Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04TELAVIV1353
2004-03-04 13:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN ENVOY LOOKS TO UPCOMING QUARTET MEETING TO

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 001353 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2009
TAGS: PREL KPAL RS XF IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT GOI EXTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ENVOY LOOKS TO UPCOMING QUARTET MEETING TO
COORDINATE VIEWS ON DISENGAGEMENT


Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 001353

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2009
TAGS: PREL KPAL RS XF IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT GOI EXTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ENVOY LOOKS TO UPCOMING QUARTET MEETING TO
COORDINATE VIEWS ON DISENGAGEMENT


Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (C) Russian Special Middle East Envoy Kalugin, just back
from a trip to Saudi Arabia, told the Ambassador March 3 that
the Saudis "made some nice noises" about working with Arab
League partners in an effort to recommit to the Beirut Arab
League declaration, the roadmap, UNSCR 1515 endorsing the
roadmap, and possibly even making reference to the Geneva
Initiative. As far as Kalugin knew, the Saudis were not yet
circulating a specific draft. Kalugin noted that his trip to
Saudi Arabia coincided with that of U/S Larson; Kalugin's
interlocutors told him that, while they were not opposed in
principle to the Greater Middle East Initiative, as briefed
to them by Larson, they sought greater clarity about how it
would be linked to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Kalugin,
who will be in Washington for the March 10 meeting of Quartet
envoys, indicated that he had been asked to stay on in the
U.S. to participate in the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister's
March 11-12 talks in preparation for the G-8 summit.


2. (C) Turning to Israeli plans for disengagement, Kalugin,
who was joined by Russian Ambassador Tarasov, catalogued a
number of questions that the GOR has about the mechanics of
and implications arising from Israeli evacuation of the Gaza
Strip. For example, would it be carried out in such a way
that it would not undermine final status negotiations and the
vision of two states, living side-by-side in peace and
security? Would there be any coordination with the
Palestinians? What would be the role of the Quartet? Adding
to these questions, Kalugin enumerated several that had been
posed to him by Palestinian Foreign Minister Sha'ath and
Negotiations Affairs Minister. Would it be a full or partial
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip? Would there be any linkage
to the West Bank? How would the border with Egypt be
secured? What would be the nature/scale of Israeli responses
to Hamas-perpetrated terror attacks? Would Israel be open to
consulting with the Palestinians on a schedule of
implementation? In addition, Sha'ath reportedly made clear
that he hoped the PA would be able to assume control of the
evacuated settlements "to use them for their purposes."
Erakat was said to claim that the PA was ready to assume
control of the Strip with "no problem."


3. (C) Ambassador Kurtzer pointed out that the United States
has posed to the GOI a number of questions -- many of them
quite similar to those that Kalugin articulated -- but that
they have not yet been fully answered. He took issue with
the underlying assumptions of some of the Palestinian
questions, however, commenting that the Israelis have made
clear their strong opposition to engaging in negotiations
with the Palestinians over Israel's unilateral moves, since
the impetus of unilateral disengagement was the absence of
progress on the negotiations track. In addition, the
Ambassador said, the Israelis are adamant that settlements
would not be handed over to the PA. Ambassador Tarasov
cautioned that the Israelis, too, needed to avoid unrealistic
expectations. The GOI should be interested in what happens
the day after they evacuate, and the process is going to
require some level of coordination with the Palestinians.
Otherwise, he warned, Israel risks creating chaos. Tarasov
and Kalugin made the case that these issues -- and the
possible Quartet role in dealing with them -- should be taken
up at the March 10 meeting of Quartet envoys. Noting that
various Quartet representatives, including UN envoy Terje
Larsen, have gone on record independently with reactions to
the Israeli plan, Tarasov argued that these positions should
be formally coordinated.

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