Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04TAIPEI3563
2004-11-10 09:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT OUTLINES FUTURE CROSS-STRAIT POLICY

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR CH TW 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 003563 

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR CH TW
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT OUTLINES FUTURE CROSS-STRAIT POLICY
DIRECTION

REF: TAIPEI 3521

Classified By: AIT Acting Director David J. Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 003563

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR CH TW
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT OUTLINES FUTURE CROSS-STRAIT POLICY
DIRECTION

REF: TAIPEI 3521

Classified By: AIT Acting Director David J. Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: National Security Council (NSC) Secretary
General Chiou I-jen provided the Acting Director on November
10 an advanced copy of a 10-point policy statement President
Chen Shui-bian planned to unveil later in the day. The
policy reiterates themes from Chen's May 20 and October 10
speeches, providing slightly more clarity over Taipei's
position on the "1992 Hong Kong" framework and opening of
direct transportation links. Chen will also call on his
government to craft a set of "Sunshine Policies" to
facilitate closer substantive relations with the Mainland.
Chiou said the president wants to signal Beijing that
dialogue could be resumed by either addressing "principle"
issues first, hence the "1992 Hong Kong" formulation, or
technical issues, such as direct links. Chiou acknowledged
that some of Chen's recent statements aimed at domestic
constituencies may have been "misinterpreted" by Beijing as
deviating from the course Chen set on May 20, but he asserted
that this sort of suspicion underscores the need for
effective channels of communication. End Summary.

Chen's 10 Points
--------------


2. (C) NSC Secretary General Chiou I-jen asked the Acting
Director for an urgent meeting on November 10 to preview a 10
point cross-Strait/foreign policy plan that he predicted
would be announced later in the day by President Chen
Shui-bian (See para 8 for AIT's informal translation).
According to Chiou, Chen wanted to demonstrate to Beijing and
Washington that the conciliatory policy line he set on May 20
is not only unchanged, but is being reinforced in substantive
terms. Chiou said that Taipei sees a window of opportunity
after the December 11 Legislative Yuan (LY) election to
restart some form of dialogue with Beijing. The November 10
address would aim to lay the policy groundwork to move
forward. Chiou noted that Chen would preside over 4 hours of
meetings later in the day with his foreign policy team, and
if there were no serious objections, the points he provided

to AIT would be read out by the president in front of
television cameras. Chiou noted that he would follow-up with
a press conference to provide further background on the
policy initiatives.


3. (C) Chiou highlighted several elements of the address for
AIT. Chiou said that in point number 3, the president would
expand a bit on his "1992 Hong Kong basis" formulation first
floated during Chen's October 10 National Day address. Chen
would acknowledge Beijing's insistence on the "one China
principle" and ask Beijing to respect the Taiwan people's
loyalties to the "Republic of China." Chiou noted that in
the following point, Chen would call for opening talks on
direct transportation links using the "Taiwan-Hong Kong
aviation talks" model referred to recently by the PRC State
Council Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). Chiou asserted that the
two points were meant to give Beijing an option. If they
want to address political principles first, Taiwan was
willing to look back to the 1992 Hong Kong talks, which
focused on bridging the political gap between the two sides.
If the PRC preferred to start with less sensitive subjects,
Chiou asserted that point number 4 offered Beijing the model
of the 1993 Singapore talks, which established protocols for
technical cooperation between the two sides.


4. (C) In addition to calling for direct transportation
links, Chiou said that Chen would order that Taiwan's
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) expand their operations beyond
Taiwan's borders. Chiou said that following the president's
address, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and Ministry of
Economic Affairs (MOEA) would be tasked with revising current
restrictions on the operations of SOEs overseas, including on
the Mainland (Comment: the points provided to AIT do not
refer to SOE operations on the Mainland, but Chiou explicitly
stated that the PRC would be part of the SOE globalization
initiative. End Comment.) On the military side, Chiou said
that Chen will announce that Taiwan will "absolutely not"
procure weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and call on China
to openly renounce the use of WMDs against Taiwan. He
acknowledged that this commitment meant that there would be
no plans for an attack on Shanghai. Chiou noted that Chen
will also call for talks on the establishment of an air and
sea buffer zone between the two sides, and pledge to reduce
the size of Taiwan's military to 100,000 personnel.

Staying on Message
--------------


5. (C) The Acting Director responded positively to Chen's
renewed commitment to the constructive steps laid out in his
inaugural and 10/10 speeches, but he re-emphasized the
importance of consistency in Taipei's public messages. Chiou
acknowledged that President Chen's November 7 speech to the
Taiwan Association of Professors (Reftel) may have caused
concern in Beijing, but Chiou assured AIT that they did not
represent a change in policy. Chiou said that the president
informed him after the fact that Chen was careful to use the
term "People's Republic of China" rather than "China," as
some media outlets reported, to describe the other side. In
addition, Chiou asserted that Chen did not say anything that
contradicted his May 20 pledge not to address sovereignty
issues in the upcoming round of constitutional reforms. The
Acting Director countered that the tone of the speech left
considerable room for interpretation and could encourage
skeptics in Beijing to question Chen's sincerity. Chiou
accepted that this may be the case, but added that if Taiwan
could communicate with Beijing like it does with the United
States, such "misinterpretations" could be avoided.


