INTERIOR MINISTER ALIMI ON RAMADAN RELEASES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002754

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2014
TAGS: PTER PREL YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER ALIMI ON RAMADAN RELEASES


Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary. DCM pressed Interior Minister al-Alimi
on October 26 not to proceed with ROYG plans to release all
138 security detainees, Hadi Dulqum, and Jaber al-Banna in a
Ramadan Amnesty in the next days and weeks. A decision to go
forward, said DCM, may have serious consequences for
U.S.-Yemen partnership in the GWOT.. DCM urged Alimi to
continue to hold 30 of the 138, plus Dulqum and al-Banna,
while we work together to investigate and build legal cases
against them. Alimi agreed in principle to cooperate and
also recommended we work directly with the attorney general
on the al-Banna and Dulqum cases to explore the possibility
of prosecution; the MOI cautioned, however, that President
Saleh's deadlines stood and any review of cases had to be
accomplished within the set timeframe. End Summary.

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Eleventh Hour Meeting
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2. (S/NF) DCM, COS, Legatt and Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker)
met with Interior Minister Alimi at 2300 on October 26 to
discuss the pending Ramadan release of 138 security
detainees, Hadi Dulqum, and Jaber al-Banna. DCM made clear
the negative mood in Washington and possible consequences for
the ROYG vis-a-vis USG cooperation and assistance on all
fronts should Yemen release these known al-Qaida associates
before a legal case against them can be assembled. Alimi
repeated the ROYG's position that the releases could be
prevented only if the USG provided solid case evidence that
could be used in a Yemeni court. He added that we should
trust the strong measures the ROYG would take to ensure that
those releases stay out of trouble.


3. (S/NF) COS responded that information on USG objection
to the release of 30 of the 138 individuals would be provided
the next morning (October 27),however, he stressed, it was
incumbent upon the ROYG to build a legal case, according to
Yemeni law. DCM proposed a joint effort by USG and ROYG
officials to review together the evidence against the 30
detainees, Dulqum and al-Banna, in order to find a legal
solution. Alimi agreed in principle, but insisted that the
ROYG had no other information and was relying on the U.S. to
provide evidence.

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Dulqum and al-Banna
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4. (S/NF) In response to Alimi's claim that the ROYG
possesses no evidence on Dulqum and al-Banna's links to
al-Qaida, Legatt showed Alimi a 52-page dossier on al-Banna
and promised to provide an Arabic translation within days.
(Note: the dossier represents the latest of several
summaries of al-Banna's federal indictment shared by legatt
with the ROYG. End Note). Information that links Dulqum
directly to AQ, said COS, has been shared with the ROYG. We
do not believe that information is true, retorted Alimi, and
we cannot try Dulqum on the evidence we currently have.
EmbOffs pressed the danger in going ahead with the releases,
pointed out several cases where the ROYG released individuals
who went on to perpetrate suicide and other terrorists
attacks in the region.


5. (S/NF) "We have laws," said Alimi, "a Constitution, a
Parliament to which we are responsible. There are
journalists, human rights groups, families of detainees we
must answer to; we cannot continue to hold these men
indefinitely without bringing them to trial." DCM agreed,
saying the U.S. is asking the ROYG to show it is serious
about our partnership in the GWOT by not releasing known AQ
associates while we work together to build a legal case
against them. "The door is open," replied Alimi, but the
President's deadlines stand and we have to work within those
limits.

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Comment
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6. (S/NF) During his phone call with NSC CT Advisor
Townsend, Saleh agreed to postpone any releases until the
20th day of Ramadan (November 3),and to hold Dulqum and
al-Banna until Ramadan is over. Neither Saleh nor Alimi,
however, are showing signs of backing-down. The ROYG
continues to demand the USG provide solid case evidence to
prevent the releases. Although Saleh has in the past offered
to hand over al-Banna in exchange for 5 million in rewards
for justice program funds, the current ROYG stance, that
Yemen law prevents extradition of citizens to other
countries, in concert with their claim that he has not
violated Yemeni law, leaves us at a stand-still on a legal
solution for al-Banna. We will report further developments.
End Comment.
KRAJESKI