Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ROME2464
2004-06-24 15:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

IRAQ POST-HANDOVER: GOI SUPPORT STRONG AND

Tags:  AMGT ECON EAID IT IZ PREL IRAQI FREEDOM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002464 

SIPDIS


STATE FOR HR/CDA AND NEA/I - RSCHLICHER
SECDEF FOR OSD - AJTORRES
CPA BAGHDAD FOR EXECSEC - BREMER, JONES AND PMO - NASH,
KELLEY, GIBB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2009
TAGS: AMGT ECON EAID IT IZ PREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: IRAQ POST-HANDOVER: GOI SUPPORT STRONG AND
UNWAVERING

REF: SECSTATE 134750

Classified By: Economic Minister-Counselor Scott F. Kilner for reasons
1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002464

SIPDIS


STATE FOR HR/CDA AND NEA/I - RSCHLICHER
SECDEF FOR OSD - AJTORRES
CPA BAGHDAD FOR EXECSEC - BREMER, JONES AND PMO - NASH,
KELLEY, GIBB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2009
TAGS: AMGT ECON EAID IT IZ PREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: IRAQ POST-HANDOVER: GOI SUPPORT STRONG AND
UNWAVERING

REF: SECSTATE 134750

Classified By: Economic Minister-Counselor Scott F. Kilner for reasons
1.5 (b) and (d).


1. This message contains an action request in paragraph 7.


2. (C) SUMMARY: Citing the parallel goals of strengthening
Iraqi security services and forging an overarching Iraqi
national identity from a highly regionalized reality, the GOI
has described a comprehensive plan to provide assistance to
the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) after the transfer of
sovereignty on June 30. The GOI assistance package includes
25 to 30 advisors placed in Iraqi ministries and in IRMO and
PCO, the successor entities to the CPA Program Management
Office. Some thirteen of these advisors will work with the
Iraqi Ministry of Defense alone, to coordinate analysis and
planning as well as a comprehensive program of military and
logistics training in both Iraq and Italy. The GOI also
expects to have a fully staffed Embassy in Baghdad and, for
the first time, a consulate in Basra, by the end of the year.
END SUMMARY.

SECURITY, COORDINATION AMONG MISSIONS "CRUCIAL"
-------------- --


3. (C) MFA Iraq Task Force Deputy Director Luigi Maccotta
told Ecmin on June 24, in response to reftel demarche, that
the GOI considered coordination and information sharing among
the foreign missions in Iraq after June 30 to be "crucial,"
as the missions must band together to replace the CPA as a
coordinating body. Maccotta explained that this was
especially important regarding security, and asked for
clarification on whether security would really be left
entirely up to each individual mission. According to
Maccotta, the GOI had understood that there would also be
some limited shared support coming from the Multi-National
Force (MNF) or from another international body such as the
United Nations.

GOI MINISTRY LIAISON OFFICERS
--------------


4. (C) Aside from the roughly thirteen advisors who will work

with the Ministry of Defense (see para 5),the GOI is also
planning to provide nine others, most of whom will be
existing staff asked to remain through transition. Two of
these Ministry Liaison Officers would work with the Ministry
of Culture, and one each would work with the Ministries of
Human Resources, Finance, Development and Planning, Health,
Youth and Sports, Education and Justice. Another one or two
would work directly with the office of Prime Minster Iyad
Allawi.


5. (C) Maccotta emphasized the importance the GOI placed on
strengthening the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi
security services, including the Army. Towards this end, the
GOI is planning to have thirteen or more advisors work with
the Ministry, a plan which has already been approved by
Italy's Council of Ministers, according to Maccotta. These
advisors would also offer training, in Italy and in Iraq,
covering a range of disciplines from the logistical to the
tactical. The GOI also plans to have two of its military
officers placed within the structures of the MNF Central
Command in Iraq, one in the office of security transition and
another at the command level. Specific names of military
generals have already been identified for these two roles.

CONTINUED SUPPORT FROM WITHIN IRMO AND PCO
--------------


6. (C) Building on the existing Italian presence within the
CPA Program Management Office, the GOI plans to embed four to
six advisors within the two PMO successor organs, the Iraq
Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) and the Project
Contracting Office (PCO). One of these would be placed in
Basra to focus on oil issues; the others would likely remain
in Baghdad to focus on several areas, including logistics and
water resources, Maccotta explained.

GOI QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS
--------------



7. (C) Maccotta asked for clarification in two areas, and
requested answers to these concerns from Washington. First,
as mentioned in paragraph 2, the GOI had imagined there would
be some degree of common or shared protection, such as that
offered by the MNF around Baghdad's Green Zone. Maccotta
asked where this will end and where individual foreign
mission responsibility for security will begin. The second
question sought confirmation that non-Americans will be
allowed to work within IRMO and PCO, as they currently do in
PMO. He explained that the GOI believed that there are three
areas in which it can provide assistance to post-handover
Iraq - through its embassy, through the Iraqi ministries and
through IRMO and PCO. Washington guidance is requested on
the above two questions.

BUILDING THE ITALIAN DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO IRAQ
-------------- --


8. (C) The staff of the Italian Embassy in Baghdad will
ultimately consist of four diplomats plus an ambassador,
along with some twelve administrative staff. The Consulate
in Basra is scheduled to have a staff of two, plus
administrative staff. In addition, the GOI plans to have a
political advisor embedded in the military camp in Nasiriyah,
as well as two or three civilians working in the Italian
equivalent of USAID.


9. (C) Due to the fact that these Iraq staffing imperatives
emerged after the current fiscal year budget had already been
set, additional requests for funding had to be made outside
of the normal budget cycle. This has slowed funding
somewhat, and will result in a gradual GOI ramp-up to full
staffing levels. Initial staff at the Italian Embassy in
Baghdad is expected to consist of two diplomats plus the
ambassador, with full staff in Baghdad and Basra in place by
the end of 2004.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) The amount of thought the GOI has already given to
its assistance package, including complex negotiations among
the MFA, the Prime Minister's Office and the Council of
Ministers, reflects how serious the GOI is about helping
rebuild and secure post-handover Iraq. Security for foreign
missions in Iraq after June 30 remains a major concern and an
area on which the GOI seeks further clarification. The clear
goals and specific areas for assistance outlined by Maccotta
further indicate the pride this government feels at being
"the third largest member of the Coalition" and a major
stakeholder in the future security of Iraq. END COMMENT.


11. (U) Minimize Considered for Baghdad.

Visit Rome's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m

SEMBLER


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2004ROME02464 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL