AFTER THE BOMBINGS: KARIMOV'S DECISION-MAKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 002609


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CACEN AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/14
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBIO PINR PTER UZ
SUBJECT: AFTER THE BOMBINGS: KARIMOV'S DECISION-MAKING
DICHOTOMY

REFS: A) Tashkent 385 B) Tashkent 1052 C) Tashkent 726 D) Tashkent 2603

CLASSIFIED BY AMB. JON R. PURNELL, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary. This is the second of two cables, which
provides insight into President Karimov's decision-making
process. The first of which looked at Karimov's possible
succession plans (ref D). Although Uzbekistan was rocked
twice this year by terrorist bombings, little has changed
for President Islom Karimov. The terrorist attacks have
had little impact on either the population or Karimov's
policies but have highlighted an apparent dichotomy in his
decision-making and policy formulating ability: he is a
keen analyst of regional security issues, but curiously
passive about confronting domestic challenges. His hold on
power, a number one concern, remains unchallenged, reducing
his impetus to make any kind of change. End summary.

DICHOTOMY OF VISION
--------------

2. (C) When President Karimov makes decisions regarding
policy for Uzbekistan, he most likely considers their
impact on his own position first and foremost. Minister of
Defense Gulomov (protect) indicated as much in confidence
during a recent DOD visit when he told DCM (then Charge)
that Karimov cares only about security and his position,
and sometimes the two do not coincide. What is good for
the country in the longer term is presumably also a factor
in his calculations, since his legacy is inextricably
linked to the success or failure of Uzbekistan as a state.
However, short-term security concerns and maintaining his
hold on power still remain top priority.


3. (C) Karimov is capable of strategic vision, especially
regarding regional security. In this realm, his decision-
making appears shrewd and rational; he readily acknowledges
the U.S. role in Afghanistan as beneficial to Uzbek and
Central Asian security. His concerns about internal Afghan
politics and Russian influence in the region are well
founded and clearly articulated. It is in this well
defined area of security that we find a reasonable,
intelligent partner in Karimov and Uzbekistan.


4. (C) By contrast, Karimov can appear remarkably short-
sighted in other areas, such as macro-economic reform and
democratic development. Karimov's horizon seems to be only
three or four months down the road and no further. He has
exhibited this tendency at least since the mid-1990s. Many
of these policies, however, have outlived their usefulness
and only serve to hamper economic growth and democracy
building. Karimov clings to his Soviet command-style
economic background, apparently believing that his populace
can survive without cash as the National Bank starves the
market of local currency.

A DEER IN THE HEADLIGHTS
--------------


5. (C) When faced with unexpected threats, however,
Karimov's response appears to be retrenchment. In certain
cases, like after the 1999 Tashkent bombings and the Rose
Revolution in Georgia, Karimov has had a knee-jerk reaction
that abandons much rational explanation. In the wake of
Uzbekistan's worst terrorist attacks since 1999, Karimov
has curiously done very little in the policy realm. He has
placed the blame on his neighbors and Western countries
like the U.K. He has shown no interest in innovation or
new policies that could lead to loosening the Govenment's
firm control over what is said in Uzbekitan's mosques. He
also likely fears that any tye of loosening would provide
an opening for Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT) or other etremists.
Additionally, Karimov sees no profit fr himselfin
adopting major new economic policies Elites, including
members of Karimov's own famly, are doing very well under
current economic cnditions. There is no incentive for
these elite to make changes that might threaten their
wealt. And he so thoroughly controls bank functions that
virtually the entire inancial system is nder his thumb.


6. (C) In he past, Karimov has used distinctive occasions
lke the opening of an Oliy Majlis (legislature) sesion to
make some sort of policy statement (ref A. On April 29,
Karimov addressed the opening sesion of the Oliy Majlis
(ref B),during which hefocused on terrorism and laid the
blame on the Western media, HT, and outsiders. While he
did address the nation on Uzbek TV on March 30 after the
first spate of suicide bombings (ref C),he did not do so
after the July 30 events. In fact, in August, Karimov
attended the opening session of the Oliy Majlis but chose
not to make an address. He had perfect opportunity during
the official Independence Day commemoration on August 31 to
present a policy address, but he did not.


7. (C) Karimov's curious pause on the policy front at this
time could simply be due to a lack of ideas and vision. He
is a Soviet-era hold over, as is most of his government,
who is focused on his position and ways to keep it. His
lack of a vision for Uzbekistan's future is severely
limited by his experiences as well as his preoccupation
with security. Other leaders might have fired the top
police chief, Interior Minister Almatov, or the
intelligence czar, NSS Chair Inoyatov, for failure to
prevent terrorist attacks. Such moves here, we expect,
would only rock the political boat and upset Karimov's
prized balance. In the meantime, he does little to address
the question of why terrorists have found Uzbekistan
fertile ground for recruiting people willing to die to
oppose his regime.

PURNELL