AFGHANISTAN: ITALY EDGING BACK ON PRT/FSB

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 002122

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS AF IZ IT NATO AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: ITALY EDGING BACK ON PRT/FSB

REF: A. (A) ROME 2115

B. (B) USNATO 534

CLASSIFIED BY: DCM EMIL SKODON, 1.5 (B) AND (D)



1. (C) SUMMARY. ITALY IS EDGING BACK FROM A COMMITMENT TO A
PRT AND FSB IN AFGHANISTAN, PENDING GREATER CLARITY OF ITS
ROLE IN POST-JUNE 30 IRAQ. WE ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT
BERLUSCONI'S GOVERNMENT WILL EVENTUALLY JOIN A PRT - AND
THINK AN FSB IS STILL NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION - BUT DO NOT
EXPECT A FINAL DECISION BEFORE ADOPTION OF A NEW SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND PARLIAMENT'S EXTENSION OF ITALY'S
DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) DCM, ACCOMPANIED BY POL-MIL COUNSELOR, MET ON MAY 27
WITH MFA SECRETARY GENERAL UMBERTO VATTANI AND ON MAY 28 WITH
PM BERLUSCONI'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, GIOVANNI CASTELLANETA.
TOPICS INCLUDED PLANS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S JUNE 4-5 VISIT TO
ROME, IRAQ (REF A),AND AFGHANISTAN, ON WHICH WE PUSHED AGAIN
FOR ITALY TO JOIN A U.S.-LED PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM
(PRT) IN HERAT AND TO TAKE THE LEAD IN STANDING UP A FORWARD
SUPPORT BASE (FSB) IN WESTERN AFGHANISTAN.


3. (C) CASTELLANETA, IN PARTICULAR, WAS LESS FORWARD-LEANING
THAN HE HAD BEEN IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS. (ASKED BY
AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TO CLARIFY BERLUSCONI'S POSITION ON
PRT/FSB IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PM'S MAY 19 MEETING WITH THE
PRESIDENT, CASTELLANETA HAD ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT ITALY
WOULD ULTIMATELY RESPOND FAVORABLY TO BOTH PARTS OF THE U.S.
REQUEST. HOWEVER, FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS, THE
GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO WAIT UNTIL PARLIAMENT AUTHORIZED FUNDING
FOR CONTINUING ITALY'S DEPLOYMENT BEYOND JUNE 30 WHICH, HE
ARGUED, MUST IN TURN AWAIT FINALIZATION OF THE PENDING
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.)


4. (C) IN HIS MAY 28 MEETING WITH THE DCM, CASTELLANETA
HEDGED EVEN MORE, CITING A NEED TO WAIT UNTIL COMPETING
OVERSEAS REQUIREMENTS FOR ITALIAN TROOPS (BALKANS, IRAQ,
AFGHANISTAN) ARE SORTED OUT. HE SAID ITALY MAY STILL BE
ASKED TO MAKE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS IN IRAQ,
SUCH AS FOR THE PROTECTION OF UN PERSONNEL AND MISSIONS. HE
ALSO CITED A RECENT SUGGESTION AT NATO (REF B) THAT ITALY
PROVIDE TWO NRF BATTALIONS TO BACKFILL U.S. TROOPS TAPPED TO
PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN ELECTIONS. IN LIGHT OF THESE AND
OTHER POTENTIAL DEMANDS, AND ITALY'S ALREADY STRETCHED
CAPACITY TO FILL OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS, CASTELLANETA ARGUED
THAT IT WAS PRUDENT FOR ITALY TO WAIT BEFORE COMMITTING TO
THE PRT/FSB.


5. (C) VATTANI PROVIDED MORE HOPE. CITING MOD ARGUMENTS THAT
IT WOULD NEED ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR A PRT/FSB, VATTANI SAID
THE MFA HAD IDENTIFIED A 50 MILLION EURO ACCOUNT WHICH MIGHT
BE DRAWN FROM FOR THIS PURPOSE. (NB: WE BELIEVE THESE FUNDS
WERE ORIGINALLY EARMARKED FOR CIV-POL PRT ACTIVITIES
ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR GHAZNI; IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THEY
COULD BE USED FOR THE STRICTLY MILITARY EXPENSES OF AN FSB.)
VATTANI CRITICIZED NATO'S LIST OF FSB REQUIREMENTS AS EXTREME
AND INFLEXIBLE. HE CALLED FOR A MORE MODEST DEFINITION OF
FSB NEEDS, SINCE ADDITIONAL ASSETS WOULD BE AVAILABLE, IF
NEEDED, FROM KABUL AND ITS ENVIRONS. (VATTANI ALSO CONFIRMED
THAT HIGH-LEVEL RESISTANCE TO FSB CONTINUES AT THE MOD. HE
VOLUNTEERED AT ONE POINT THAT CHOD DI PAOLA "MUST BE PUSHED"
ON FSB.)


6. (C) LIKE CASTELLANETA, VATTANI CITED CONTENDING DEMANDS
FOR ITALY'S LIMITED NUMBER OF DEPLOYABLE FORCES, CALLING FOR
MORE ASSISTANCE FROM THIRD COUNTRIES ON A BROAD ARRAY OF
FRONTS. HE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT FSB, NOTING
THAT REQUESTS TO THE DUTCH AND TURKS FOR HELP HAD BEEN
REBUFFED. CITING THE "NEED FOR QUIET" IN THE BALKANS, HE
SAID ALLIES WERE PAYING TOO LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE NEEDS OF
THAT REGION. HE URGED CONTINUED ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. TO
PUSH OTHER ALLIES TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES IN KOSOVO, WHICH WOULD
FREE UP ITALIANS (AND OTHERS) FOR OTHER OVERSEAS DUTIES. HE
ALSO SPOKE OF THE NEED TO GARNER BROADER PARTICIPATION IN THE
IRAQ MNF, ADDING THAT AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ ARE LINKED, AND
THAT PROGRESS ON ONE FRONT CAN HELP SECURE PROGRESS ON THE
OTHER.


7. (C) FOR ALL THE CAVEATS, PRT AND FSB PREPARATIONS CONTINUE
WITHIN THE ITALIAN BUREAUCRACY. WORKING LEVEL CONTACTS IN
THE MFA INDICATE THAT BOTH PROPOSALS REMAIN VERY MUCH ON THE
TABLE. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT ITALIAN MILITARY PLANNERS
CONTINUE TO PREPARE FOR ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF A PRT AND FSB,
ALTHOUGH NO PRECISE DATES ARE UNDER DISCUSSION.

ROME 00002122 001.2 OF 002

M A COMMITMENT TO A
PRT AND FSB IN AFGHANISTAN, PENDING GREATER CLARITY OF ITS
ROLE IN POST-JUNE 30 IRAQ. WE ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT
BERLUSCONI'S GOVERNMENT WILL EVENTUALLY JOIN A PRT - AND
THINK AN FSB IS STILL NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION - BUT DO NOT
EXPECT A FINAL DECISION BEFORE ADOPTION OF A NEW SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND PARLIAMENT'S EXTENSION OF ITALY'S
DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) DCM, ACCOMPANIED BY POL-MIL COUNSELOR, MET ON MAY 27
WITH MFA SECRETARY GENERAL UMBERTO VATTANI AND ON MAY 28 WITH
PM BERLUSCONI'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, GIOVANNI CASTELLANETA.
TOPICS INCLUDED PLANS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S JUNE 4-5 VISIT TO
ROME, IRAQ (REF A),AND AFGHANISTAN, ON WHICH WE PUSHED AGAIN
FOR ITALY TO JOIN A U.S.-LED PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM
(PRT) IN HERAT AND TO TAKE THE LEAD IN STANDING UP A FORWARD
SUPPORT BASE (FSB) IN WESTERN AFGHANISTAN.


3. (C) CASTELLANETA, IN PARTICULAR, WAS LESS FORWARD-LEANING
THAN HE HAD BEEN IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS. (ASKED BY
AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TO CLARIFY BERLUSCONI'S POSITION ON
PRT/FSB IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PM'S MAY 19 MEETING WITH THE
PRESIDENT, CASTELLANETA HAD ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT ITALY
WOULD ULTIMATELY RESPOND FAVORABLY TO BOTH PARTS OF THE U.S.
REQUEST. HOWEVER, FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS, THE
GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO WAIT UNTIL PARLIAMENT AUTHORIZED FUNDING
FOR CONTINUING ITALY'S DEPLOYMENT BEYOND JUNE 30 WHICH, HE
ARGUED, MUST IN TURN AWAIT FINALIZATION OF THE PENDING
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.)


4. (C) IN HIS MAY 28 MEETING WITH THE DCM, CASTELLANETA
HEDGED EVEN MORE, CITING A NEED TO WAIT UNTIL COMPETING
OVERSEAS REQUIREMENTS FOR ITALIAN TROOPS (BALKANS, IRAQ,
AFGHANISTAN) ARE SORTED OUT. HE SAID ITALY MAY STILL BE
ASKED TO MAKE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS IN IRAQ,
SUCH AS FOR THE PROTECTION OF UN PERSONNEL AND MISSIONS. HE
ALSO CITED A RECENT SUGGESTION AT NATO (REF B) THAT ITALY
PROVIDE TWO NRF BATTALIONS TO BACKFILL U.S. TROOPS TAPPED TO
PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN ELECTIONS. IN LIGHT OF THESE AND
OTHER POTENTIAL DEMANDS, AND ITALY'S ALREADY STRETCHED
CAPACITY TO FILL OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS, CASTELLANETA ARGUED
THAT IT WAS PRUDENT FOR ITALY TO WAIT BEFORE COMMITTING TO
THE PRT/FSB.


