FOREIGN MINISTER ASKS FOR CLARIFICATION OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003353

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STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV TW
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ASKS FOR CLARIFICATION OF
SECRETARY'S MEDIA INTERVIEW


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Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Mark Chen asked the AIT
Director to a meeting October 26 to seek clarification over a
set of interviews given by Secretary Powell in Beijing on
October 24. Chen said the Secretary's reported statements on
eventual reunification and Taiwan's lack of sovereignty
deeply "hurt the feelings of the Taiwanese people" and
appeared to be a departure from past U.S. policies and
commitments. Chen requested that the USG make further public
clarifications over the matter in order to avoid further
damage to the relationship. The Director responded that
there has been no change in U.S. policy nor did the Secretary
intend to signal one. He added that the Secretary's visit to
Beijing was aimed at advancing cross-Strait dialogue and
defending Taiwan's right to participate in APEC and the World
Health Organization (WHO). The Director cautioned, however,
that repeated public statements over Taiwan's sovereignty led
reporters to press the Secretary on the question of Taiwan's
sovereignty, an issue we have long sought to avoid speaking
about openly. End Summary.

Clarification, Not a Protest
--------------


2. (C) Foreign Minister Mark Chen asked the AIT Director in
for an urgent meeting October 26 regarding a set of
interviews Secretary Powell gave on October 24 in Beijing.
Chen emphasized that the meeting was to seek further
clarification, and he did not intend to deliver a formal
protest. Chen noted that the government was under intense
pressure from the media and Legislative Yuan (LY) over the
Secretary's statement that Taiwan was not a sovereign

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independent country and suggestion that the USG supports
eventual unification. Chen stated that the reason the
Secretary's statements had caused so much harm to the Taiwan

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people was that they came from the United States, Taiwan's
best friend. "If it was China or anyone else, we could
understand it," he added, "but coming from the United States,
it is a deep shock." Chen said he was especially surprised
that the U.S. made such a "heavy" statement after months of
effort on Taipei's part to reopen dialogue with Beijing.

Violation of the Six Assurances?
--------------


3. (C) Chen noted that the State Department Spokesman's
October 25 clarification addressed Taipei's concern over the
reference to reunification. Chen asserted, however, that the
Secretary's remarks about Taiwan's sovereignty appeared to

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violate the "Six Assurances" provided to Taiwan by the United
States in 1982. Chen said that he could tell the media and
public that U.S. policy has not changed, but no one would
believe him because the Secretary's statement on Taiwan's
sovereignty did depart from the long-standing USG practice of
remaining silent on the issue of Taiwan's status. Chen
asserted that the Secretary's statement would undermine the
Taipei government's attempts to build a consensus behind
renewed dialogue with Beijing and give the PRC less reason to
engage with Taipei.


4. (C) The Director responded that the "Six Assurances" only
committed the United States not to change its position on
Taiwan's status, not whether or not it would state what that
position is. He noted that the Secretary's statement that
Taiwan is not a sovereign, independent country reflects a
policy that has been in place since 1978. The Director
acknowledged that we try to avoid having to publicly explain
our position, but pointed out that Taiwan's status only
became a major public issue after President Chen Shui-bian
and other senior Taiwan officials repeatedly drew attention
to it. The Director reminded FM Chen that the Secretary's
comments came in response to a quite specific question about
whether the U.S. endorsed President Chen's recent assertion
that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country. He added
that Taipei's insistence on this formulation has also
provided Beijing an excuse not to respond to Taiwan's recent
offers to restart dialogue.

Managing the Media
--------------

5. (C) The Foreign Minister said he took the Director's
point, but stated that "it is too much to ask" for President
Chen or his ministers to deny they represent a sovereign and
independent country. However, Chen insisted that the most
important task at hand was to prevent the episode from
further damaging the relationship. In this context, Chen
requested that the Secretary "or one of his deputies" find an
opportunity in the coming days to fully clarify the U.S.
position.


6. (C) The Director said he would convey this request, but
suggested that Chen and other Taiwan leaders take a more
active role in shaping the public response. The Director
noted that the purpose of the Secretary's visit to Beijing
was not to give media interviews, but to press Beijing on
issues of concern to Taipei. In addition to encouraging
Beijing to respond positively to President Chen's October 10
address, the Director said the Secretary pressed PRC leaders
on Taipei's participation in APEC and the WHO and restated
that we would not yield to demands to cease arms sales. The
Director asserted that if Taiwan focuses on the positive
elements of the relationship, it will demonstrate the
strength of ties between the two sides. However, if it
dwells on issues where we differ, such as Taiwan's status, it
will only increase attention to differences.

Media Groundrules
--------------


7. (C) Chen said that he would be talking to the media later
in the day, but promised to keep the Director's meeting out
of the press. However, as the meeting closed, there was a
reporter waiting outside of Chen's office to take still
photos of the Director and Foreign Minister departing. AIT
will report media reaction Septel.

Comment: Damage Control Overdrive
--------------


8. (C) The Foreign Minister and other senior officials remain
in a high state of agitation over the media and political
fallout from the Secretary's interview. FM Chen was clearly
seeking a more public USG clarification of the Secretary's
remarks rather than insights into why they may have been
made. Chen did acknowledge the broader policy context, but
only after several attempts were made to frame the issue for
him. Even then, however, his mind was focused on how to get
the issue off the front pages before his next appearance
before the LY and how to phrase the U.S. stance to his boss,
President Chen.
PAAL