EXTRANCHECK REPORT: PRE-LICENSE CHECK FADEL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001191

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR EB/ESP; U.S. CUSTOMS HG FOR STRATEGIC
INVESTIGATIONS; ROME FOR CUSTOMS ATTACHE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC YE
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK REPORT: PRE-LICENSE CHECK FADEL
AL-HUSSEINI

REF: A. USDOC 01535

B. SANAA 00823

C. USDOC 00982


1. (u) Summary. Reftel c requested a pre-license check (PLC)
of the cargo trucks and spare parts of the Republican Guard
of Yemen. Despite repeated attempts, Post did not get the
full cooperation of the Republican Guard and was not able to
access facilities to conduct the PLC as requested by
Department of Commerce (DOC). Over a period of 60 days, with
the help of a four-week extension (ref a) on the original
deadline (ref c),Post explained the PLC process and
consequences of noncompliance to the Republican Guard of
Yemen through both diplomatic and military liaison channels.
After having consulted with DOC officials, Post will send a
diplomatic note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and
the Republican Guard outlining the possible repercussions,
including loss of the license to receive these export
commodities. End Summary.

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BACKGROUND
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2. (u) Post received original PLC request in reftel c on
March 8. The purchaser is the Fadel Al-Husseini Trading
Group. The enduser is the Republican Guard of Yemen. The
enduser site is the training and storage facilities of the
Yemeni Republican Guard camps.


3. (sbu) In reftel b, Post requested an extension of four
weeks to pursue investigating the extrancheck request. USDOC
granted a four-week extension until May 10 (ref a).

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ATTEMPTS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS
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4. (u) Starting March 13, Emboffs made repeated attempts
through emails, telephone calls, and faxes (per Republican
Guard request) to arrange a pre-license check visit (ref b).
On March 31, Post submitted a diplomatic note to the
Republican Guard through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) requesting cooperation on the extrancheck. Post
repeatedly notified all parties that the extrancheck is a
requirement of the agreement to purchase these commodities.
Emboffs contacted many parties at the MFA and the Republican
Guard including the following: Major Walid al-Eryani, Deputy
Office Manager of the Commander Ali's office; Zaid
al-Wareeth, MFA Protocol; and, Hadi Haidarah Qassem, MFA
Protocol. In their comments, the parties demonstrated
understanding but did not allow Emboffs to inspect any cargo
trucks or the maintenance shop for the trucks.


5. (u) Based on consultations with DOC officials, Post will
send a diplomatic note to the MFA and the Republican Guard
informing them of the consequences of noncompliance, which
include placement on the interagency list of "unverified
parties" and potential non-issuance of this or future
licenses.

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ATTEMPTS THROUGH MILITARY LIASON CHANNELS
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6. (sbu) Post recruited the assistance of the Operational
Control Element in Sanaa (OCE-S) from the United States
Special Operations Force. Jeffrey Cuiper, Officer in Charge
of OCE-S, and James Holmes, OCE-S Chief of Operations, train
and supply military equipment to the Special Operations Force
of Republic of Yemen (Y-SOF). The head of the Yemeni Special
Operations Force is also the head of the Republican Guard,
Ahmed Ali, son of President Saleh. Since April 13, OCE-S has
made repeated requests to Ahmed Ali's office through Captain
Rajeh, liason officer of Y-SOF and the Republican Guard.
With our assistance, OCE-S provided all vehicle
identification numbers (VINs) of the cargo trucks the
Republican Guard has already received from American companies
through the Al-Husseini Company. Post requested to see any
five cargo trucks of 17 VINs provided. OCE-S's requests for
inspection of parts and cargo trucks has so far gone
unanswered despite notification that if the Republican Guard
blocks this inspection, this order may not be shipped and
that all future military equipment from the U.S. Department
of Defense may also be jeopardized.

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CONTACTS WITH DOC
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7. (u) In a April 3 teleconference, Emboff consulted Mary
O'Brien, Department of Commerce employee in Abu Dhabi,
regarding the extrancheck. Post faxed her the bills of
lading and other documents provided by Fadel Al-Husseini.
She indicated that inspection of cargo trucks and spare parts
in the maintenance shop are essential to this pre-license
check.


8. (sbu) Per a May 11 teleconference with Tom Andrukonis, DOC
Office of Enforcement, Post obtained an outline of possible
consequences of noncompliance with the pre-license check.

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COMMENT
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9. (sbu) Despite being notified of the potential consequences
of non-compliance, the Republican Guard has been
uncooperative with Post's requests to allow the pre-license
check. Post utilized multiple channels of inquiry to assist
the Republican Guard with this purchase. Nevertheless, the
Republican Guard failed to allow access to the facilities and
equipment as requested. Post has limited confidence that
this most recent diplomatic note will improve the situation.
End Comment.
HULL