3/20/04 ABIZAID MEETING WITH SALEH: CT OPS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 000680

SIPDIS

STATE PASS TO AID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR PTER EAID IZ AF PK YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: 3/20/04 ABIZAID MEETING WITH SALEH: CT OPS IN
YEMEN, PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN; IRAQ; ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE


Classified By: Edmund J. Hull, Ambassador for reasons 1.5 (a) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. During his 3/20/04 visit to Sanaa, GEN
Abizaid, accompanied by Ambassador and senior staff, called
on President Saleh. Saleh asked about ongoing Pakistani CT
operations in Waziristan. He asserted that good intelligence
and money to spread around were more effective in tribal
regions than large military operations, and predicted that
Pakistani forces would find it hard to sustain the
deployment. Saleh reviewed significant recent CT successes
in Yemen, including the apprehension of Cole suspects Badawi
and Quso,. He was visibly pleased to receive from
Ambassador a letter of congratulations from FBI Director
Mueller. Saleh noted that Yemen,s harsh topography and
limited resources could have made the country a "den" of
terrorism similar to Afghanistan or northwest Pakistan, but
ROYG commitment and cooperation with the USG had made the
country secure. He suggested resumption of U.S. naval
refueling in Aden. Saleh appealed for continuing U.S.
assistance (both security-related and development-related)
and U.S. pressure for Yemen,s oil-rich Gulf neighbors to
assist the country as well. End Summary.


2. (SBU) CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid, accompanied
by Ambassador, called on Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh
during a five-hour visit to Sanaa on March 20. The U.S.
party also included POLAD Litt, RADM Robb, COL Reynes, OMC
Chief and DCM (notetaker). Yemeni officials present included
FM Qirbi, Defense Chief of Staff Qasimi, Interior Minister
Alimi, and PSO Chief Qamish.


3. (C) GEN Abizaid recalled his useful meeting with FM Qirbi
during the latter,s early February visit to Tampa and
Washington, and commended Saleh on the success of
recent/ongoing counterterrorism operations in Yemen. He
noted that the United States appreciates Yemen,s active
support in the global war on terrorism.

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CT Operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan
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4. (C) Saleh asked Abizaid whether media reports that
Pakistani forces had surrounded Ayman al-Zawahiri in the
tribal region of northwest Pakistan were accurate. The
General replied that it was uncertain whether or not an HVT
was present. He stressed that the initiative shown by
Pakistani forces was important nonetheless, and assured Saleh
that U.S. forces were similarly doing their part to keep
pressure on the terrorists on the Afghan side of the border.
He expressed optimism over operations in Yemen, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan, noting that Afghan President Karzai continued to
strengthen his position.


5. (C) President Saleh showed considerable interest in the
Pakistani operation, asking if Pakistani forces would remain
long in the tribal areas. Abizaid replied that Pakistani
President Musharraf understood the need to establish
authority there, so the forces were determined to remain and
dominate the region. Saleh expressed skepticism, stating
that military operations in tribal regions should be a last
resort, and effective intelligence, coupled with money to
spread around, was far more effective. He recalled previous
CENTCOM Commander GEN Tommy Franks telling him that groups in
Afghanistan were always seeking money. Saleh predicted that
the Pakistani military would find it difficult to sustain
operations in the tribal zones.

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CT Operations in Yemen
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6. (C) Saleh underscored ROYG determination to work with the
USG to defeat terrorism despite Yemen,s limited resources
and difficult geography. Yemen could have become a worse
"den" of terrorism than Afghanistan or Pakistan, he said, but
sustained and successful effort by the ROYG -- and good
cooperation with the USG on many levels -- had brought
success. Consequently Yemen is much more secure both for
Yemenis and for Americans, said Saleh, and U.S. ships can
again come to Aden to refuel. Citing his recent extended
stay in Marib, the President expressed satisfaction at the
increased presence of security forces there and in other
tribal areas of Yemen. "You will see even more of this in
future," he said.


7. (C) Although Yemen,s tribal regions present difficulties
similar to those of northwest Pakistan, said Saleh, the ROYG
had enjoyed greater CT success because of effective
intelligence. Saleh recounted several recent successes,
including the apprehension of Cole suspects Jamal al-Badawi
and Fahd al-Quso, on March 18, the March 19 capture of two
others who had been with them, and the expected imminent
capture of others. He pointed to the capture of 10 fugitive
terrorist suspects in recent days, a number which Interior
Minister Alimi amended to eight. (Note: MOI forces have
taken the lead in recent CT operations, as has become the
norm in Yemen over the past year. MOD forces are typically
in a back-up role. End Note.) Saleh accepted the amendment,
concluding that "We have effective intelligence and we spend
money, which is better than large military operations."


8. (C) In addition, said Saleh, the ROYG had made productive
use of dialogue to rehabilitate extremist sympathizers who
had not yet engaged in violent operations. PSO Chief Qamish
noted that the dialogue program had succeeded in two areas:
(a) some jailed suspects had come to realize their error and
repented; and (b) some fugitive suspects had been induced to
surrender because they knew that dialogue, rather than death
or indefinite incarceration, awaited them. Interior Minister
Alimi pointed out that dialogue was possible only/only with
suspects who had had no involvement whatsoever in planning or
carrying out criminal acts. Saleh commented that the absence
of a dialogue option contributed to the USG,s difficulty in
managing the issue of Guantanamo detainees. Ambassador
informed Saleh that the USG was addressing the issue, and
that a ROYG delegation was being invited to visit the Yemeni
detainees held at the Guantanamo facility.

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Cooperation with Saudi Arabia
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9. (C) Saleh added that cooperation with the KSA was also
important to CT success in Yemen. Recently captured
terrorist suspects had large quantities of Saudi currency,
illustrating the connection between extremists operating in
the two countries. In fact, said Saleh, the influx of Saudi
money to extremists remained a problem even though the
terrorist network in the Arabian peninsula had been greatly
diminished by U.S. and regional CT efforts. He noted that
the ROYG had turned over 15 extremists to the Saudis,
routinely provided Saudi counterparts with information
gleaned from interrogations, and needed the Saudis to share
information and hand over Yemenis arrested in KSA. Saleh
observed that religious extremism had evolved in the region
over a period of 60-70 years, so defeating it would take
work, time and money. It could not be achieved overnight,
said Saleh, but he was convinced that Crown Prince Abdullah
and Deputy MININT Mohamed bin Nayef were serious about doing
so.

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FBI Director,s Letter
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10. (C) The Ambassador also congratulated President Saleh on
Yemen,s recent CT successes, and presented him with the
Arabic text of a message from FBI Director Robert Mueller
offering congratulations on the capture of Cole suspects
Badawi and Quso,. Saleh read the text carefully and was
visibly pleased. He commented that this was the first time
he had received such an expression of thanks from the USG
over a CT success, despite Yemen,s many successes while
cooperating with the USG in the war on terrorism.

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U.S. Assistance to Yemen
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11. (C) Saleh again stressed that Yemen was committed to
"maximum cooperation" with the USG in fighting terrorism
despite the country,s limitations. He said Yemen needed
assistance in many areas, not only in security, intelligence
and military affairs, but also development assistance --
particularly in education, medical care and agriculture. "We
depend on the generosity of U.S. assistance," he said. Saleh
emphasized that he also hoped the USG would urge Yemen,s
neighbors, particularly KSA and Qatar, to be similarly
generous in aiding Yemen. He noted that some other states in
the region exert pressure on Yemen due to its close
cooperation with the USG, and that KSA had even cut some
financial assistance because the Saudi leadership had an
exaggerated idea of the scale and type of aid Yemen was
receiving from the United States. GEN Abizaid said the USG
would do what it could to assist KSA in its own CT effort and
to foster Saudi-Yemeni cooperation.


12. (C) Saleh expressed appreciation for the EDA boats
recently received for the Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG),but
appealed to GEN Abizaid to convey to Washington the message
that Yemen needs continuing assistance. As an example of the
sort of help Yemen needs in the security sector, Saleh noted
that the Yemeni military had an antiquated French
communications system. He indicated that Yemen would welcome
rehabilitation or replacement of this system by the USG.
Such aid will both increase ROYG capabilities and boost the
morale of police and security forces to work with the USG to
achieve further CT successes, he said.


13. (C) GEN Abizaid reiterated U.S. appreciation for Yemen,s
positive role in the war on terrorism, stating that he and
the Ambassador would convey the message on continued U.S.
assistance. The General said he would immediately advocate
enhanced intelligence sharing, continued training for Yemeni
military/security forces and cooperation to strengthen the
YCG. Intelligence sharing is especially significant, he
said, because the more each side knows of what the other
knows, the better they can achieve CT success together. GEN
Abizaid added that he also understood and would convey to
Secretary Rumsfeld the importance of the sort of non-military

SIPDIS
assistance Saleh had mentioned, particularly in tribal areas.

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Iraq
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14. (C) Turning to the situation in Iraq, Saleh asked the
nationality of infamous terrorist suspect Abu Musab Zarqawi.
GEN Abizaid replied that Zarqawi was Palestinian, but
acknowledged the President,s assertion that Zarqawi was
thought to hold Jordanian nationality. Saleh,s point
appeared to be that Middle Eastern terrorists originate in
many places, not only Yemen. In response to Saleh,s
question about the significance of al-Qaida as a threat in
Iraq, Abizaid listed, in descending order, four main sources
of the terrorist threat in Iraq: (a) Zarqawi; (b) Ansar
al-Islam; (c) Al-Qaida; and (d) Baathi loyalists. He noted
that U.S. forces in Afghanistan had not encountered forces
affiliated with al-Qaida in more than five months, although
Taliban forces had been engaged as recently as the previous
week. Saleh commented that many extremists claim to be
Yemeni who actually are not, and asserted that 95 percent of
the extremists in Yemen were actually born in Saudi Arabia.
"We Yemenis are not all terrorists!" he proclaimed.


15. (C) Comment. President Saleh was clearly pleased that
the timing of GEN Abizaid,s visit coincided with the
apprehension of Cole suspects Quso, and Badawi and other
significant CT successes. Saleh,s appeal for U.S. economic
assistance and U.S. pressure on oil-rich neighbors to aid
Yemen was an updated variation on an important theme.
Economic development (especially in regions predominantly
tribal and traditional) is no less important than continuing
FMF and other channels of direct security-related assistance
if CT gains in Yemen are to be sustained for the long term.
Post is coordinating with CENTCOM and CJTF/HOA to institute a
program of Civil Military Operations to provide visible,
beneficial projects. More broadly, it is essential for the
USG to maintain a significant level of ESF, in addition to
the highly successful USDA food aid programs of recent years,
in order to maintain a robust, broad based in-country
development program as a counterpart to ongoing CT engagement.

HULL