GME: REFORM YEMENI-STYLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001193

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM YM DEMOCRATIC REFORM
SUBJECT: GME: REFORM YEMENI-STYLE

REF: A. SECSTATE 106755

B. SANAA 956

C. SANAA 1172

D. SANAA 1178

Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for Reasons 1.5 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Embassy Sanaa continues to engage government,
civil society and business leaders on the Greater Middle East
draft proposals (ref a). While most interlocutors express
opposition to the idea of reform being "imposed from outside
the region," the discussion generated by the GMEI appears to
have spurred increased attention on reform efforts within
Yemen. The acceptance by President Saleh to attend the G-8
summit and to host the pilot microfinance project proposal
(refs c and d),along with reform efforts by non-government
actors, point towards increased willingness to allow
practical considerations to override reluctance stemming from
anger over Iraq, the MEPP and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.
Ongoing reform efforts in Yemen, including economic reform
and the parliament's recent increased attention on government
corruption, illustrate that the seeds of reform are already
growing in Yemen. Few interlocutors have indicated opinions
on any of the specific proposals, preferring to make general
comments and/or concentrate on what is needed in Yemen. End
Summary.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP REACTION


2. (C) Ambassador met with Senior Presidential Advisor and
former Prime Minister Dr. Abdul Karim al-Iryani 5/11. Iryani
said he sees a "positive evolution" in Arab attitudes towards
GMEI that he expects to be reflected in the outcome of the
Arab summit May 22-23. He said he understood that Arab
Foreign Ministers have agreed on a generally positive
position on reform, without necessarily any reference to
GMEI. He noted one sticking point has been (and possibly
remains) Saudi refusal to endorse multi-party democracy.
Iryani noted a "healthy ferment" on reform in Yemen. He
raised two concerns on GMEI. He asked if there was "any
meat" to the proposals, to which Ambassador noted the
microfinance initiative (ref d). He said Arab public opinion
continues to perceive GMEI as a dodge for engaging seriously
the Palestinian issue, whether or not that is the case.


3. (C) With the exception of Prime Minister Ba Jammal,
reactions at the highest levels of the ROYG are indicative of
support, with President Saleh accepting the invitation to Sea
Island and Deputy Prime Minister Sofan noting support in a
written letter (refs c and d). The PM, however, made a
statement in the press that the only reform Yemen needs is
unification. Comment: The PM is notorious for making
statements outside the ROYG norm and is currently under
pressure from a corruption scandal. End Comment.


4. (U) The Consultative (or Shura) Council, Yemen's appointed
111-member upper house, held a conference 5/17-18 to discuss
the 2003 Arab Human Development report and the GMEI papers
that was attended by high-ranking ROYG officials (including
DPM Sofan, FM Qirbi and al-Iryani),political parties, NGOs,
academics and others.

NGOS AND THINK TANKS ACTIVE ON ISSUE; POLITICAL PARTIES


5. (U) Several NGOs and think tanks have recently held
seminars and discussions on reform in Yemen. For example,
the Yemen Institute for Democratic Development (YIDD) held a
workshop in late April, attended by political parties,
journalists and other intellectuals at which the Foreign
Minister spoke. The tenor of discussion centered around
fueling reform within Yemen while not allowing reform to be
imposed by the outside. A prominent think tank leader Dr.
Fares al-Saqqaf held discussions with government, opposition
and non-partisan Yemenis, with Emboffs invited to listen.
Although a few references were made to the absence of
Israel-Palestine solutions in the initiative and a rejection
of reform from the outside, most of the discussion focused
practically on reforms needed within Yemen. Dr. al-Saqqaf
told Pol/Econ Deputy that he formed a committee of
government, political party and NGO leaders, including Deputy
Foreign Minister Mustafa Noman (ref b),to formulate a
"National Initiative for Political Reform."


6. (C) Prominent NGO leader Izzedine al-Asbahi of the Human
Rights Training and Research Center (HRITC) echoed several
other interlocutors when he told Pol/Econ Deputy that he was
concerned that the recent scandals regarding abuses at Abu
Ghraib lessened the credibility of the U.S. in pushing for
reform, which he saw as a disappointing development for the
region.


7. (U) Opposition political parties took the opportunity
presented by GMEI to put pressure on the ROYG for continued
reform within Yemen, despite most parties publicly rejecting
any reform initiatives coming from the West. The Yemen
Socialist Party (YSP) is most supportive among political
parties. The YSP Secretary General Ali Saleh Obad Muqbil was
quoted in a speech given to his Central Committee 5/6
(printed in the party newspaper),"this motion created by
international initiatives for reforms in the region provides
a valuable opportunity for the will of reform and change at
the national levels of all Arab and Muslim states.
Therefore, we have to rush to seize the moment to generate a
strong pressuring force to accomplish real reforms." YSP
leaders in Taiz, the third-largest city in Yemen, echoed this
sentiment to Pol/Econ Deputy, noting that outside pressure
was useful in their fight for Yemeni reform but also
expressing hope that the initiatives would be practical
rather than just rhetorical. The second-largest opposition
party Islah displayed skepticism at the central level about
whether the GME would "end up supporting the regime or the
reform seekers," while Islah moderates in Taiz expressed
cautious support to Pol/Econ Deputy.

COMMENT


8. (C) Embassy interlocutors seem torn between wanting to
support GMEI for their own reasons, i.e., watering the seeds
of Yemeni reform, and being reluctant to support any
initiative that comes from the outside. Several noted a
decided lack of credibility stemming from the recent prison
abuse scandal in Iraq and the absence of the Palestinian
issue. The widespread exploration of the reform agenda
regardless probably stems from a typically Yemeni willingness
to be practical, internal and external political calculations
and the desire by Yemen to maintain what it perceives as its
leadership in political reform in the region. End Comment.
HULL