread support for Gaza withdrawal
and solidify Sharon's reputation as the only Israeli leader
capable of taking such a step. Observers say those points
are likely to be factors in both Attorney General Mazuz's
possible indictment considerations, and the public's support
for even a corruption-tainted prime minister (Refs B and C).
An opinion poll published March 31 by the major daily
"Yedioth Ahronoth," and a separate internal Likud survey both
show that, even before any Sharon public relations campaign,
51 percent of Likud members who would take part in the
referendum would support his disengagement plan.


5. (C) Sharon need be in no hurry to finalize a withdrawal
plan, although he will need to manage the "outcomes" of his
visit to Washington in mid-April. The acts of negotiating
with Washington and conducting broad-based referenda maintain
him in the public eye as an engaged, strong, confident
leader, and dissipate pressure to address the bribery
allegations, both those of the Greek island affair, for which
the state attorney has recommended indictment, and those in
the parallel Cyril Kern affair that await state attorney
recommendations. They also allow him to put off both the
immensely difficult logistical task of actually withdrawing
from settlements, and his possibly even more difficult
ideological about-face from 37 years of hard-driving support
for settlements. Accordingly, Sharon could well determine
some months from now, once a Likud referendum is out of the
way, that he needs to go to a national referendum on
withdrawal as well, a process that would require new
legislation and eat up additional months before the first
settler leaves Gaza.

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