CHR-60: ITALIANS SHOP STRATEGIES ON AFGHANISTAN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000307

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT: CHR-60: ITALIANS SHOP STRATEGIES ON AFGHANISTAN,
IRAN, DEMOCRACY CAUCUS

REF: A. A) BUTLER/BASS E-MAIL JAN 26


B. B)STATE 13279

Classified By: Pol M/C Tom Countryman, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)


1. (U) Italian MFA Human Rights Director Giuseppe Calvetta
reviewed with us January 27 ministry thinking on several
CHR-related elements following the January 21 meeting of EU
human rights experts (COHOM).

Iran
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2. (C) The Irish presidency would be contacting Tehran in the
coming days to try to organize the next session of the
EU-Iranian HR dialogue for the first week in March. EU
members were cautiously optimistic that Tehran would agree to
resume the dialogue despite lingering anger over EU support
for the Canadian UNGA resolution. Perhaps hedging their
bets, COHOM experts had agreed to adopt the same approach on
Iran at CHR-60 as last year: the EU would not/not co-sponsor
a resolution, but member states sitting on CHR would support
a resolution. The open question was whether Canada intended
to sponsor a resolution again this year.

Possible resolutions: Chechnya,
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3. (C) EU members were pondering how to proceed regarding
possible resolutions on China, Iraq and Chechnya and Calvetta
asked for U.S. intentions on all three. Chechnya posed a
special challenge for the MFA; it had asked the Council of
Ministers for a formal recommendation on how to proceed on
the issue, given PM Berlusconi's oft-expressed (including, on
occasion, when it shouldn't be) personal support for
President Putin.

Afghanistan,
--------------


4. (C) Regarding an Afghan resolution, we replied that
informal soundings in Washington revealed strong opposition
to a resolution. We believed it would be counterproductive
to continue to criticize the current proto-government for a
situation largely created by its predecessors. However, the
U.S. might be prepared to countenance a chairman's statement,
if it concentrated on deficit areas where the international
community, or specific donors, were committed to supporting
the Afghan government to correct them -- i.e., a statement
that was forward-looking and encouraging rather than critical
of circumstances largely created in the past.


5. (C) Calvetta tried again, suggesting the resolution could
be 'technical.' We replied that our clear impression was
that Washington would not support that approach; since the
bulk of attention invariably would focus on 'resolution'
rather than the 'technical' qualifier, it would have the same
effect of sending the wrong signals to the Afghans and to
donors.

Iraq
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6. (C) Calvetta wondered if the U.S. might contemplate a
similar approach (i.e. chairman's statement identifying
elements/areas that would be focus of international
community's assistance to a nascent government) regarding
Iraq. We replied that we were uninstructed, but judged it
highly unlikely that the U.S. would countenance even a
chairman's statement, given the timing of CHR-60 relative to
transition process in Iraq and the temptation for
mischief-making from those critical of U.S. policy in the
region.

Democracy Caucus
--------------


7. (C) Reaffirming Italy's strong push to help develop a
democracy caucus in UN fora, beginning with CHR-60, Calvetta
said Italy was itching to do more but was having difficulty
developing tactics for proceeding. He lamented the
difficulties involved in persuading more desirable,
democratic countries to buck comfortable regional rotations
and take on regional offenders who invested lots of time,
energy -- not to mention other sources of suasion -- in
winning seats in UN fora. For example, how could core
Community of Democracy members persuade Uruguay to compete
actively against Cuba for a CHR seat? Italy was working to


develop the CD's practical promise, but it was difficult to
overcome the habits and psychology of the current regional
groupings. We suggested that Italy and other interested,
activist CD members needed to brainstorm on incentives we
might, individually or collectively, offer to such countries
to offset the perceived risks

Swedish Grading Curve
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8. (C) In an aside as the discussion concluded, Calvetta
noted that the Swedish rep had announced at the January 21
COHOM Stockholm's publication of its annual assessment of
human rights. The assessment reportedly concluded that
adherence to human rights norms had improved across the
globe, with two notable exceptions: the United States and the
Russian Federation. Shaking his head, Calvetta said he'd
asked for a copy of the report and was told that it thus far
was only available in Swedish.
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2004ROME00307 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL