COMBATING RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM; USG-GOI DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001568

SIPDIS

UNVIE FOR IAEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2014
TAGS: PTER TSPL PARM IS COUNTERTERRORISM ISRAEL RELATIONS
SUBJECT: COMBATING RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM; USG-GOI DISCUSS
JOINT ACTIVITIES

REF: 03 TEL AVIV 7234

Classified By: DCM Richard LeBaron for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) U.S. and Israeli delegations discussed efforts to
combat radiological terrorism during February 24-25 talks
held in Israel. The parties reviewed existing institutional
structures and technologies as well as strategy and
approaches for research, development, testing and evaluation.
Also discussed was the role of science and technology in
support of operational and public affairs challenges in
responding to a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) event.
The need to develop advanced technologies to detect RDD's and
respond to such an event was of paramount concern, as well as
the training of first responders and avoiding public panic.
Both sides agreed that an RDD event -- designed for mass
disruption rather than mass destruction -- could have
devastating economic and psychological impacts in excess of
direct damage to human health.


2. (C) Further collaboration on radiation detection,
dispersion modeling, performance standards, testing protocols
and unconventional explosive detection will be considered
under the umbrella of the Joint Counterterrorism Group
Working Group on Homeland Security. Israel is among few
countries undertaking serious research and development toward
combating an RDD event, and would be a logical USG partner
for further cooperation. End Summary.


3. (C) The USG delegation was led by Robert Harward,
Director for Strategy and Defense Issues, Office of Combating
Terrorism, NSC, and Dr. Holly Dockery, Director of
International Affairs, Science and Technology Directorate,
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It included officials
from DHS, the Department of Energy (DOE),National Institutes
of Standards and Technology (NIST),and Embassy Tel Aviv
ESTHoff. The Israeli delegation was led by Gideon Shavit,
Director of External Relations, Israel Atomic Energy
Commission (IAEC),and included officials from the IAEC,
Ministry of Defense, National Security Council, Israeli
Police, Ministry of Environment, Israeli Security Agency,
Israeli Defense Forces, and Israeli Institute of Biological
Research.

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WORKSHOP FOCUS ON S&T ROLE IN RDD EVENT
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4. (C) The meetings were held at the Soreq Nuclear Research
Center outside of Tel Aviv, the centralized location in
Israel for radioactive detection capabilities (explosive
detection is centralized at Police/Israeli Security Agency
facilities, and chemical/biological detection at the Israeli
Institute of Biological Research). The parties reviewed
existing institutional structures for RDD detection and
management of an RDD event, and explained the results of
recent Table Top Exercises conducted to simulate responses to
such an event. The principal lessons learned included the
need to better train first responders, the development of
refined standards for decontamination ("how clean is
clean?"),and the public affairs challenges in preventing
panic and media frenzy. Additionally, the USG team
emphasized the need for science and technology
representatives to be engaged from the start in exercise
planning, and not just in assessing the performance of
existing technologies. This would optimize data collection
and evaluation of technological performance.

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GOI HIGHLIGHTS CARGO RISK TO CIVIL AVIATION
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5. (C) A session on aviation security reviewed the latest
systems and technologies in detecting RDD as well as other
explosive devices. Ram Arnon of the Israeli Security Agency
explained that the GOI is now moving to 100 percent physical
screening of cargo, a change from past practice of screening
based on profiling and the bill of lading. In Arnon's view,
given the stepped-up screening of passengers, the next large
aviation event is more likely to occur from cargo placed
aboard passenger jets. The U.S. delegation reviewed advances
in aviation security technologies, as well as new screening
systems and technologies being evaluated at the test bed of
the Port Authority of NY/NJ.

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CLEAN-UP STANDARDS: HOW CLEAN IS CLEAN?
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6. (C) On mitigation and decontamination issues, both
delegations reviewed existing standards both for permissible
radiation exposure to first responders as well as acceptable
levels for post event clean-up. The USG del explained our
policy that decontamination levels be considered on a
site-specific basis, with the guiding principle of attaining
as low a contamination level "as reasonably achievable"
(ALARA). DHS officials noted the importance of separating an
RDD event from normal environmental clean-up standard when
assessing proper decontamination levels. The GOI briefed the
US delegation on their new standards for acceptable dosage
limits for first responders, bringing them more into accord
with current international standards. These new limits
recognized the distinction between those applicable to
remedial action and those for life saving activities, the
latter having a higher threshold.

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS CHALLENGES
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7. (C) The IAEC gave an extensive briefing on public affairs
issues and working with the media, having recently held a
seminar on these issues with local media and other
policymakers. They emphasized the general lack of knowledge
in the public concerning RDD (and association with nuclear
devices),and the potential for media frenzy and panic. The
GOI is identifying and preparing a list of speakers to
address key issues and avoid a vacuum filled by "experts" who
might send an inappropriate message. Dr. Dockery indicated
that the GOI analysis dovetailed with the USG analysis,
although we have yet to hold a formal exercise on this issue.
Dockery noted that in the U.S., like Israel, public
attitudes about radiation are very backward, and emphasized
the need for a consistent and coordinated governmental
message should an event occur. She added that in many cases
of public disasters (e.g. earthquakes),the local media
outlets provide more helpful, practical advice to the public
than the national media, which tends to focus more on
dramatic visual images.

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FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES
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8. (C) The GOI del presented a proposal for follow-up
activities that included the following: table top exercise
on public affairs, a meeting on dispersion models, a USG
seminar to Israeli first responders, a follow-up meeting on
technologies for detection of illicit trafficking of
radioactive materials, a discussion of USG decontamination
doctrine and procedures, and mutual visits to exercises.
Dockery and Harward explained that certain of these issues
were beyond the purview of this delegation (comprised of S&T
officials),but that we would pass their suggestions on to
the appropriate offices and agencies. The USG would be
prepared to consider, however, certain follow-up under the
auspices of the Homeland Security Working Group of the JCG.
Specifically, we would look into the suggested follow-up on
dispersion models in association with an MOD-Department of
Defense meeting planned for April, as well as further
discussions concerning detection of unconventional
explosives. Additional areas of cooperation suggested by the
US del include linkages between explosives and RDD detection,
as well as the use of the Soreq testing facilities to conduct
joint experiments and testing of RDD devices.


9. (C) Comment. The meetings were useful and both
delegations accomplished internal goals. The GOI has for
some time expressed interest in establishing closer links
with civilian USG counterparts engaged in homeland security
issues. The Israelis view DHS as a newly established
counterpart in this respect, and this RDD meeting represents
an inroad into further collaboration. For the USG, there are
few countries which share the same risk profile concerning
RDD events and which are actively engaged in the R&D required
to combat this form of terrorism. Israel would be a logical
partner for increased collaboration given their interest and
technical expertise in this field.

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