Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ROME2168
2004-06-08 09:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

MFA OFFICIALS TELL A/S JONES ITALY WILL HELP PUSH

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002168 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ IR SR AF EUN NATO IAEA IRAQI FREEDOM AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIALS TELL A/S JONES ITALY WILL HELP PUSH
FOR QUICK IRAQ UNSCR RESOLUTION; RESOURCE CONSIDERATIONS
HOLDING UP DECISION ON AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENT

REF: STATE 122673

Classified By: DCM EMIL SKODON. REASON:1.5 (B)(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002168

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ IR SR AF EUN NATO IAEA IRAQI FREEDOM AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIALS TELL A/S JONES ITALY WILL HELP PUSH
FOR QUICK IRAQ UNSCR RESOLUTION; RESOURCE CONSIDERATIONS
HOLDING UP DECISION ON AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENT

REF: STATE 122673

Classified By: DCM EMIL SKODON. REASON:1.5 (B)(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a June 4 meeting over lunch on the
margins of President Bush's Rome visit, MFA Political
Director Giampiero Massolo told EUR A/S Jones that the draft
UNSC Iraq resolution was "heading for a good result in a
relatively short time," and Italy was doing all it could to
help. He said that PM Berlusconi was personally engaged with
President Putin to help smooth the way with Russia on the
UNSCR. Massolo suggested that an event in New York to signal
international recognition of the interim government, followed
by a pledging conference sometime in the future, might
satisfy Russian calls for an international conference on
Iraq.


2. (C) Massolo confided that the Ministries of Defense and
Foreign Affairs agree that Italy should deploy a PRT to
Afghanistan, but added that Italy's resource constraints
would make it difficult to stand up an FSB alone. Further,
Italy is in the process of implementing a tax reduction
program and is already stretched thin given its current
world-wide deployments. He added that Italy was thinking of
taking the ISAF lead after Turkey. Massolo underlined that
Italy, like the US, will be looking for a strong statement on
Iran from the June 14 IAEA Board of Governors, but added that
Italy supports engaging the Iranians on other issues such as
regional stabilization. Jones insisted that we must act now
to re-establish UNMIK leadership, and not wait for elections
as some have suggested. She said that the US view would be
to support its European colleagues in developing a list of
qualified candidates from which SYG Annan could choose the
next UNMIK head, and promised that Amb. Rossin would be ready
to take up his post as UNMIK deputy head in mid-August.
Massolo asked for US assistance in halting momentum towards
establishing additional permanent UNSC seats. An enlargement

that did not include Italy would be a &national
catastrophe.8 END SUMMARY


3. (SBU) With Massolo were Deputy POLDIR Claudio Bisognero,
Director for EU Security Affairs Luigi Mattiolo and NATO
Affairs Director Giovanni Brauzzi. The DCM, SA Deborah
Mennuti and Poloff Jim Donegan (notetaker) accompanied A/S
Jones.

--------------
Iraq UNSC Resolution Strategy
--------------


4. (C) Massolo began by noting that recent meetings indicated
an excellent "chemistry" and working relationship between
President Bush and PM Berlusconi, symbolic of Italian-US
cooperation on a broad range of issues. For instance,
Massolo felt that the draft UNSC Iraq resolution was "heading
for a good result in a relatively short time," and Italy was
doing all it could to help. He acknowledged some foot
dragging by the Russians, centering on Moscow's concerns over
moving too quickly and the need for true legitimacy for the
interim government but, Massolo continued, these issues did
not represent significant stumbling blocks to the ultimate
approval of the resolution. Massolo said that PM Berlusconi
was personally engaged with President Putin to help smooth
the way with Russia on the UNSCR.


5. (C) A/S Jones expressed USG appreciation for Italy's role
throughout the UNSCR deliberation process, and underlined
that Secretary Powell has told Russian FM Lavrov that the US
has no objection to Russia's proposal for an international
conference on Iraq, but that it could not be a precondition
to a UNSCR. Jones also underscored that the USG could not
accept excluding some non-permanent Security Council members
from the conference. The participant formula should either
include all Security Council members or just the Permanent
members. The USG would also not want to see Italy excluded.
Massolo said that Russia realizes that a conference could not
be a condition for the UNSCR, and pointed out that in any
case it was unlikely that Iraqi authorities would want a
conference at this time. He suggested that an event in New
York to signal international recognition of the interim
government, followed by a pledging conference sometime in the
future, might be a compromise that addressed Russian
concerns.


6. (C) A/S Jones noted that UNSG Annan was sponsoring a
"Friends of Iraq" meeting of some 40 countries in New York

during the week of June 7, and that President Bush was
hopeful that the resolution could be voted on within the next
week. Massolo and Jones agreed that this timing was
critical, and that the resolution should not be the subject
of negotiation at the G-8 Summit. Massolo reported that the
UK was optimistic that the side letters to the resolution
could be completed as early as June 4.


7. (C) In order to gain wider acceptance for the resolution,
Massolo proposed that the current draft be modified slightly
to include "cosmetic, eye-catching phrases," such as
references to "international humanitarian law" and the
"sovereignty of the Iraqi people." He said it would also
help if the resolution referenced specific dates for
elections and force withdrawal. Massolo was pleased to learn
from Jones that the draft to be tabled in New York later that
day contained language along those lines.