6. (C) Later in the day, NSC Senior Advisor for cross-Strait
affairs Chen Chung-hsin informed AIT that the 10 points had
been accepted at the afternoon foreign policy meeting with
only one or two small word changes. Chen noted that Vice
President Annette Lu urged that the point dealing with the
"1992 Hong Kong" framework be removed, ostensibly because
domestic reaction to president's October 10 reference to the
formula was not positive enough. Chen said that the
president rejected Lu's demand, stating that the "1992 Hong
Kong" framework was integral to the government's efforts to
find a way forward. However, the president did agree to Lu's
demand to add "or develop" to the call for the PRC not to use
nuclear weapons. Chen asserted that he and others argued
against the change, noting that it would make Taiwan look
naive, but the president agreed to include the change "in
order to shut her (Lu) up." According to Chen, a pool camera
filmed the president reading out the statement at about 6:00
pm local time. He expected the tape to be broadcast later in
the evening. Chen added that he had alerted his cross-Strait
media and academic contacts to pay special attention to the
initiative.

Comment: Getting Back on Track
--------------


7. (C) As promised (Reftel),Chen's moderate NSC advisors
have redirected the president back to the conciliatory May 20
line. Chen's points should lay down a helpful marker on a
number of issues, even if some of the military confidence
building measures (CBMs) initiatives are seen as overly
optimistic. The larger problem remains consistency. While
Chiou offered assurances that the president has no intention
on changing the substance of his May 20 policy line, he
admitted that pressures from Chen's fundamentalist base will
constrain the president's room to maneuver on the question of
Taiwan's sovereignty. Chen's plan to hit the campaign trail
starting November 12 may test his ability to stay on message.


8. (C) (Begin informal AIT translation of the president's
draft policy statement)

1) The maintenance of stability in the Taiwan Strait and the
status quo of peace continues to be a matter of great concern
to the international community and an area where the United
States plays an important role. Taiwan and the United States
both have long enjoyed common values of freedom, democracy,
and human rights. Over the past half century, Taiwan's
democratic and economic development has become an asset to be
enjoyed by the international community. It is certainly not
a liability. We thank the United States for its continued
commitment to the "Taiwan Relations Act" and the "Six
Assurances." In the future, the two sides should continue to
cooperate to maintain peace and stability in the Asia Pacific
region on the basis of a common alliance of values.

2) We believe the coming two years should be viewed as a
unique opportunity to restart dialogue across the Taiwan
Strait in the common pursuit of long-term peace and
stability. The two sides' governments and leaders should
wisely use this "window of opportunity" to create a basis for
peace and happiness. While there are many factors that
contribute to the other side's inability to respond to our
goodwill and sincerity, our determination and patience will
not change. We would like to once again reiterate that the
cross-Strait policy direction set out in the president's May
20 Inaugural Address and this year's National Day Address
will not change in any way during the (the president's) term
of office. On the basis of the "Two No Changes," government
agencies should actively explore reopening dialogue, reducing
tensions, and cooperatively developing "Sunshine Policies" to
promote cross-Strait cooperation.

3) We fully acknowledge (renzhidao) the Beijing authority's
insistence on the "one China" principle. At the same time,
we urge the other side to positively view the reality of the
"Republic of China's" existence and the democratic
determination of Taiwan's 23 million people to be their own
masters. If the two sides can extend mutual understanding
and tolerance, we can use peaceful dialogue to rationally
discuss how to resolve our differences and eliminate
confrontation. The "1992 Hong Kong talks" embodied exactly
this spirit.

4) On the basis of the "1992 Hong Kong talks," the government
is actively pursuing cross-Strait economic and cultural
exchanges, including the Three Links. At this stage, we can
use the Taiwan-Hong Kong Aviation Talks model to immediately
open consultations on direct two-way air cargo and Chinese
New Year's charter flights.

5) In order to fulfill the economic strategy of "promote
development in Taiwan, reach out to the world," the
government should take a cue from the private sector and
encourage major State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to expand
their international operations and investment. They should
also actively encourage foreign capital and labor talent to
come to Taiwan in order to accelerate the globalization of
our industrial base.

6) The Ministry of National Defense has already completed a
plan to reduce the term of compulsory military service to 18
months starting July 1 next year with a target of cutting our
military forces to 100,000 by the year 2008. This effort
will help ease cross-Strait military tensions, create a lean,
more effective military force, and enhance our self-defense
capabilities.

7) For humanitarian reasons and in view of international
norms, we believe that the use of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons should be banned in the Taiwan Strait. We
are willing to publicly pledge that we will absolutely not
develop these sorts of weapons of mass destruction and
strongly urge China to publicly announce that it will not or
develop or use weapons of mass destruction against Taiwan.

8) In order to avoid miscalculations or unintended military
clashes, we recommend that the two sides consider
establishing a military buffer zone. Aircraft and ships
should avoid entering this zone, or if they do need to enter
it, they should first notify the other side.

9) We recommend that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait
consider the approach used in the 1972 U.S.-Soviet "Maritime
Incident Agreement" and the 1998 U.S.-China "Maritime
Cooperation Agreement" to create a Taiwan Strait military and
security consultative mechanism that can promote the eventual
creation of a "Taiwan Strait Code of Conduct." This effort
would be similar to the international demilitarized zone
created between South and North Korea and the communication
mechanism between India and Pakistan.
10) Security in the Taiwan Strait is more important than the
interests of individual political parties or personalities.
The development of peace across the Taiwan Strait is the
common hope of all people. We can only develop cross-Strait
relations if Taiwan is united internally and stable
politically. After the year-end legislative election, we
will invite representatives from various political parties
and social groups to join the "Cross-Strait Peace and
Development Committee." We do not rule out inviting the
leaders of the opposition parties to serve as members. Our
hope is to develop a consensus among all political parties
and the public behind a long-term "Cross-Strait Peace and
Development Platform" that will serve to actively promote
cross-Strait peace and stability, and create a sustainable
and prosperous new cross-Strait relationship.
PAAL