ITALY - HIGH-LEVEL CONCERN RE UNSC REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002745

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR P, EUR, IO, IO/UNP, EUR/WE, EUR/AGS, EAP/J

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2014
TAGS: KUNR PREL GM JA FR RS IT UNSC
SUBJECT: ITALY - HIGH-LEVEL CONCERN RE UNSC REFORM

REF: A. STATE 135590


B. ROME 02168

C. ROME 01425

D. ROME 00548

Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) This cable contains action requests. Please see para

8.


2. (C) Summary: The Government of Italy is becoming
increasingly concerned about any UN reform that could result
in a permanent UNSC seat for Germany and/or Japan. The
Italians fear that an increase in the number of peranent
UNSC seats would result in a less efficien UN, a Security
Council less amenable to the intrests Italy shares with the
US, and, ultimately,would relegate Italy to a permanent
second tier rle in Europe. The Italians believe that Germany
ill present a plan that will have a reasonable chace of
getting the two-thirds majority necessary o amend the
Charter. Italy is focusing its lobbyng efforts on the major
regional powers that the German plan would exclude; the
medium-sized state interested in protecting their regional
standin; and the US and China, which would have to ratify
any amendment, along with the other P-5, before t could
enter into force. Italy seeks, at a minimum, US public
neutrality on the issue and a privae assurance that "Italy's
vital interests and th efficient functioning of the UNSC"
will be take fully into account by Washington. End Summary.

2. (C) The Government of Italy is becoming increasingly
concerned about any UN reform that could reult in a
permanent UNSC seat for Germany and/or apan, but not Italy.
The Italians consider this issue one of their highest foreign
policy priorities and are using every possible opportunity to
enlist U.S. support for their position, as evidenced in the
June 16 meeting between U/S Grossman and Italian Ambassador
Vento (ref A),the June 4 meeting between A/S Jones and MFA
Political Director Giampiero Massolo (ref B),the February
visit of G-8 Political Director Davies to Rome (ref C),
ongoing exchanges with Embassy officers and repeated public
statements by high level officials, most recently FM Frattini
in London June 22. This concern has also been raised with
President Bush by both PM Berlusconi and President Ciampi.


3. (C) The nominal Italian argument is that UN reform
resulting in an increase in the number of permanent UNSC
seats would mean a less efficient UN, and a Security Council
less amenable to the interests Italy shares with the US.
Their mostly unspoken but more potent fear is that granting
Germany a permanent seat would relegate Italy to a permanent
second tier role in Europe and also weaken the G-8 (ref C).
Embassy has encouraged the Italians to focus on UN reform in
broader terms, and has stressed that Security Council reform
is likely to be so contentious that consensus will be
difficult.


4. (C) The Italians agree that it will be a difficult
process, but believe that Germany is focused on presenting a
plan to the UNGA in early 2005 that has a reasonable chance
of getting the two-thirds majority necessary to amend the
Charter. Retired Ambassador Paolo Fulci (Permrep to the UN
during the last serious discussion of expansion in the
mid-90s) explained to POL MC how the Germans hope to avoid
the regional rivalries that stymied consensus and prevented
any proposal from reaching a vote in the 90s. Ten years ago,
South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt had arguably equal claims to
a permanent African seat; now, South Africa was clearly
ascendant over the others in terms of GNP and regional
influence. Similarly, Mexico and Argentina were no longer
equal rivals with Brazil for a permanent Latin American seat.
In this circumstance, the Germans believe it possible to
cobble together a package of permanent seats that would
attract the necessary 130 votes, despite the vociferous
objection of those members that would miss the cut.


5. (C) With no hope of swaying those major regional powers
who stand to benefit from the expected German plan, Italy is
focusing its own lobbying effort in three directions:

-- those major regional powers the German plan would exclude;

-- medium-sized states which may fear diminution of their
regional standing if a neighbor is promoted to permanent
membership;
-- and the two permanent members -- the US and China -- which
the Italians believe should have reason to be opposed to
expansion (China solely because of its rivalry with Japan)
and which would have to ratify any amendment, along with the
other P-5 countries, before it could enter into force.

In seeking to influence the medium-sized and smaller states,
we can expect the Italians to be as blatant as they claim
Germany is in promising bilateral economic and political
benefits to those who support them, while arguing that once
the Germans have their seat, they will have no incentive to
keep their promises.


6. (C) As an alternative to permanent seats for named
countries, Italy will argue that there should be additional
rotating regional seats. FM Frattini's deputy chief of staff
told DCM that Italy could accept that such rotating seats be
weighted so that states like Germany and Japan (and Italy)
could have more frequent turns than smaller states. With
their EU partners, particularly the smaller ones, Italy is
prepared to argue (though apparently has not done so yet)
that there should be no expansion until ratification of the
EU Constitution at which time the EU could claim a new
permanent seat. It attributes French and UK endorsement of
German aspirations to a desire to head off the EU-seat
option, lest it lead other EU members to try to force UK and
France to cast their votes on an EU, rather than national,
basis. For France and the UK, accepting a permanent German
Security Council seat is a lesser evil than establishing a
single EU seat. The possibility of an EU seat effectively
dies if Germany has its own seat. Without the support of at
least one of the "big three" the single seat proposal would
have no chance of success, even under qualified majority
voting


7. (C) The Italian government recognizes that, in an
eventual UNGA vote, the US will have the same official weight
as Luxembourg, and that a two-thirds vote in UNGA is required
to amend the Charter. The Italians also recognize that all
the P-5 members must ratify the amendment and thus, in
theory, any one of the five ultimately holds veto power after
the two-thirds vote in the General Assembly. The Italians do
not want to get to this point and are working to avoid the
possibility of an UNGA vote. Therefore, as the neuralgic
reaction reported in ref A indicates, the Italians fear that
any USG signal of support for expansion will be taken by
Berlin as bolstering its case and adding an air of
inevitability to the process. Italy seeks from the US -- at
a minimum -- public neutrality on the issue, and a private
assurance that "Italy's vital interests and the efficient
functioning of the UNSC" be taken fully into account by
Washington. A/S Jones' assurance (ref B) that we will look
closely at UNSC reform clearly resonated with Italian policy
makers.


8. (C) Action Requests:
-- for USUN: Embassy Rome would welcome comment on the
expected role of the Eminent Persons Panel report expected
this fall.
-- for Department: Not only Italians, but Germans and
Japanese, plus officials of other regional powers may raise
this issue with increasing frequency. We recommend that
Department provide worldwide guidance that can be used with
all interlocutors. From our point of view, it would be
wisest not to allow anyone to take either our support or our
opposition for granted. Rather, we suggest that our position
make clear that we will examine carefully any specific
proposal for expansion with an eye to judging whether it
would enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council.
-- for all posts: Embassy Rome would appreciate being
included in any reporting on your host nation's view on UNSC
expansion.

Visit Rome's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m

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2004ROME02745 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL