TRILATERALISM: ITALY NOT ANNOYED, BUT, FOR NOW,

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000540

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2014
TAGS: PREL FR GM UK IT ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: TRILATERALISM: ITALY NOT ANNOYED, BUT, FOR NOW,
NOT OVERLY CONCERNED

REF: LONDON 470

Classified By: POLMINCOUNS TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.5 (B)(D).


1. (C) Summary: The last thing Europe needs is a new
troika. That's the consistent line taken by Italian
government officials, in both public statements and
conversations with Embassy Rome staff. The UK-French-German
"trilateral" initiative (as described reftel) is divisive,
diverts attention from constitutional treaty negotiations,
and sends the wrong signal to the rest of Europe, not least
to the accession states. Further, if Italy had been asked to
join the club, it would have refused. There's clearly an
element of rationalization in this principled stance. Still,
the MFA is clearly concerned that this latest iteration of an
EU "directorate" will disillusion accession states already
wary of Brussels' increasing authority over their affairs.
The menu of issues on which the "trilaterals'" views coalesce
is limited enough, though, that it should naturally constrain
their ability to drive too much EU policy. Italy agrees that
a core group of members coming together, under the right
circumstances, to push the EU forward may induce the other
members to come to agreement on the institutional changes
required to run the EU more efficiently at 25. End Summary.


2. (C) In an aside during a lunch with visiting US G-8
Poldir Glynn Davies (septel),MFA Political Director (and
Ambassador-designate to the UK) Giancarlo Aragona, while
clearly irritated about the "trilateralism" initiative,
opined that the UK "had inserted itself" into an ongoing
Franco-German dialogue simply in order to protect its own
interests. Though member-states had long understood the
"special psychology" underpinning the Franco-German
relationship, they had little patience for a triumvirate that
shared so few common positions, especially on internal EU
issues. "We feel strongly" that it's simply a bad idea,"
Aragona underscored.


3. (C) MFA director for EU institutional issues, Giuseppe
Buccino-Grimaldi, said that Prime Minister Frattini's public
statement on January 20 and follow-up press interviews made
clear that Italy agrees the EU integration process must
accelerate, but disagrees on the trilateralism methodology.
Frattini underlined (in that interview) that if Italy had
been offered the opportunity to join the three, it would have
refused. Most worrying, according to Buccino-Grimaldi, is
that the initiative diverts attention from the ongoing effort
to forge an EU constitution, and could undermine efforts to
integrate new members. Italy is not necessarily opposed to
smaller groups eventually taking the lead on key EU
initiatives, but only in the context of structured
cooperation as prescribed in a constitutional treaty, and
with the ultimate aim of forging consensus on required
institutional changes.


4. (C) Buccino-Grimaldi's view is that the inherent
differences in how the three view key EU issues (particularly
defense) will ultimately limit the influence of
"trilateralism" in the long run, especially if ongoing
negotiations begin to indicate chances for adoption of the
constitutional treaty during the Irish or Dutch Presidencies.
While echoing Frattini's assertion that Italy would have
refused if asked to join the three, he did not close the door
on Italy's participation in such a grouping should it become
apparent that agreement on a constitutional treaty is not
possible.


5. (C) Daniele Mancini (who reports directly to the Secretary
General on U.S.-EU relations) told PolMilOff that "if Italy
had been asked to join the club, my hope is that it would
have refused, although a core group of all the founding
members coming together to push the EU forward would make
some sense." The UK-French-German initiative is divisive, he
continued, and sends the wrong signal to the rest of Europe,
not least to the accession states. Moreover, moving forward
at three plays into the hands of those who would divide
Europe into new and old camps.


6. (C) Comment: Leaving the door open to possible Italian
participation in a core group, even under the condition of
the collapse of debate on the constitution, calls into
question Italy's claim that if asked, it would not have
joined the UK-French-German initiative. Readers who recall
how hard Italy fought to join exclusive foreign policy
groupings like the Quint and the Contact Group may also find
it hard to believe that the Italians are anything other than
insulted at not being invited. But times change. Italian
officials are clearly dismayed by efforts to create an EU
avant-guard at such a crucial moment in the EU constitutional
process. Our initial soundings suggest Italy will neither try
to break into the club nor seek to create a counterbalancing
axis. Rather, it will continue to call for more majority
decision making on foreign policy and seek to position itself


as the high-minded champion of inclusive decision making
within the EU, hoping that inconsistencies within the
"directorate" prevent it from getting political legs. On
February 17 (the eve of the next trilateral summit) FM
Frattini will make a major foreign policy address to
Parliament. We expect that ongoing debate within the Italian
government on how to deal with "trilateralism," from both
Italian and EU perspectives will be a major theme of his
speech.

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2004ROME00540 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL