ITALIAN PRT/FSB ON BACK BURNER FOR NEAR FUTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003849

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2014
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL IT AFGHANISTAN IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: ITALIAN PRT/FSB ON BACK BURNER FOR NEAR FUTURE

REF: A) ROME 2913 B) ROME 2122

Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JONATHAN COHEN
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. Facing budget cuts and with a military
straining to meet its current obligations overseas, Italy
will not consider deploying a PRT/FSB in the near term.
However, Italy has not ruled out leading a PRT/FSB at some
point in the future. Italy will keep the possibility on the
back burner while its NRF battalion remains deployed in
Afghanistan, and during its ISAF command from July through
December 2005. To make a PRT and/or FSB feasible for Italy
in the future, the U.S. will have to take the initiative to
convince other Allies to contribute. End Summary.


2. (C) On September 27 POLMIL Counselor engaged MFA NATO
Office Director Giovanni Brauzzi on Italy's position with
respect to a prospective phase II PRT/FSB deployment.
Brauzzi did not rule out Italy's reconsideration of a PRT/FSB
deployment, but indicated that the GOI did not intend to be
proactive on the matter and was not inclined to consider such
a deployment before 2006, when Italy will have finished its
semester of ISAF command (July-December 2005).


3. (C) Lack of resources, according to Brauzzi, is the main
factor impeding PRT/FSB deployment. He repeated the
frequently cited point that, in a year of unexpected military
budget cuts, Italy is already pushing its limits in foreign
military operations. Because of its deployment of the NRF
land battalion in support of Afghan elections through
December 2004, its assumption of ISAF command in July 2005,
and its commitments in Iraq, Italy will find itself strapped
for resources at least through the end of 2005. (Note: Italy
will also take on EUFOR and KFOR leadership in late
2005/early 2006.)


4. (C) Addressing possible Italian command of a future FSB in
Herat, Brauzzi noted that the Italian Air Force had recently
expressed greater confidence in its ability to provide air
support requirements. Brauzzi said an Italian-commanded FSB
was still conceivable, though, again, not in the short term.
In any case, Brauzzi emphasized that an Italian-commanded FSB
would require strong commitment of resources from Allies as
well as, he hoped, substantial participation by Afghan
forces.


5. (C) Discussing current demands on Italian military
resources, Brauzzi pointed out that Iraq has become Italy's
number one priority. Afghanistan is obviously highly
important as well, but Italian politicians' claims that
Afghanistan takes precedence serve mainly to assure the
public that Italy's military commitments abroad are in line
with NATO and the UN. Brauzzi said that the GOI now has too
heavy a political and military investment in Iraq to see its
reconstruction fail.


6. (C) Commment. The Italian PRT/FSB is off the front burner
but not off the table. For now, the MoD still must decide
how to implement a cut that amounts to some four percent of
total defense spending; and the Italian military is close to
maxing out its current deployment capabilities. Still, Italy
has a political interest in being a visible part of the
solution in Afghanistan. In 2003-2004 Italy completed
detailed planning for PRTs in Ghazni and Herat, in both cases
withdrawing a standing offer only in response to last-minute
U.S. requests. Once Italy's NRF land battalion is back on
home soil and Italy's ISAF command expires, Italian officials
may be willing to consider further military commitments in
Afghanistan. However, even in 2006, Italy would be unlikely
to have either the resources to stand up a PRT/FSB on its own
or the clout to cajole sufficient partner participation. To
convince Italy to take on a PRT and/or FSB, the U.S. will
have to put serious political muscle into finding willing
partners. End Comment.


7. (U) Minimize Considered.


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2004ROME03849 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL