ITALY - EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002489

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2014
TAGS: PREL PARM PHUM ETTC EU CH IT HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT: ITALY - EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA

REF: STATE 137493

Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) We raised reftel points with senior Italian officials
at meetings on June 23, 24 and 25. They acknowledged that
there may be a gradually emerging EU consensus on lifting the
EU China Arms Embargo, but said that there is no deadline and
that the EU does not want to signal to Beijing that the EU is
satisfied with the human rights situation. Our interlocutors
insisted, however, that there has been some improvement in
the human rights situation in China and said a reinforced
code of conduct could serve as a continued brake on arms
deliveries. The Italians argued that since the embargo is
applied strictly on the basis of human rights concerns, USG
arguments that emphasize strategic considerations are not
directly relevant. They also claimed that lifting the
embargo would not result in a flood of EU arms sales to
China. We carried out the demarche after contacting the
Japanese Embassy which, after checking with Tokyo, was
directed by the GOJ not to join in the demarche. End Summary.

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Export Control Talks
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2. (C) At a June 23 day-long bilateral meeting on export
controls hosted by the Italian Foreign Ministry and including
senior Ministry of Defense officials, PM/DDTC Managing
Director Turk Maggi and Embassy's Econ Minister-Counselor
stressed US concerns about any EU move to lift its arms
embargo on China. Their points tracked closely with those in
reftel. (Septel reports on the export control meeting.)


3. (C) MFA Export Control Coordinator Minister Carlo Tripepi
(who chaired the bilateral meeting) argued that it was
important for the USG to understand that the EU arms embargo
was applied strictly on the basis of human rights concerns.
He claimed that USG arguments emphasizing strategic
considerations were, therefore, not directly relevant to the
EU embargo. Maggi responded that the USG position on the
embargo was also linked to human rights; China has not taken
sufficient steps to merit its lifting. Tripepi emphasized
that lifting the embargo would be a "political decision" and
would not mean that the spigot on EU arms sales to China
would be turned on fully. Tripepi suggested that China has
demonstrated a willingness to lean forward in improving its
own behavior on export controls, adding that China has
expressed an interest in improving cooperation within the
context of Wassenaar, is a member of the NSG, and has
indicated that it wants to improve cooperation with the
Australia Group.


4. (C) Counselor Diego Ungaro, who directs the MFA office
responsible for defense industrial issues, said that, with
regard to China, the intricacy of the relationship between
export controls and industrial cooperation argues for
controlling the transfer of sensitive technology on a
case-by-case basis. He described the EU-China defense
industrial relationship as one that cuts across many sectors
and said he favored a close scrutiny of specific programs to
guard against the transfer of critical technologies. Ungaro
recognized that there was a direct relationship between
growing defense industrial cooperation with China and the
need to have robust controls on technology transfer. An MoD
official assured Maggi that his ministry has a voice in
export control decision making, but noted that the EU arms
embargo was limited in scope because it only covers certain
items on Italy's national munitions list primarily related to
internal security. He argued that lifting the embargo will
not open the floodgates on Italy's arms exports.

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Follow-up Demarches
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5. (C) Embassy officer followed up on the 24th with MFA
China Desk Officer Gianluca Grandi, who had attended the
meeting on the 23rd, to reiterate reftel points. Grandi
confirmed that there was a growing consensus within the EU in
favor of lifting the embargo. He said, however, that no
deadline for doing so had been established and noted that
Italy's openness to lifting the embargo was shared by "a
majority" of its EU partners. Pressed on whether it was a
question of six months, a year, or more, he was noncommittal.
(Note: The Japanese Embassy here said the GOJ had been
assured by the EU that no action on this issue would be taken


under the Dutch Presidency.) Grandi asserted that any shift
in the EU's arms trade relationship with China would be
accompanied by a reinforcement of the EU Code of Conduct, and
that the CoC might even be made legally binding. He said
that Italy is aware that the human rights situation in China
is not satisfactory, but argued that some progress has been
made, noting that the Chinese constitution now includes a
provision on protecting human rights. Lifting the embargo
would provide an incentive to make further progress, he
argued.


6. (C) Poloff also raised reftel points in a June 25 meeting
with MFA Director for EU CFSP Luigi Mattiolo. Mattiolo said
that the latest Council conclusions contained no clear or
fixed end point for debates on lifting the embargo, a signal
that the EU is far from consensus on this issue and that the
embargo will "not be lifted anytime soon." He claimed that,
rather than working around a fixed date, the EU is
considering the embargo "within the overall framework of
relations with China." Mattiolo acknowledged that the EU
will have to agree on more definitive language during the
Dutch Presidency to ensure that the December 8 China-EU
Summit is not hijacked by that single issue. At this time,
however, the EU does not want to give a signal to Beijing
that the EU is satisfied with the human rights situation in
China or that there is building consensus towards lifting the
ban. Mattiolo said that the EU is working concomitantly to
review the CoC on weapons sales. Unlike Grandi, he admitted
that it was unlikely that the CoC would evolve from a
politically binding to a more legally binding agreement.


7. (C) Mattiolo agreed to discuss our request for an
evaluation of China's human rights situation with the MFA's
Human Rights Directorate. He also thanked us for the
heads-up that the issue would be raised during the US-EU
Summit, and mentioned specifically USEU DCM Foster's detailed
briefing to EU DG Cooper as tremendously useful in helping
the EU prepare discussion points for the Summit.

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Japanese Embassy
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8. (C) Prior to demarching the MFA, we conveyed reftel
points to the Japanese Embassy in Rome and explored the
possibility of delivering a joint demarche. Political
Counselor Yoshi Hoshino contacted Tokyo for guidance and was
advised that, although Japan shares US concerns and wishes to
collaborate closely on China issues, he was not to deliver a
joint demarche. Hoshino stated that at the recent EU-Japan
Summit, Deputy FM Tanaka demarched the EU on the arms embargo
and that the EU understands Japanese concerns and has given
the GOJ assurances that no decision to lift the embargo will
be made under the Dutch Presidency. (Note: No such
assurances were provided to us by our Italian interlocutors.)
Although the Japanese feel this is not the appropriate time
to deliver a joint demarche since "it could risk jeopardizing
a harmonious Japan-EU-US approach towards China", Hoshino
assured us that the GOJ intends to deliver demarches on the
arms embargo in the near future.


9. (U) Mr. Maggi did not have an opportunity to clear this
message.

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2004ROME02489 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL