TAIWAN PUTS POSITIVE SPIN ON PRC REJECTION OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003190

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN PUTS POSITIVE SPIN ON PRC REJECTION OF
10/10 SPEECH

REF: A. TAIPEI 3077


B. TAIPEI 3162

Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: Taiwan officials tried to put a positive spin
on the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) reported rejection of
President Chen Shui-bian's October 10 inaugural address.
National Security Council (NSC) and Mainland Affairs Council
(MAC) officials say that TAO Spokesman Zhang Mingqing's
statement largely mirrored the PRC's May 17 Taiwan policy
line and signaled that "the door to dialogue remains closed,
but not necessarily locked." MAC Senior Vice Chairman Chiu
Tai-san told reporters that the TAO spokesman's October 13
remarks would not alter Taipei's commitment to easing
cross-Strait tensions. Officials admit that President Chen's
assertion on October 10 that "the Republic of China is
Taiwan" likely provoked the negative PRC statement, but claim
that Chen needed to emphasize Taiwan's sovereignty to avoid a
domestic backlash to his "1992 Framework" offer. One senior
presidential advisor downplayed the significance of the PRC
reaction, asserting that Chen's real audience on October 10
was Washington, not Beijing. End Summary.

TAO Rejects 10/10 Message
--------------


2. (C) Taiwan officials responded cautiously to media reports
about PRC TAO Spokesman Zhang Mingqing's rejection of
President Chen's 10/10 speech. NSC Senior Advisor for
cross-Strait policy Chen Chung-hsin told AIT that Zhang's
remarks were, in substance, largely a reiteration of the May
17 PRC policy statement on Taiwan. Chen stated that Zhang's
comments suggested that "the door to dialogue remains closed,
but not necessarily locked." MAC Planning Bureau Chief Chang
Shu-ti offered a similar assessment, noting that Zhang
responded to most questions during the TAO press conference
with established policy formulations. Chang said that the
similarities between the October 13 TAO press conference and
the May 17 policy statement may indicate that the PRC
leadership remains in an observation mode awaiting the
outcome of elections in the United States and Taiwan.

Self-Inflicted Wound?
--------------


3. (C) Chen administration officials say that the negative
tone of the October 13 TAO statement was likely provoked by
the president's emphasis on the sovereignty of the "ROC" and
its 23 million people during his 10/10 speech. The NSC's
Chen said that he fully understands why the PRC would be
"allergic" to the president's "ROC equals Taiwan"
formulation, but added that he is also sympathetic to the
domestic political pressures the president faces from within
his own camp. Chen said he hoped that Beijing would
understand that, just as they have to make aggressive noises
towards Taiwan to satisfy their own hard-liners, President
Chen needs to also address his own fundamentalist base.
"Perhaps this is wishful thinking," Chen added, "but I hope
they can differentiate between what is meant for them and
what is for domestic consumption."


4. (C) Executive Yuan (EY) Research, Development, and
Evaluation Council (RDEC) Vice Minister Chen Chun-lin put a
slightly different spin on the president's sovereignty
formula, asserting that the PRC should understand that Taiwan
also has its "bottom line." "Beijing needs to realize that
we are ready to talk," he stated, "but only if they accept
that we are an equal partner, not a local government." Chen
added that if Beijing's precondition is that Taiwan accepts
that it is part of Beijing's "one China," no president will
be able to gain the necessary public support to open a
political dialogue.

Taiwan Response: Patient and Maybe Even Unified
-------------- --


5. (C) The NSC's Chen said that the Chen administration will
remain low-key on the TAO statement to see how things evolve
over the coming weeks. When asked about the October 13 TAO
comments, MAC Senior Vice Chairman Chiu Tai-san told
reporters that Taiwan would continue to send positive signals
to Beijing to show Taipei's sincerity. Chiu said that Taiwan
did not expect Beijing to immediately accept Chen's overtures
and promised that Taipei would give Beijing more time to
consider ways forward. A MAC press release issued later in
the day offered a similar message, and reiterated an October
11 offer to initiate talks on two-way direct charter flights
for the Chinese New Year. MAC Planning Bureau Chief Chang
told AIT that Taipei will continue to pursue the New Year
charter plan, despite the TAO's reiteration that any
cross-Strait links be considered domestic in nature. Chang
asserted that Taipei is prepared to authorize private
entities to negotiate two-way charter flights, but said that
MAC would not explicitly announce this until there was some
signal from Beijing that talks on the subject may be possible.


6. (C) The NSC's Chen told AIT that the immediate challenge
facing the government is to get everyone back on the same
page. Chen complained that Premier Yu Shyi-kun and MAC
Chairman Joseph Wu should not have engaged in rhetorical
debates with opposition legislators over the existence of a
"1992 consensus" in the days following the president's 10/10
speech. Immediately after the October 13 TAO press
conference, Chen said he personally called EY Spokesman Chen
Chi-mai and MAC Chair Wu to ensure that everyone used the
same talking points in their public comments.


7. (C) While NSC and MAC officials search for small signs of
flexibility from Beijing, Presidential Office Deputy
Secretary General James Huang told AIT that the major

SIPDIS
objective of President Chen's speech -- satisfying Washington
-- had already been achieved. Huang said that whether or not
Beijing wants to talk to Taiwan is of secondary importance.
"That's their decision," he asserted, "our main concern is
reassuring the United States that we are trying to be
constructive." Huang dismissed the domestic political debate
over the "1992 consensus" that arose from Chen's 10/10
speech. "His reference to a '1992 Framework' had nothing to
do with any '92 consensus," Huang stated, "he used the 1992
formulation to respond to (EAP) Assistant Secretary Kelly's
April 21 description of the cross-Strait situation that
existed in 1992."

Comment: Mixed Messaging Strikes Again
--------------


8. (C) President Chen's decision to use the same speech to
achieve contradictory policy goals scuttled an important
opportunity for cross-Strait progress yet again. It is not
clear whether this was his intention to start with,
carelessness, or simply force of habit. It is certainly
consistent with his past behavior. In any event, it appears
from the October 13 TAO statement that Beijing has chosen,
unsurprisingly, to focus on the portion of the speech Chen's
aides say they were supposed to ignore. Given the negative
tone of Beijing's public reaction to 10/10, we are not as
optimistic as officials here that the PRC will reopen the
door to contacts on New Year charters and other forms of
dialogue any time soon.
PAAL