MINISTER OF DEFENSE REITERATES NO SHOOT-DOWN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000209

SIPDIS

STATE FOR P, INL, L/LEI, WHA, WHA/PPC, AND WHA/CEN
SOUTHCOM FOR GENERAL HILL
JIATF-S FOR RADM SIROIS
SECDEF FOR EFROTHINGHAM
NSC FOR JBJOSTAD
DOJ FOR MLWARREN AND DKOFFSKY
ONDCP FOR BCRANE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2014
TAGS: SNAR MOPS PINS PREL MCAP PINR HO
SUBJECT: MINISTER OF DEFENSE REITERATES NO SHOOT-DOWN
POLICY AND SHARES AIR DEFENSE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 203


B. TEGUCIGALPA 193

C. STATE 15961

D. TEGUCIGALPA 179

Classified By: Ambassador Larry Palmer;
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Minister of Defense (MOD) Frederico Breve
delivered a document to the Ambassador on January 27 which
explains the Honduran Air Force's (HAF) standard operating
procedures for intercepting intruding civil aircraft
violating Honduran airspace and the use of live ammunition,
including warning shots, against suspected narcotrafficking
aircraft or other suspect aircraft flying in Honduran
airspace. The Government of Honduras (GOH) also provided
copies of the incident reports for the 1/20 plane crash in
the department of Lempira. The MOD and the Chief of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff stated unequivocally, and in writing,
that the GOH has a strict policy of not shooting down civil
aircraft. Breve welcomed the possible visit of a U.S. team
to discuss air interdiction policy issues. He stated
forthrightly that the GOH has nothing to hide in this case.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) At a luncheon with the Ambassador on January 27
Minister of Defense (MOD) Frederico Breve delivered a
document to the Ambassador on January 27 which explains the
Honduran Air Force's (HAF) standard operating procedures for
intercepting intruding civil aircraft violating Honduran
airspace and the rules of engagement for the use of live
ammunition, including warning shots, against suspected
narcotrafficking aircraft or other suspect aircraft flying in
Honduran airspace. The GOH had provided on January 26 copies
of the incident reports for the 1/20 plane crash in the
department of Lempira, which will be reported septel. Breve
presented the information as a matter of fact and entertained
follow-up questions from the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of
Mission, USMILGP Commander and Defense Attache.


3. (C) The 2-page document, which is signed by General
Isaias Barahona, the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of
the Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF),explains HAF air defense
intercept policy and reiterates that the HAF has discarded
any procedure which would result in the firing on a civil
aircraft with the intention of shooting it down. The
document begins by explaining that the HAF uses the ICAO
international procedures for the interception of unidentified
aircraft. (Independently, the HAF Command Staff provided the
Embassy with the specific pages from the ICAO Annex A that
they use to signal intruding aircraft in Honduran airspace.)
The document then adds that the HAF has established standard
operating procedures (SOP) for this type of operation.


4. (C) According to the document, the HAF SOP employs a
series of established tasks from its First Air Defense
Squadron's Normal Operations Plan prior to a HAF aircraft
intercepting another aircraft. In Chapter B--The Procedure
for Unknown/Suspicious Aircraft, the SOP establishes the
following procedure (informal translation):


A. In the case of having to detain or having information
about unknown/suspicious aircraft. The Watch Officer in the
HAF Operations Center (aka COFAH) shall take the following
steps:


1. immediately shall inform the HAF General Command, the
Chief of the Air Force Staff (aka JEMGA),and the Commander
of the First Air Defense Squadron (aka PEDA),

2. shall place on alert all air bases or the air base on
stand-by alert according to its role, and

3. shall contact air control agencies about transiting
aircraft and flight plans in order to obtain information
about the aircraft.


B. In the case of issuing orders from the HAF General Command
for the take-off of interceptors, all necessary coordination
shall be done in order to provide tactical air control of the
intercepting aircraft within the air defense system.


C. If the unknown/suspicious aircraft proceeds towards
another neighboring country, the Watch Office in the COFAH
shall contact the respective operations center of that
country or the Liaison Officer and shall facilitate relevant
information about said aircraft, such as velocity, flight
path, altitude, time, actual position, and characteristics of
the aircraft, if there was a visual identification.


D. In the case of the interception of the unknown/suspicious
aircraft, the Watch Officer shall give this information to
the appropriate DEA agent, according to the list of names
provided and to the U.S. Air Force Area Mission Chief.


5. (C) The document explains further "during their execution
of an interception, the air crews will faithfully observe the
regulations established by the ICAO Annex 2 and the HAF's air
regulations manual." Only after completing all of the ICAO
signals and procedures, the document states, may the air
crews consider, in consultation with the COFAH, the option of
firing warning shots from along side of (parallel to) the
intruding aircraft without putting at risk either the life or
safety of the occupants of the intruding aircraft.

6 (C) Finally, the document closes with a series of
observations and policy statements. First it notes that the
actual violations of Honduran airspace are not coming from
other States and are incompatible with civil aviation norms,
such as drug-trafficking and other illicit flights without
corresponding flight plans. It says that, given this
situation, Honduran pilots are obliged to make visual
contact, to comply with all established procedures, and to
try to visually check, if possible, if the illicit aircraft
is carrying cargo. The document further explains it is
important to emphasize that these intruding aircraft are not
on commercial routes but on routes that are utilized by
drug-trafficking aircraft as identified by JIATF, which
through its intelligence systems has been able to define a
very constant pattern to the routes being used by
drug-trafficking aircraft.


7. (C) The closing paragraph states that the GOH has
discarded any policy of opening fire with the intention of
shooting down an illicit aircraft. It reaffirms that the
policy of the HOAF high command is based on the agreement
between our two nations to confront drug trafficking. The
last sentence maintains the right of the State of Honduras to
protect its security in the face of a threat from an illicit
flight connected to international terrorism.


8. (S) COMMENT: This document tracks closely other
conversations with HAF base commanders and pilots and cites
specific confidential HAF SOPs. Breve welcomed the possible
visit of a U.S. team to discuss air interdiction policy
issues. He stated forthrightly that the GOH has nothing to
hide in this case. Post invites State and DOD to send an
inter-agency team to Honduras to confirm the GOH's written
assurances and to further discuss the GOH's air interdiction
policy. However, the team should be prepared to respond to
specific questions from the GOH about the specific
counternarcotics intelligence sharing arrangements in place
with its other Central American neighbors. END COMMENT.
PALMER