8. (C) Massolo suggested that the resolution address the
possibility of an international conference, in general terms,
as a negotiating tool to use with the Russians. He also
proposed that it include formation of an &Iraq security
council8 composed of the MNF, Iraqi military and government,
as a forum for coordination during the interim period. A/S
Jones indicated that Secretary Powell would explore these
ideas with FM Frattini later that day (septel).


9. (C) Massolo further predicted that a resolution
&package8 that contained the above elements would help the
Italian government when it came time for Parliament to
authorize extension of the Italian military presence in Iraq
at the end of June. The more multilateral the presence, the
better for public relations, he added. The main internal
Italian concern was not the Left per se, but the &pacifist
and Catholic8 elements that transcend party lines.
President Bush,s meeting with the Pope would help in that
regard.

--------------
Afghanistan PRT Deployment
--------------


10. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, Massolo said that the
Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs agree that Italy
should deploy a provincial reconstruction team (PRT),but
added that Italy's resource constraints would make it
difficult to stand up a forward support base (FSB) alone.
Further, Italy faces mounting budget constraints. &Tax
reduction is a costly business,8 he emphasized, and
therefore the Ministry of Finance had an increasingly strong
say in decisions relating to foreign military deployments.
Italy is also ending conscription at the end of 2004, Massolo
added, and MOD officials are beginning to worry about how
Italy will be able to maintain its 9000 troops currently
deployed abroad under the constraints of an all-volunteer
military. Italy would always need to keep troops available
to deploy to the Balkans should the situation there
deteriorate, as it did in Kosovo in March. Still, averred
Massolo, it will help the US position if President Bush
continues to emphasize to PM Berlusconi the importance of the
PRT and FSB to US strategic interests.


11. (C) Massolo added that Italy was thinking, &in parallel,
not as a substitute8 for PRT deployment, of taking the ISAF
lead after Turkey. He was optimistic that Italy would reach
decisions on all these issues prior to the NATO summit. A/S
Jones expressed appreciation for Italy,s outstanding
contribution to peacekeeping efforts worldwide, and said she
understands the resource constraints under which many of
these political decisions must be made. She also underlined
USG gratitude for Italy,s role in the Global Peacekeeping
Operations Initiative to be highlighted at the Sea Island G-8
Summit.

--------------
US-EU/Istanbul Summit Preparations
--------------


12. (C) A/S Jones had hoped for a more operational EU-US
statement on the Middle East than the draft from Brussels.
Mattiolo emphasized that the document was indeed just that, a
working draft that had not been formally circulated to all
Member States, and that Italy agreed with the US view that
the Dublin statement should be more action oriented.
Mattiolo predicted that a more acceptable draft incorporating
US comments would be ready for review by June 9. Brauzzi

added that work was proceeding on the Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative, which would offer a menu of options on a
self-selection basis to countries in the region wanting to
participate in stabilization efforts. A/S Jones said that at
the Istanbul Summit, the US would see how far we could get
on the question of a possible NATO presence in Iraq. One
problem is that the timing was wrong, coming as it did just
prior to the transfer of sovereignty to the interim
government. Both agreed that the door must remain open for a
NATO or other multilateral role in the Security Council
Resolution.

--------------
Iran/IAEA
--------------


13. (C) Reiterating the need for a &balanced8 approach
towards Iran, Massolo told Jones that Italy, like the US,
will be looking for a strong statement from the June 14 IAEA
Board of Governors meeting that makes clear and
unconditional the need for Iran to cooperate fully with the
IAEA and to comply with its nonproliferation commitments. In
fact, when he visited Tehran he told Iranian officials that
&any other country would already have been called before the
UNSC.8 That said, continued Massolo, &we must not lose
Iran.8 We can engage the Iranians on other issues, he
suggested, such as regional stabilization, so as to make them
feel part of the international community. While he did not
criticize directly the results of the EU-3 initiative, he
said that he was not enthusiastic, from an EU-institutional
standpoint, about such &pioneer groups8 acting outside EU
negotiating structures. Note: Poloff delivered reftel
non-paper to MFA Office Director for Arms Control Giovanni
Ianuzzi on June 3. End Note.

--------------
UNMIK HEAD
--------------


14. (C) Massolo was looking forward to continued close
cooperation with the US and in the Contact Group on Balkans
stabilization, especially in Kosovo. Quint Ambassadors would
discuss that day in New York nominations for head of UNMIK
A/S Jones said that the US role would be to support its
European colleagues in developing a list of qualified
candidates from which SYG Annan could choose. The US was
proposing Amb. Rossin as UNMIK deputy; he would be ready to
take up his post in mid-August. Jones insisted that we must
act now to re-establish UNMIK leadership, and not wait for
elections as some have suggested.

--------------
UNSC Reform
--------------


15. (C) Massolo concluded the meeting with a plea for US
assistance in halting what Italy sees as momentum towards
establishing additional permanent UNSC seats. He cited
increased coordinated &activism8 by Germany, Brazil and
Japan, among others, to use efforts to reform and streamline
the UN as a means of increasing the number of permanent seats
in the UNSC, which would have exactly the opposite effect
desired by those members, including the US, who wish to see a
more efficient UN. Under any Rome government, an enlargement
that did not include Italy would be a &national
catastrophe.8 A/S Jones promised to speak with A/S Holmes
and Amb. Cunningham to plan a course of action.


16. (SBU) A/S Jones has cleared this message.


Visit Rome's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m

SKODON


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2004ROME02168 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL