Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ROME2875
2004-07-26 05:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

ITALY WARNS AGAINST MARGINALIZATION OF THE EU IN

Tags:  PREL KPAL IS IT EU UNGA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002875 

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2014
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS IT EU UNGA
SUBJECT: ITALY WARNS AGAINST MARGINALIZATION OF THE EU IN
THE QUARTET

REF: A. USUN 1677


B. ROME 2763

Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002875

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2014
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS IT EU UNGA
SUBJECT: ITALY WARNS AGAINST MARGINALIZATION OF THE EU IN
THE QUARTET

REF: A. USUN 1677


B. ROME 2763

Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. The Italian MFA warned that US
"acquiescence" in Israel's efforts to exclude the European
Union from engagement in the peace process is undermining the
EU's credibility in the region, which will impede progress on
the Roadmap and serve to further the divide between the
Israelis and Palestinians. Our MFA contacts argued that
Italy has striven to bridge the gap both between the
conflicting parties and within the EU, and they urged
Washington to include the EU in its initiatives from the
beginning or risk condemning the Quartet to irrelevance. End
summary.


2. (C) At a July 21 luncheon hosted by DCM Skodon for key
players in the MFA's Middle East Bureau, Director General
(NEA A/S-equivalent) Riccardo Sessa said that the US is
allowing Israel to exclude the European Union from any
discussion of security and political issues in the Peace
Process. He charged that Israel seems to want the EU
involved only when it comes time to open its wallet. This
approach not only undermines the EU's credibility with the
Palestinians and the Quartet's efforts to implement the
Roadmap, but also increases skepticism among EU states that
the Quartet is more than a cloak for a process determined
only by Israel and the US.


3. (C) Sessa and Eastern Med Office Director Luca Ferrari
cited three specific cases:
-- Israel's refusal to engage with EU interlocutors;
-- Recent security-related meetings involving the US, Russia,
Israel and Palestinians, but not the EU;
-- The July 21 AP report of a planned meeting in October
among the US, Egypt, Israel and the Palestinians. (Note:
Embassy subsequently informed Ferrari, per Department press
guidance, that the AP report is without foundation).


4. (C) Sessa said the US could not continue to take
initiatives, or simply to endorse Israeli initiatives, and
then expect the EU to follow up ("clean the dishes") with the
necessary financial resources. Washington, he stressed, must
involve the EU in its efforts to move the Roadmap forward,
otherwise the Palestinians, with whom EU countries have

traditionally enjoyed more confidence, will begin to view the
EU as an impotent player and thus lose faith in the peace
process.


5. (C) Sessa and Ferrari described how this dynamic had
affected the EU position on the UNGA resolution, approved the
previous day, on the ICJ advisory opinion. Germany, normally
sensitive to Israeli positions, had been unusually silent and
virtually ready to accept the Palestinian text first tabled.
As a result, the UK, Netherlands and Italy had been lonelier
in their determination to insist on amendments to the text.
Israel recognized that Italy had made an effort: an Israeli
radio broadcast the same day had reportedly singled out Italy
and the UK for their efforts to amend the draft. The new
Italian Ambassador to Israel, Sandro de Bernadin, on
presenting his credentials July 21, got an earful of
criticism directed at the EU, but also appreciation for
Italy's attempt to re-balance the EU approach. However,
Sessa continued, the US needed to recognize the limits to the
ability of any EU member to stand up for Israel's legitimate
concerns. As more EU members came to doubt whether Israel
took the EU's Quartet membership seriously, the usual
pressure to come to EU consensus would inevitably overwhelm
the ability of the UK, Italy or any other state to insist on
a balanced position.


6. (C) Sessa said the Italians recognize that Israel's
escalating demonization of the European Union has much to do
with Israeli domestic politics. It is the US, he argued,
that should realize that this trend will inevitably cause EU
political opinion to turn against continued involvement in
the Quartet. This would undo what Italy regards as its own
successful efforts (during its EU Presidency last year),and
the Dutch intention currently, to make the EU a more balanced
and impartial player between Israel and the Palestinians.


Sessa emphasized that the US could take steps right now to
improve the image of the EU as a serious member of the
Quartet.


7. (C) In reply to the Italian arguments, DCM and poloffs
explained that it remained USG policy to implement the
Roadmap under the auspices of all members of the Quartet,
including the EU. If EU members felt they were losing
credibility with Israel, they should ask themselves what
concrete steps they could take to prove to the Israelis that
Europe continued to make vital contributions to advancing the
peace process. We urged the Italians to help convince the
Palestinians not to divert energy toward maneuvering for
empty victories in the UN when it could be better spent on
working toward practical measures to smooth the proposed Gaza
transition.


8. (C) Comment. The Berlusconi government prides itself on
having developed a closer relationship with Israel and on
having led the EU to adopt a more balanced approach to the
conflict. In addition to securing EU support for designating
Hamas as a terrorist organization during the Italian EU
presidency, Italy has consistently been, along with the UK,
one of the stalwarts in seeking more balance in the repeated
UNGA resolutions against Israel. Our MFA interlocutors
clearly are frustrated that their efforts are being
undermined by what they perceive as US acceptance in Israel's
exclusion of the EU in key negotiations. End comment.


9. (C) On other issues: Sessa said he had spoken that morning
with Nimmer Hammad, the long-time Palestinian representative
to Italy, about the situation in Gaza. He said Hammad had
never seemed so discouraged at the internal Palestinian
situation, and had no clue as to how Arafat could resolve it.
Sessa said that all of the EU recognizes the need to give
Arafat a tough message on ceding real authorities to others;
even French FM Barnier had done so during last week's call on
Arafat. It remains difficult to deliver this message
effectively because of the US (and Italian) position
discouraging direct contact with him. Ferrari added his
judgment that the Palestinians' post-Arafat scenario would
not only be bloody between Hamas and Arafat, but also among
the various Fatah-related factions. Sessa noted Italy still
views Sharon's Gaza plan as viable and something that "needs
to be done in any case."


10. (U) Postscript: In a July 23 front-page editorial in
leading daily Corriere della Sera, Foreign Minister Frattini
explains Italy's vote in favor of the ICJ resolution. He
defends construction of the "wall" as a reasonable measure
against a vicious terrorist threat, but says Italy and the EU
cannot accept that it is built on Palestinian territory.
Court opinions and UNGA resolutions, he says, cannot resolve
issues that must be addressed through politics and dialogue.
If the EU wants to have a serious role in the peace process,
it must be "equidistant" between Israel and Palestine;
"otherwise, Europe will condemn itself to a marginal role and
the destiny of peace will be entrusted solely to the US."

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2004ROME02875 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL