Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04TAIPEI3409
2004-10-29 10:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

TAIPEI SEEKS TO LIMIT FALLOUT OVER SECRETARY'S

Tags:  PREL PGOV CH TW 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003409 

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIPEI SEEKS TO LIMIT FALLOUT OVER SECRETARY'S
BEIJING INTERVIEWS

REF: A. TAIPEI 3353


B. 10/26 AIT-EAP/TC E-MAIL (NOTAL)

C. TAIPEI 3234

Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003409

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIPEI SEEKS TO LIMIT FALLOUT OVER SECRETARY'S
BEIJING INTERVIEWS

REF: A. TAIPEI 3353


B. 10/26 AIT-EAP/TC E-MAIL (NOTAL)

C. TAIPEI 3234

Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: Chen administration officials are working to
limit media and political fallout from a set of interviews
given by Secretary Powell in Beijing on October 24.
President Chen Shui-bian expressed appreciation to the AIT
Director on October 28 for a series of public statements by
the Secretary and other Department officials clarifying that
U.S. policy has not changed. Nevertheless, the media and
political parties continue to utilize the episode to advance
a variety of domestic political agendas. The Taiwan
Solidarity Union (TSU) has focused on the Secretary's remarks
in an attempt to resuscitate their flagging Legislative Yuan
(LY) campaign while the opposition Pan-Blue has used the
episode to justify opposition to the USD 18 billion special
defense procurement budget. Former President Lee Teng-hui
has played both sides of the public debate, asserting on the
one hand that the Secretary's remarks were blown out of
proportion by an ignorant Taiwan media but also asserting
that the comments should remind Taiwan's people of the need
to become a "normal country." Some Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP) officials warn that the episode could have longer
term policy consequences, including over the fate of the
special defense budget. Other observers, however, suggest
that the incident will help remind leaders in Taipei that
Taiwan does not exist in a vacuum. End Summary.

Switch to Moderation
--------------


2. (C) Chen administration officials are sending out
reassuring messages to the media in an effort to stem the
public relations furor that they themselves fanned after
Secretary Powell's comments on Taiwan's status during two

SIPDIS
October 24 interviews in Beijing (Ref A). President Chen
Shui-bian told the Director October 27 that he appreciated
the Secretary's subsequent clarification and the State
Department's reassurances that U.S. policy had not changed.
Presidential Office Deputy Secretary General James Huang told
reporters the same day that the Powell CNBC interview and

statement by EAP DAS Schriver to TECRO Washington Rep. David
Lee that the USG still respects the 1982 U.S.-Taiwan "Six
Assurances" were "helpful and positive." Unnamed
presidential aides told the Taiwan media that the leadership
"breathed a sigh of relief" following Washington's
clarifications that the Secretary did not intend to signal a
new policy change. Soon thereafter, signs emerged of efforts
to stop the damage and take credit for effective "crisis
management" by the Chen administration.


3. (C) The initial response in Taipei to the Secretary's
interviews was shock, combined with fear that the USG had
decided on a major policy reorientation without Taipei's
knowledge. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairman Joseph Wu
told AIT that Taipei's biggest concern was that the
Secretary's statements on reunification and non-sovereign

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status would become regular policy formulations.
Presidential Office Secretary Liu Shih-chung said Taipei was
also surprised over the timing of the statements, noting that
Taipei has been trying for months to repair relations with
both Beijing and Washington. Green-leaning Academia Sinica
political analyst Hsu Yung-ming asserted that "what the DPP
feared most was that there was some major U.S. policy
decision made and they had totally missed signs of its
formulation."


4. (C) The Chen administration's current attempts to play up
the strength of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship stand in
contrast to the initial barbed public response to the
Secretary's references to Taiwan's lack of sovereignty (Ref

SIPDIS
B). President Chen used public meetings with visiting
foreign delegations on October 25-27 to emphasize Taiwan's
sovereign and independent status and complain that it is
"unfair" that many countries do not recognize this "fact."
Premier Yu Shyi-kun and Foreign Minister Mark Chen offered
similar comments during Legislative Yuan (LY) interpolations.
Yu went further than other officials on October 28 when he
used the "one country on each side" formulation initially
coined by Chen Shui-bian in 2002 to describe relations
between Taiwan and the Mainland. No senior official has used
the phrase since the March 20 election.

5. (C) The decision to take a combative public line was
clearly made at the top. Officials like MAC's Wu and
Presidential Office Deputy SecGen Huang told AIT immediately
after the Secretary's interview was reported in Taipei that
they would counsel a quiet, low-key response. MOFA North
American Affairs Director General Victor Chin told the Deputy
Director that the decision to tone down rhetoric was also
made at the top. Chin said that Chen discarded plans to make
barbed comments at an Asia Foundation dinner on October 28
after learning about Secretary Powell's interview with CNBC.
However, just as Yu appeared to play domestic politics with
"one country on each side," officials like Huang and Wu
consistently used restrained language with the media
throughout the week to signal to us that Taipei's commitments
to improved relations with Washington and Beijing remain
strong.

Political Reaction Polarized
--------------


6. (C) DPP officials expressed somewhat contradictory
concerns over the political ramifications of the controversy.
DPP Secretary General Chang Chun-hsiung told AIT that the
government feared that the Secretary's interview may signal
to the public that the USG was pushing Taiwan towards
unification. "Many centrists in Taiwan might come to the
conclusion that even the United States wants Taiwan to be
unified with China," he stated, "so they may decide to simply
give up hope." That, he suggested, might also reduce support
for the special defense budget. However, Chang's deputy,
Chung Chia-bing, and officials at the Presidential Office and
MAC expressed the exact opposite concern, warning that the
Secretary's sovereignty language would strengthen the hand of

SIPDIS
pro-independence fundamentalists. Chung noted that the TSU
decided after the Powell interview to reschedule a "name
rectification" rally on December 5 that had been originally
canceled under pressure from the DPP, which is planning a
rally on December 4 that will feature a more moderate
nationalist agenda (Ref C). Academia Sinica's Hsu asserted
that the Secretary's comments on Taiwan sovereignty breathed
new life into the TSU's floundering electoral campaign. Hsu
warned that the TSU may follow-up on the episode by proposing
a referendum on whether or not "Taiwan is a sovereign,
independent country" in conjunction with the December 11 LY
election, a move Hsu said would put the DPP in an awkward
position.


7. (C) Opposition leaders seized on the Beijing interviews to
lash out at the DPP's mismanagement of relations with
Washington, burnish their own nationalist credentials, and
justify their recent opposition to action on the USD 18
billion special procurement budget for U.S. defense articles.
Pan-Blue legislators placed a hold on the special budget
bill in the LY pending a "satisfactory U.S. explanation for
the Secretary's remarks," provoking a food fight with ruling
party counterparts at a lunch-time committee meeting. LY
President Wang Jin-pyng told reporters on October 28 that the
controversy had negatively impacted on the atmospherics for
the special budget debate but said that this did not excuse
Pan-Blue parties from fulfilling their commitment to start
deliberations on the authorization portion of the bill before
the November 11 recess. However, DPP LY Defense Committee
Convener Lee Wen-chung told AIT that the latest confrontation
will make it virtually impossible for any serious
deliberations on the special budget until after the December
11 election. Lee added that the controversy over the
Secretary's interview would likely not be a factor in the

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special budget's prospects after December 11.

Lee Teng-hui Plays Both Sides
--------------


8. (C) Former President Lee Teng-hui offered sharply
divergent responses to the Secretary's interview, perhaps
reflecting conflicting pressure from the TSU and his more
realist advisors (Septel). Lee's first reaction was to scold
the Taiwan media for blowing the incident out of proportion,
asserting that the Secretary's formulation on Taiwan's
sovereignty was simply a recitation of the USG's
long-standing position. However, Lee later characterized
Powell's comments as a reminder of Taiwan's current abnormal
status. While TSU candidates used the recent media attention
to boost their campaign efforts, some moderate Lee associates
also expressed satisfaction over the episode for very
different reasons. Lo Fu-chen, Chairman of the
quasi-official Association of East Asian Relations and a
long-time Lee confidante, told AIT that the Secretary's
statement will serve as a useful reminder to Chen Shui-bian.
"Chen gets too wrapped up in domestic political dynamics and
forgets that as a leader he also needs to operate at the
international level," Lo stated. Lo said that he appreciates
Washington's willingness to remain ambiguous about Taiwan's
status, but added that "sometimes you need to inject some
clarity to remind Chen about how important ambiguity is in
the cross-Strait setting."

Comment: Lessons Learned?
--------------


9. (C) It is still too early to say conclusively whether the
Chen administration has learned the lesson that it must be
more restrained in its public as well as private dealings
with the United States. The history of the last few years
does not encourage optimism. The Chen administration has
clearly instructed its officials to send the message that it
is business as usual. This is likely aimed, at least in
part, to prevent the TSU and Pan-Blue from scoring additional
political points in the ongoing election campaign.


10. (C) If there is a silver lining, it may be that the
episode has created a renewed appreciation for how much
influence Washington can wield over Taiwan's domestic
political environment. DPP SecGen Chang noted that President
Bush's December 9, 2003 statement on Taiwan nearly destroyed
Chen's hopes for re-election and expressed fear that the
Secretary's October 24 remarks might do something similar in

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the current LY campaign if not handled correctly. In
assuring Taiwan officials that U.S. policy has not changed,
AIT has also used the opportunity to remind them about how
important ambiguity regarding Taiwan's sovereign status is
for both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
PAAL