Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ROME3116
2004-08-11 19:16:00
SECRET
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

U/S BOLTON'S JULY 10 MEETING WITH LIBYAN OFFICIALS

Tags:  PARM PREL KNNP MNUC LY IAEA 
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S E C R E T ROME 003116 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR U/S BOLTON, A/S DESUTTER
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TRIPOLI
NSC FOR JOSEPH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2014
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP MNUC LY IAEA
SUBJECT: U/S BOLTON'S JULY 10 MEETING WITH LIBYAN OFFICIALS


Classified By: A/POLMINCOUNS PAULA THIEDE FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

S E C R E T ROME 003116

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR U/S BOLTON, A/S DESUTTER
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TRIPOLI
NSC FOR JOSEPH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2014
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP MNUC LY IAEA
SUBJECT: U/S BOLTON'S JULY 10 MEETING WITH LIBYAN OFFICIALS


Classified By: A/POLMINCOUNS PAULA THIEDE FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)


1. (S) Summary. U/S Bolton July 10 told Libyan officials
that Libya had to end military cooperation with Iran as a
sine qua non of concluding Phase III cooperation. The
Libyans responded that all ongoing activity was linked to
closing out existing contracts, which would be terminated on
September 30, 2004. Libya remained committed to SCUD-B
elimination, but needed to save face with its military. Some
form of compensation was needed. Libyan officials proposed
various schemes--including a possible Russian buy back--that
U/S Bolton deemed probably unworkable. He urged Libya to
keep the SCUD-Bs until the end of their natural life and
consider procuring from a non-rogue state an MTCR-compliant
alternative in the meantime. The Libyans said that US/UK
inspections of their SCUD stock, if it were maintained, would
require international cover, and suggested bringing the MTCR
into the process. They reiterated support for establishing a
Trilateral Mechanism, but wanted to make sure that langauge
establishing it includes mention of Libya's legitimate
defense needs. End Summary.


2. (S) U/S John Bolton on July 10 met at EUCOM Headquarters
in Stuttgart with Libyan Ambassador to Italy Abdul Ati
al-Obeidi, Chief of External Security Musa Kusa, and General
Ahmed Mahmud. David Landsman, Head of the FCO's
Counter-Proliferation Department represented the UK. EUCOM
J5 Major General Jonathan Gration and POLAD Terry Snell also
participated. U.S. Embassy Rome political-military officer
served as notetaker for the meeting, which focused on
implementation steps connected to Libya's December 19, 2004
commitment to eliminate its WMD.

Libyan-Iranian Military Cooperation
--------------


3. (S) U/S Bolton explained that he had asked for the meeting
in the spirit of removing remaining obstacles to Phase III
conclusion. He stressed that the US/UK wanted to wrap up
Phase III, but there was a need to work through some

outstanding items first. U/S Bolton told the Libyans that
the U.S. had sensitive information indicating Libya was still
pursuing military cooperation with Iran despite its May
announcement that it would cease such activity. This was of
concern and had to be resolved before Phase III could be
considered complete. He asked the Libyan officials to
clarify the status of Libya's military relationship with
Iran.


4. (S) Al-Obeidi asserted that all current military-related
activity is connected to completing existing contracts with
Iran. He explained that General Mahmud had over the past two
weeks sent official letters to Iranian authorities informing
them of Libya's intent to end all military cooperation with
Iran by September 30, 2004. Al-Obeidi offered to let US/UK
officials planning to visit Libya in August see the letters.
General Mahmud affirmed that all outstanding contracts would
be terminated on September 30 and noted that copies of such
contracts had already been provided to US/UK experts. He
asked that thought be given to compensating Libya for the
economic loss it will incur from terminating its relationship
with Iran. Musa Kusa, concluding the Libyan response,
underscored Libya's commitment to following through on its
commitments; the September 30 date was firm, he said.


5. (S) U/S Bolton explained that the U.S. was working under
the assumption that all military cooperation was to have been
severed immediately following Libya's May announcement. This
translated into no new relationships being established, the
termination of existing contracts, and no future resumption
of previous relationships. Nevertheless, he allowed that
this may not have been Libya's intention and that there could
have been a misunderstanding. U/S Bolton told the Libyans
that, although he could not give them a definitive response,
the U.S. probably could accept activity needed to close out
existing contracts. Termination by September 30 should be
consistent with the U.S/UK-Libya agreement on Iran.


6. (S) U/S Bolton stressed that the U.S./UK team would need
to examine this issue together with appropriate Libyan
officials, who, he was informed, would be made available from
General Mahmud's staff. David Landsman said he had also
assumed termination would follow immediately from Libya's
announcement, but stressed that it was now important to have
a solid date after which Libya would no longer cooperate

militarily with Iran. He agreed with U/S Bolton that
trilateral discussions about steps Libya is taking to
terminate its relationship were important. U/S Bolton added
that the issue of compensation could be discussed in
diplomatic channels, but signaled that Libyan optimism about
a positive outcome would be misplaced.

SCUD-B Disposition
--------------


7. (S) Al-Obeidi reiterated Libya's commitment to eliminate
its stock of SCUD-B missiles, but suggested the problem was
not whether, but how to do so. He argued that simply
destroying them would create problems with the Libyan army.
Some form of compensation was needed. Qadhafi, al-Obeidi
said, wanted to know if the U.S. couldn't simply take all of
Libya's SCUDs since twenty-three have already been requested.
Alternatively, perhaps the Russians could be persuaded to
buy them back. Qadhafi, according to al-Obeidi, wanted the
US/UK to make a gesture that would help him satisfy the
military; the issue was not one of money but of saving face.
"If you want Libya to be an example, you also have to take
our problems into account," al-Obeidi argued. Musa Kusa also
claimed that Libyan "public opinion" was an issue as there
was a prevailing sense that the U.S. was being tougher on
Libya than on North Korea.


8. (S) U/S Bolton stated flatly that the U.S. was not
interested in obtaining more Libyan SCUD-Bs beyond the number
already discussed. He thought there was an agreement that
Libya would keep its SCUD-B missiles until the end of their
useful life, i.e. another three-to-five years. The U.S., he
assured his interlocutors, recognizes that Libya has
legitimate defense needs and has no problem with Libyan
procurement--from a non-rogue state--of an MTCR-compliant
alternative to the SCUDs. The expected shelf life of the
SCUD-Bs should give Libya plenty of time to find such an
alternative, he suggested, adding the caveat that neither the
U.S. nor the UK were in a position to act as suppliers.


9. (S) U/S Bolton clarified that his original understanding
was that Libya was interested in procuring a replacement for
the SCUD-Bs from Russia, not in having Russia buy back the
existing missiles. He agreed to consider engaging the
Russians on a possible SCUD-B buy back, but thought such a
scheme would be much less interesting to them than selling
Libya a new system. He also assured the Libyans that the
U.S. could agree to language in an eventual declaration
ending Phase III on Libya's legitimate interest in satisfying
its defense needs within MTCR parameters as long as a missile
purchase was not from a rogue state. Landsman said the UK
also accepts Libya's legitimate defense needs, and, within
the constraints of the EU arms embargo, is keen to help Libya
define its military requirements. (NOTE: Landsman noted that
the UK MoD is engaged in talks with the Libyan military on
restructuring its defense requirements in the post-December
19, 2003 environment. (End Note.)


10. (S) Al-Obeidi added that if Libya were to keep its
SCUD-Bs, the question of how inspections were to be handled
would need to be addressed. He explained that Tripoli would
have difficulty with the continuing presence of US/UK teams
visiting Libya without international cover. Drawing an
analogy to the manner in which the IAEA was brought into the
post-December 19 nuclear inspection process, he suggested
that a solution might be to organize US/UK inspections under
the aegis of the MTCR.


11. (S) U/S Bolton first assured al-Obeidi that what the
US/UK had in mind was monitoring, not intrusive inspections.
Nevertheless, he took on board al-Obeidi's idea to bring the
MTCR into the inspection process, noting that the MTCR was
not an international body with a large secretariat like the
IAEA. Without entering into specifics, U/S Bolton suggested
a possible way forward could be for Libya to send periodic
reports to the MTCR for evaluation. He asked the Libyans to
think of the inspection issue with the Trilateral Mechanism
in mind. Working on it under the umbrella of the Mechanism
would give Libya ownership of the process; this was one of
the advantages of cooperating together as partners. Avoiding
discussion of the SCUD-B issue by the full MTCR membership
would be important as this would only bog down progress.


12. (S) Al-Obeidi assured U/S Bolton that Libya supported
using the Trilateral Mechanism, once it was set up, to work

through issues together, but insisted on the need for
international cover with regard to inspections. He suggested
that Libya could invite the MTCR to inspect Libya's SCUD-Bs
as a follow up activity to submitting reports. Al-Obeidi
added that Libya accepts the notion of an exchange of letters
establishing the Mechanism, but wanted the text to be
balanced with language on Libya's legitimate defense needs in
addition to its post-December 19 commitments. He thought the
establishment of expert-level subcommittees would create a
useful mechanism for working through technical issues. U/S
Bolton agreed.

Wrap-Up
--------------


13. (S) Concluding, U/S Bolton listed a set of action items
for follow up: The US/UK team planning to visit in August
would address the issue of Libya's military cooperation with
Iran; Libya would receive draft langauge from the US/UK
establishing a Trilateral Mechanism before the next US/UK
visit. Libya's legitmate security concerns would be an
element of future discussion via the Mechanism. If Libya
kept its SCUD-Bs until their utility expired, the US/UK would
support Libyan procurement of an MTCR-compliant alternative
from a non-rogue state. The way ahead, including the MTCR
inspection component, could be discussed in the Trilateral
Mechanism. Al-Obeidi, wrapped up by saying, "so far, so good
on WMD, but now we will be looking for closer political
cooperation."


14. (U) U/S Bolton did not have an opportunity to clear this
cable.


15. (U) Minimize considered.

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SEMBLER


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2004ROME03116 - Classification: SECRET