5. (C) VATTANI PROVIDED MORE HOPE. CITING MOD ARGUMENTS THAT
IT WOULD NEED ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR A PRT/FSB, VATTANI SAID
THE MFA HAD IDENTIFIED A 50 MILLION EURO ACCOUNT WHICH MIGHT
BE DRAWN FROM FOR THIS PURPOSE. (NB: WE BELIEVE THESE FUNDS
WERE ORIGINALLY EARMARKED FOR CIV-POL PRT ACTIVITIES
ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR GHAZNI; IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THEY
COULD BE USED FOR THE STRICTLY MILITARY EXPENSES OF AN FSB.)
VATTANI CRITICIZED NATO'S LIST OF FSB REQUIREMENTS AS EXTREME
AND INFLEXIBLE. HE CALLED FOR A MORE MODEST DEFINITION OF
FSB NEEDS, SINCE ADDITIONAL ASSETS WOULD BE AVAILABLE, IF
NEEDED, FROM KABUL AND ITS ENVIRONS. (VATTANI ALSO CONFIRMED
THAT HIGH-LEVEL RESISTANCE TO FSB CONTINUES AT THE MOD. HE
VOLUNTEERED AT ONE POINT THAT CHOD DI PAOLA "MUST BE PUSHED"
ON FSB.)


6. (C) LIKE CASTELLANETA, VATTANI CITED CONTENDING DEMANDS
FOR ITALY'S LIMITED NUMBER OF DEPLOYABLE FORCES, CALLING FOR
MORE ASSISTANCE FROM THIRD COUNTRIES ON A BROAD ARRAY OF
FRONTS. HE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT FSB, NOTING
THAT REQUESTS TO THE DUTCH AND TURKS FOR HELP HAD BEEN
REBUFFED. CITING THE "NEED FOR QUIET" IN THE BALKANS, HE
SAID ALLIES WERE PAYING TOO LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE NEEDS OF
THAT REGION. HE URGED CONTINUED ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. TO
PUSH OTHER ALLIES TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES IN KOSOVO, WHICH WOULD
FREE UP ITALIANS (AND OTHERS) FOR OTHER OVERSEAS DUTIES. HE
ALSO SPOKE OF THE NEED TO GARNER BROADER PARTICIPATION IN THE
IRAQ MNF, ADDING THAT AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ ARE LINKED, AND
THAT PROGRESS ON ONE FRONT CAN HELP SECURE PROGRESS ON THE
OTHER.


7. (C) FOR ALL THE CAVEATS, PRT AND FSB PREPARATIONS CONTINUE
WITHIN THE ITALIAN BUREAUCRACY. WORKING LEVEL CONTACTS IN
THE MFA INDICATE THAT BOTH PROPOSALS REMAIN VERY MUCH ON THE
TABLE. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT ITALIAN MILITARY PLANNERS
CONTINUE TO PREPARE FOR ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF A PRT AND FSB,
ALTHOUGH NO PRECISE DATES ARE UNDER DISCUSSION.

ROME 00002122 002.1 OF 002

ERLUSCONI'S PRIORITY IS
EXTENDING ITALY'S DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ, AND HE WANTS NOTHING TO
INTERFERE WITH PARLIAMENT'S FUNDING EXTENSION (CURRENT
FUNDING AUTHORIZATION EXPIRES ON JUNE 30). AS NOTED REF A,
THE COMING MONTH PRESENTS CHALLENGES APLENTY FOR BERLUSCONI,
BUT WE EXPECT HIM TO SUCCEED IN EXTENDING ITALY'S IRAQ
DEPLOYMENT. THEREAFTER, BARRING ANY ADDITIONAL AND
EXTRAORDINARY REQUESTS FOR ITALIAN FORCES IN IRAQ (OR
ELSEWHERE),THE POLITICAL WAY SHOULD BE CLEAR FOR ITALY TO
JOIN THE HERAT PRT. AND, GIVEN ENOUGH ASSURANCES ABOUT
ASSISTANCE AND EQUIPMENT, ITALY MAY STILL BE PERSUADED TO
TAKE THE LEAD ON AN FSB. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A
COMMITMENT SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.


9. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

VISIT ROME'S CLASSIFIED WEBSITE:
HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/ROME/INDEX.CF M

SEMBLER

ROME 00002122 002.2 OF 002

/FSB. BERLUSCONI'S PRIORITY IS
EXTENDING ITALY'S DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ, AND HE WANTS NOTHING TO
INTERFERE WITH PARLIAMENT'S FUNDING EXTENSION (CURRENT
FUNDING AUTHORIZATION EXPIRES ON JUNE 30). AS NOTED REF A,
THE COMING MONTH PRESENTS CHALLENGES APLENTY FOR BERLUSCONI,
BUT WE EXPECT HIM TO SUCCEED IN EXTENDING ITALY'S IRAQ
DEPLOYMENT. THEREAFTER, BARRING ANY ADDITIONAL AND
EXTRAORDINARY REQUESTS FOR ITALIAN FORCES IN IRAQ (OR
ELSEWHERE),THE POLITICAL WAY SHOULD BE CLEAR FOR ITALY TO
JOIN THE HERAT PRT. AND, GIVEN ENOUGH ASSURANCES ABOUT
ASSISTANCE AND EQUIPMENT, ITALY MAY STILL BE PERSUADED TO
TAKE THE LEAD ON AN FSB. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A
COMMITMENT SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.


9. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

VISIT ROME'S CLASSIFIED WEBSITE:
HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/ROME/INDEX.CF M

SEMBLER

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2004ROME02122 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL