ASSESSMENT OF THE YEMENI CENTRAL SECURITY FORCES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002985

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2014
TAGS: PARM PREL MASS YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF THE YEMENI CENTRAL SECURITY FORCES
COUNTER TERRORISM-UNIT

REF: STATE 242948

Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) This message is in response to reftel request for
additional information on USG assistance for the Yemeni
Central Security Forces for the purpose of assessing the best
funding mechanism. USG training for the CSF-CTU is an
integral part of U.S.-ROYG cooperation in the GWOT.

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Central Security Forces Counter Terrorism Unit
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2. (S) The Yemeni Central Security Force (CSF) is a
paramilitary counter-terrorism, emergency reaction, and
counter-coup force that can provide reinforcement to the
Yemeni armed forces. Its primary missions are internal
security and counter-terrorism operations. Within the CSF,
only the Counter-Terrorism Unit (CSF-CTU) is tasked with the
primary domestic counter-terrorism mission; no CSF units
conduct foreign internal defense. The CSF-CTU does not
expect to be used outside the territory or territorial waters
of Yemen. The CSF-CTU acknowledges that only the Yemeni
Special Operations Forces (YSOF),who belong to the Ministry
of Defense, will ever be used outside Yemen.

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CSF-CTU Capabilities
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3. (S) Current Country Team planning does not contemplate
assistance to any part of the CSF, other than the CSF-CTU.
Similarly, Post is not aware of, and advises against, any
plans to assist any other parts of the CSF, other than the
CSF-CTU.


4. (S) According to a National Ground Intelligence Center
(NGIC) assessment, conducted in 2002, the CSF contains
approximately 20,000 members organized into two different
types of battalion-sized organizations: Special Forces
Battalions (Al-Quwat al Khasa) and Commando/Ranger Battalions
(Quwat Al-Sai,qa). The general number of personnel in each
battalion varies from 450-750. Each battalion possesses
several pick-up-type trucks with a 12.7mm machine gun mounted
on the back. Each truck is crewed by six personnel.
Individual weapons are the AK-47-type assault rifle and 9mm
Markarov pistol. The CSF-CTU is separate from these
organizations, but does draw recruits/volunteers from them.
The CSF-CTU has approximately 150 members, divided between
three CT platoons and a small headquarters element. The
CSF-CTU is equipped in a similar manner to the rest of the
CSF. Expertise and demonstrated capability in hostage
rescue, high-value target operations, close quarters battle
and forced entry are what differentiates the CSF-CTU from its
parent organization.

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Command and Control
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5. (S) The CSF falls under the authority of the Minister of
Interior, Dr. Rashad al-Alimi. The CSF Director is Brigadier
General al-Tayyeb and the Chief of Staff is Colonel Yahya
M.A. Saleh. Colonel Yahya Saleh is the nephew of Yemeni
President Ali Abdallah Saleh. A ministerial-level committee
comprised of the ministers of Interior, Defense, plus
Military Intelligence and the director of the Political
Security Organization (PSO) conducts planning for
counter-terrorism operations. Once a plan is created, it is
given to the appropriate CSF unit for execution. CSF units
find it difficult to communicate operationally because their
equipment lacks signal strength and the rough terrain limits
their line of site (LOS) signal systems. The CSF-CTU suffers
from the same command control deficiencies as the generic
CSF. CSF-CTU Command, Control and Communications (C3)
deficiencies are excellent projects for future FMF, PKO or
OGA funding.

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CSF-CTU Training and Equipment Needs
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6. (S) CSF training requirements for the period of FY 05-07
are as follows:

-- FY 05 training requirements: One 4-man Counter-Terrorism
Training Team from November 2004 until May 2005. One 6-man
Counter-Terrorism Training Team from May to September 2005.
Emergency and Extraordinary Expense (EEE) funding has been
approved by the SECDEF in the amounts of $250,000 for this
11-month period.
-- FY 06: One 6-man Counter-Terrorism Training Team from
October 2005 to September 2006.

-- FY 07: One 6-man Counter-Terrorism Training Team from
October 2006 to September 2007.


7. (S) CSF Equipment requirements for FY 05-07: OGA has
been solely responsible for equipping the CSF-CTU up until
very recently. It is Embassy Sanaa,s understanding that OGA
is reconsidering equipment expenditures for CSF for FY 2005
and beyond. As of September 04, 4.1 million USD of PKO funds
have been approved and used to open a &pseudo8 FMS case to
procure ambulances, mobile C2 vans and both armored and
un-armored vans for the transportation of the CSF-CT Unit.
Use of these PKO funds was considered and approved as a
&one-time8 occurrence. If, however, normal FMF is to be
the principal vehicle used to fund the CSF-CTU in the future,
and OGA funding is in doubt, it will be necessary to request
that 4.5 million USD be budgeted/ear-marked for the CSF-CTU
for both FY,s 06 and 07. FY 06 funds would be used to
procure secure, tactical communications equipment and
additional armored vehicles; FY 07 funds would be used to
procure a new Yemeni National Terrorism Coordination Center.
If CSF-CTU funding requirements are not reflected in
increased FMF budgets, a re-prioritization of FMF funding
allocations will be required.

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Prioritization of CSF-CTU Funding Requests
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8. (S) The CSF-CTU should be considered as the co-priority
for FMF funds, along with the Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG) and
before the Yemen Army, Navy and Air Force. Yemen has
under-utilized its FMF budget for the past several years.
Because FMF funds are &5-year8 money, this has resulted in
an un-allocated amount between 14-17 million USD remaining
unspent and currently available for reallocation to new
projects such as the CSF-CTU. Including the CSF-CTU in
out-year FMF budgets will have a negligible effect on current
or future, Yemen Army, Navy and Air Force budgets since the
Yemen Ministry of Defense is extremely unsophisticated in its
understanding and use of FMF.


9. (U) Point of Contact for further information is Colonel
Mark J. Devlin, U.S. Army, OMC, Yemen, (967) (1) 303-155 ext.

2879.
KRAJESKI