Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04SANAA622
2004-03-17 14:51:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SANAA EAC MEETING - 16 MARCH 2004

Tags:  ASEC AMGT PREL PTER YM EAC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000622 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA,
NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2013
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER YM EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - 16 MARCH 2004

REF: A. STATE 57476

B. SANAA 589

Classified By: DCM Alan G. Misenheimer, for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000622

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA,
NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2013
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER YM EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - 16 MARCH 2004

REF: A. STATE 57476

B. SANAA 589

Classified By: DCM Alan G. Misenheimer, for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)


1. (S/NF) Summary: The Ambassador convened an EAC meeting
on 3/16 to review security conditions for Embassy personnel
and the general American community in light of the recent
thwarted attack on the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan.
EAC examined Post's already stringent and comprehensive
security procedures and proposed additional security
measures. Key offices and personnel represented included:
AID, AMB, CONS, DCM, FPD, MSG, MO, OMC, ORCA, PD, POL/ECON,
RSO, and SOCE-Yemen. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) DCM and ORCA briefed EAC on the details of the
3/14 bombing attempt in Karachi, noting that security
personnel observed small but significant details that led
them to expose the attack in progress. RSO gave an update to
EAC on the recent review of security arrangements at other
sites associated with the Embassy, particularly the Sheraton
Hotel in Sanaa.


3. (S/NF) EAC discussed the security measures in place and
the potential threat posed to residences and other
Embassy-related compounds by improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) concealed in large, high-capacity load vehicles such
as water-tank trucks. EAC outlined three areas for further
planning: (1) to consult with the ROYG on plans and
capabilities for defusing vehicle-borne improvised explosive
devices (VBIEDs); (2) to reassess and address risk from
residential water deliveries; and, (3) to explore if
additional controls for the post-managed butane canister
delivery system were necessary.

-------------- ---
RAPID RESPONSE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD)
-------------- ---


4. (S/NF) EAC agreed that RSO would take the lead in
working with the ROYG to identify and, as possible,
strengthen current explosive ordnance disposal capabilities
in the military and/or police forces. Post will examine
options for U.S. assistance in the training of rapid-response
Yemeni EOD personnel. RSO will also plan a drill or exercise
based on the Karachi consulate attack scenario.

--------------
WATER DELIVERIES TO RESIDENCES
--------------


5. (S/NF) EAC discussed residential water deliveries from
outside contractors and ways to further minimize potential
risk. As a first step, the Embassy will adjust the schedule
of water deliveries to weekday work hours to minimize
exposure to embassy personnel. Also, families, members of
household and any personal household staff will be made aware
of the water truck delivery schedule and will continue their
vigilance of suspicious or out-of-schedule deliveries. Post
will also examine options for transferring water delivery
services to Post management if deemed necessary.

--------------
WARDEN MEETING
--------------


6. (S/NF) EAC decided to hold a warden meeting to discuss
the security situation with the wider community (scheduled
for 3/22). EAC noted nervousness among community members
because of the Madrid attacks and the subsequent statement of
the Abu-Hafs Al-Masri Brigades (ref b),although the
much-publicized al-Qaeda videotape (ref a) contains
references to seven other countries but not Yemen. DCM
concluded that these developments, as well as recent CT
operations in Abyan, provided a powerful reminder of the
importance of ongoing vigilance and sound personal security
practices -- even though all available information contains
no/no reports of specific threats or attack planning in Yemen.

--------------
TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS
--------------

7. (U) In addition to security, the DCM noted the
continuing dangers of traffic accidents as the biggest risk
faced by Embassy Sanaa personnel. RSO briefed on details of
a catastrophic traffic accident near the Embassy on 3/15, in
which a large truck went out of control and caused multiple
fatalities. An embassy employee was in the car just behind
the one demolished by the truck. RSO reminded EAC members
that all Embassy personnel should keep radios with them at
all times for traffic warnings and alerts, in addition to
security measures.

HULL