ITALY/AFGHANISTAN: CONTRIBUTIONS TO ISAF EXPANSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000927

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR AF IT NATO AFGHANISTAN IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: ITALY/AFGHANISTAN: CONTRIBUTIONS TO ISAF EXPANSION

REF: STATE 50477

Classified By: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Italy remains fully on board with ISAF
expansion. Although no formal policy decision has yet been
made, the GOI (reportedly working closely with SHAPE) is
focused on Herat, with the only apparent question being
whether Italy will lead only a PRT, or that and a Forward
Support Base (FSB),as well. (A letter from DSACEUR to
Italy's CHOD evidently requests both.) Both MOD and MFA
interlocutors emphasized concerns about equipment support
needed to lead an FSB. They indicate that there is an
informal understanding with SHAPE that they would not be
expected to offer a concrete "pledge" at the March 11 Force
Generation conference, which, they explained, would focus on
Stage 1; Italy's contributions would come into play in Stage

2. Italy is no longer interested in a Ghazni PRT. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) Pol-Mil Couns, accompanied by Poloff, delivered
reftel points to MFA Special Envoy for Afghanistan,
Ambassador Enrico De Maio, and to NATO Office Director, Cons.
Giovanni Brauzzi, on March 8. Pol-Mil Couns also raised them
in a separate conversation with the Defense Minister's
Diplomatic Adviser, Minister Francesco Trupiano. Our
interlocutors cautioned that no final GOI decision has yet
been made, but both discussions found Italian planning for
GOI contributions to ISAF expansion well underway, focusing
on a PRT in Herat, with serious attention being given also to
leading a Forward Support Base there.


3. (C) GOI representatives are in close contact with SHAPE;
Trupiano and Brauzzi said DSACEUR sent a written request to
Italy's CHOD requesting Italy lead a "PRT and FSB" in Herat.
(Although the NATO request was reportedly straightforward,
some confusion remained in the MFA as to whether the U.S.
specifically sought a PRT, an FSB, or both.) Irritation at
the USG's abrupt turn-around on Italy's Ghazni PRT seems to
have diminished, if not disappeared completely; some
nervousness about the possibility of another about-face
remains. De Maio and Brauzzi requested specific USG
confirmation that Italian leadership in Herat was in line
with USG planning. All/all interlocutors indicated that the
GOI is no longer considering Ghazni as a potential PRT
location. Italy fully shares the USG's sense of urgency for
expanding ISAF as quickly as possible, for the host of
political and security reasons applicable.


4. (C) MFA interlocutors confided that there are concerns
in the Italian military that an FSB might be too large and
difficult a task, and suggested that the U.S. might help
allay those concerns. They told us MFA Secretary General
Vattani chaired a March 8 meeting and directed that the GOI
would move "in a new direction," apparently in reference to
supporting an FSB. Both our MFA and MOD interlocutors raised
specific concerns about the full range of assets needed for
an FSB, mentioning specifically helicopters and close air
support, and suggesting it would be most helpful if U.S.
assets could be added to the mix. They underscored that
Italy would also need support from other countries. The
comments of our interlocutors, however, did not suggest
unwillingness, but rather reasonably advanced planning which
was revealing the challenges of the task Italy hopes to take
on.


5. (C) De Maio and Brauzzi mused about the difference
between a "logistical hub" and a full FSB, noting that
smaller footprints sometimes might be preferable. Brauzzi
and De Maio fully concurred, however, that an FSB would need
logistical support and medical evacuation capabilities, among
others.


6. (C) MFA representatives highlighted the political
sensitivity of an FSB, particularly one in Herat. They
underscored the need for flexibility in planning the
operation, including by military planners. Would Ismail Khan
welcome a large military organization "establishing security"
on his turf? Could such an operation potentially destabilize

a currently-stable area? De Maio emphasized the history of
GOI cultural contributions in Herat as a strong plus for
Italian leadership there. Italy is well and favorably known
in Herat, he said. He added that Italy's positive relations
with neighboring Iran could also be a plus.


7. (SBU) Trupiano said Italy's newly-appointed Vice CHOD,
General Castegnetti, would likely lead Italy's delegation to
the March 11 Force Generation conference. In any event,
"senior Italian officers" will attend. Both he and the MFA
representatives clearly understood that Italy's contributions
were being sought for Stage 2, and suggested an understanding
already exists with SHAPE that Italy will not play a large
role in the Thursday conference.


8. (U) Kabul Minimize considered.
SEMBLER


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2004ROME00927 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL