SANAA EAC MEETING - DECEMBER 6, 2004

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 003025

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS,
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2014
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - DECEMBER 6, 2004

REF: A. SANAA 3014

B. SANAA 3013

Classified By: RSO Tim Laas, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.1. (S/NF) Begin Summary: On December 6, 2004, the Chief
Of Mission chaired a core Emergency Action Committee meeting
with COM, DCM, POLMIL, DATT, FPD, LEGAT, SOC-Yemen, OMC,
CONS, POLECON, PDO and RSO in attendance. The topic of
discussion was security conditions for the American community
in Yemen following the attack on the American Consulate in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The Political Military Office briefed
members on the incident and reported no specific threat
against Americans in Yemen. The RSO briefed the EAC on
current security activities intended to thwart a similar
attack in Sanaa. After a review of security, EAC members
recommended no change in current security policy and measures
following regional incidents. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) EAC members reviewed current security conditions
and measures as follows:

- The RSO briefed EAC members on security at the Chancery
noting that American Embassy Sanaa: It was note that American
Embassy Sanaa utilizes a vehicle trap and pedestrian trap at
both compound gates and at the Embassy entrance; Both
perimeter vehicle gates utilize a double Delta barrier system
at each gate and two ram-resistant electric sliding
vehicles/anti-personnel gates. No perimeter gate, vehicle or
pedestrian gate is open unless the other one is closed,
insuring a trap to prevent intrusion. Additionally perimeter
gates are fortified by hardened bullet resistant guard
booths; MSG,s standing guard orders require immediate lock
down from Post 1 of any entrance that experiences an
incident; For the Chancery building, RSO has had one entrance
permanently locked down since 2002, operating only one
entrance to concentrate access security screening at that
point reducing the possibility of an intrusion; and finally
the Chancery entrance utilizes a personnel trap.

- EAC reviewed the integrity of Embassy walls. RSO advised
EAC members that during past reviews of this wall it was
determined that the structure utilized anti-ram knee walls
and were of a design that would be very difficult to breach
with even multiple attacks due to the collapse of debris.

- The EAC reviewed procedures that will be followed by this
community after any report of an incident regionally that may
have ramifications for the security of the community in
Sanaa. The EAC noted that the COM had decided not to change
the security profile following today's incident in SA, i.e.
he did not call for a standfast of community members.
However, EAC members with the COM concurrence agreed that in
future incidents such as seen in SA, an EAC meeting would be
convened immediately to gather all sources of information and
make a determination as to whether to standfast, request
additional Yemen government support or take other appropriate
action.

- POLMIL advised EAC members that no specific information
exists which would indicate a possible attack/specific threat
against the American community in Sanaa. POLMIL noted
possible surveillance in Jeddah prior to this attack and also
discussed the possibility that the attack was in retaliation
for a recent success by SA forces against a terrorist
safehouse.

- RSO noted one surveillance incident within the past ninety
days against the Hadda Apartment Compound. The MOI advised
RSO that the vehicle use to conduct the possible incident was
owned by a Tunisian diplomat who is believed to have left
town as part of a permanent change of duty station, but left
the vehicle with unknown persons to sell the car. MOI found
the current owner of the vehicle but assessed that the owner
was not the surveillant and was not a threat to the American
community.

- RSO informed EAC members about a security review conducted
with all RSO program team leaders of their programs to
include the Marine Security Guard Detachment, LGF,
Surveillance Detection Team and RSO Investigators as well as
ROYG perimeter security commanders. Team chiefs reviewed
lessons learned from the incident in Jeddah in an attempt to
ensure proper conduct of policies and procedures as well as
proper function of all physical security equipment. The
review mentally walked team chiefs through attack scenarios
and should bolster perimeter security and internal defense
reactions in the event of a serious incident.

- The EAC was advised by the COM that RSO would conduct an
intruder drill within the Embassy compound this week during
hours of operation. It was noted that an intruder drill had
not been conducted with Embassy personnel for several months.


- RSO advised EAC members that an internal warden meeting
would be held on 7 December 2004 for Embassy wardens to
review all emergency scenarios.

- EAC members discussed the likelihood that multiple attacks
could occur in the region as has been seen in the past.

- COM mission asked RSO to pass lessons learned from the
Jeddah incident to MOI during his weekly meeting with the
Chief of Staff and the Embassy's ROYG security commanders
from Central Security Organization as well as the Political
Security Organization. Lessons learned include the
terrorists use of official uniforms and police vehicles to
surreptitious enter security perimeters. (RSO Comment: ROYG
vehicles are not allowed onto the Embassy compound and ROYG
officials do not carry weapons onto the compound when
entering the Embassy perimeter.)

- COM instructed section chiefs to allow their staff to
stagger their arrival times to prevent bottle necking at the
Embassy perimeter gate where vehicle inspections are held.
In 2003 RSO moved the inspection point further from the
public street with a lower profile, putting one layer of ROYG
security personnel between the screened vehicle and the
public and providing better concealment from the street.

- RSO agreed to pass the concerns of EAC members to MOI
regarding a key choke point (traffic circle) down from the
Embassy.

- The EAC directed the RSO to put out a security advisory
reminding community members about best practices when
commuting and a note on participating in the weekly radio
check conducted by Post 1.

- EAC asked the RSO for an update on routes used by the
community shuttle. The RSO discussed vehicle with the EAC
ensuring members that his last review of routes was as of the
last week in November and that review showed a good variation
of both COM motorcade routes and community shuttle routes.
Additionally, EAC members were advised that RSO recently
reconfirmed with the motorpool supervisor that armored
vehicles must be utilized for transporting American Embassy
officers in clusters. (RSO Comment: Locking devices are
becoming problematic on Embassy armored vehicles and GSO has
vehicle repair parts on order.)

- The COM directed the Management Office to update the
Telephone Tree. (RSO Note: The Radio Emergency and
Evacuation network, by far the best method of emergency
communications has serious problems with transmissions within
Sanaa's mountainous terrain, and has been extremely stilted
due to ROYG unwillingness to cooperate with the Embassy in
the upgrade of current networks, not allowing the Embassy to
purchase additional frequencies and install new repeaters in
strategic locations.)

- The GSO briefed EAC members on the status of the armored
vehicle fleet.


3. (U) The EAC had no specific threat information regarding
Yemen at the time of the meeting and no public warden message
was recommended by EAC members.


4. (U) RSO advised the EAC that two cables, REFTELS Sanaa
3013 and 3014, were sent as of 6 December 2004, requesting
funding for upgrades in the amount of 150K for the Hadda
Apartment Compound where the Embassy leases eleven apartments
and for 225K for upgrades to the Embassy perimeter based on
MOI recommendations/requests for specific upgrades and
logistical support.


5. (U) RSO will meet with the MOI Chief of Staff Brigadier
General Sunidar on 6 December 2004 to review security in
Yemen for the American community following the incident in
Jeddah. RSO contacts have informed the RSO the MOI has
stepped up their physical security presence in the Hadda
western residential area for an unspecified time following
the incident in Jedah.


6. (U) The Ambassador concluded the EAC meeting by directing
the RSO to ensure appropriate information regarding best
practices is shared with the community and the MOI.
KRAJESKI