DRUG PLANE CRASHES AFTER INTERCEPT BY HONDURAN AIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000179

SIPDIS

STATE FOR P, INL, L, WHA, WHACEN AND WHA/PPC
SOUTHCOM FOR GENERAL HILL
JIATF-S FOR RADM SIROIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2014
TAGS: SNAR MOPS PINS PREL MCAP PINR HO
SUBJECT: DRUG PLANE CRASHES AFTER INTERCEPT BY HONDURAN AIR
FORCE; GOH INSISTS PLANE WAS NOT SHOT DOWN


Classified By: Political Counselor Francisco L. Palmieri
for reason 1.5 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Honduran Air Force Commander insists 1/20/04
crash of a drug-trafficking civilian aircraft was not a
shoot-down. According to published statements and
conversations with U.S. mission military members, Colonel
Caceres stated that Honduran Air Force (HAF) interceptors
twice contacted the aircraft and ordered it to land.
Finally, following established HAF procedures, Caceres
explained that the HAF pilots, flying at the side of the
aircraft in question, fired warning shots on a parallel track
to the flight path. He maintains that the plane was not shot
down. Post has sought, but been unable to confirm, any other
information which contradicts Col. Caceres' account. Post
continues to press Government of Honduras (GOH) and Honduran
Armed Forces (HOAF) sources for additional details of the
circumstances of the crash of this aircraft, including
authorization to visit the crash site. Post will obtain a
copy of the incident report as soon as one is prepared. Post
recommends that the U.S. continue to share intelligence with
the GOH until or unless information is received that
indicates that the Hondurans actually shot down the aircraft.
Halting intelligence sharing could be counterproductive to
U.S. national interests and counternarcotics efforts in
Honduras. END SUMMARY


2. (C) On 1/20/04, Honduran authorities were alerted by U.S.
sources of the intrusion of its airspace over the Gulf of
Fonseca by an unidentified, suspicious aircraft. According
to HAF sources, the aircraft entered Honduran airspace around
1430 hours. In response to this information, the HAF
scrambled two planes to intercept the intruding airplane,
which had not filed a flight plan for Honduras. The HAF
planes (Tucanos) signaled for the white, twin-engine plane to
land at Toncontin International Airport. The pilot ignored
this request and evaded the HAF aircraft. Sometime later,
the same plane was relocated and was again approached near
Comayagua in central Honduras. The HAF pilots then directed
the plane to land at Soto Cano Air Base. Their instructions
were ignored. Finally, after the plane changed course and
began heading toward the El Salvador-Honduras border, the HAF
pilots, flying at the side of the aircraft in question, fired
warning shots on a parallel track to the flight path.


3. (C) HAF sources reported that shortly after those shots
were fired packages of presumably drugs or fuel were tossed
from the suspicious plane prior to the crash. HOAF sources
said that the plane then took a series of aggressive, evasive
measures, descending rapidly, before finally stalling,
crashing and burning. The weather was bad at the time, and
the crash took place in mountainous and forested terrain in
isolated Lempira Department. Honduran Air Force Chief
Caceres openly admitted that warning shots were fired;
however, he insists that the HAF pilot did not shoot the
plane down. Caceres reiterated that the HAF pilots followed
established HAF procedures in this incident. Embassy will
request that the HAF provide copies of its intercept and live
ammunition policies.


4. (C) Post continues to press GOH and HOAF sources for
additional details of the circumstances of the crash of this
aircraft. Mission requested and received authorization to
visit the crash site. It will be visited on 1/23/04 and we
will report results septel. Post has sought, but been unable
to confirm, any other information, which contradicts Col.
Caceres' account. MILGP and DAO expect that a report of the
incident will be prepared, noting a report was prepared
within days of the April 2003 shoot down incident. Mission
will obtain a copy of it as soon as received.


5. (C) Police sources informed post that on the morning of
1/21 police reached the site of the plane wreckage. The
plane had tail number N95L (fictitious),which belongs to a
Cessna 142, a different kind of aircraft. More than 19 kilos
of presumed cocaine were reportedly found at the crash site,
as well as the charred bodies of the pilot and one crew
member.


6. (U) Separately, the media reported today that the motor
and serial number of the plane were: 642080, Model Fiuring,
order 145236. The other motor number was 642081, series
TMD516TT, Continental. The tail had an American flag on it.
The two bodies have been moved to the morgue in San Pedro
Sula. We understand that both bodies were completely
charred. Identification of the remains is impossible.


7. (C) In another development, on afternoon of 1/21/04
around 1500 hours, Honduran sources reported that another
suspected drug plane entered Honduran airspace. The HAF
scrambled aircraft to intercept it. They were able to spot
the plane over Olancho traveling in the direction of San
Pedro Sula. When the drug plane saw the Hondurans it was
able, due to superior instrumentation, to fly into heavy
clouds and evade the HAF interceptors. Apparently the HAF
aircraft do not have radar that allows them to "see" in cloud
cover. The Hondurans radioed info about the plane to
Guatemalan authorities. The plane was a twin engine King Air
with tail number N89K (probably false). When relaying this
information, HAF sources shared their concerns that, when HAF
aircraft have approached these drug airplanes in the past,
the suspect airplane's crews have aimed AK 47s at the HAF
pilots. The HAF also reported that, on previous occasions,
pilots of drug planes execute aggressive, evasive measures,
including attempts to collide in mid-air, endangering HAF
planes and crews.


8. (C) COMMENT: We do not believe, based on the current
available information, that a cut-off of intelligence sharing
appears to be warranted. Post recommends that the U.S.
continue to share intelligence with the GOH until information
is received that indicates that the Hondurans actually shot
down the aircraft on January 20. Post notes the GOH made
enormous strides in its interdiction efforts during 2003,
interdicting almost 6,000 kilos of cocaine, which was more
than in the previous five years combined. The GOH is going
to considerable lengths and expense to assist the U.S. in our
joint fight against narcotics trafficking. U.S. has to date
provided token financial support for HOAF military
operations. The HOAF is doing most of this work at its own
initiative and cost. Halting intelligence sharing could be
counterproductive to U.S. national interests and
counternarcotics efforts in Honduras. Significant quantities
of drugs are passing through Honduras. If the U.S. cuts off
intelligence sharing based on the current information, the
GOH and HOAF will feel they are being unfairly punished.
Future counternarcotics cooperation could be jeopardized.
END COMMENT.
PALMER