MFA OFFICIALS TELL EUR DAS BRADTKE AND STEPHENS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002091

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ IT AF EUN NATO
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIALS TELL EUR DAS BRADTKE AND STEPHENS
ITALY WANTS TO WORK WITH USG ON IRAQ UNSC RESOLUTION,
BALKANS


Classified By: DCM EMIL SKODON. REASON:1.4 (B)(D)


1. (C) Summary. On May 18, EUR Deputy Assistant Secretaries
Bradtke and Stephens had productive exchanges with MFA
officials on the present situation and way ahead in Iraq,
Afghanistan and the Balkans, and discussed prospects for a
robust Istanbul summit agenda. Bradtke stressed the
importance of strong transatlantic cooperation in the period
ahead, particularly in working out a new UN Security Council
resolution and supporting the transition of sovereignty in
Iraq. The next 18 months will be an important period for
Balkans stabilization; the US, NATO, UN and EU would be
working together on critical issues such as SFOR-EU handover
in Bosnia and decisions relating to Kosovo status. The next
important step was reforming UNMIK, and identifying a strong
successor to SRSG Holkeri. At the 28-29 Istanbul NATO
Summit leaders must pledge support for the Iraq UNSC
resolution. NATO must also be prepared to commit additional
military resources in Afghanistan, both to support PRTs and
the elections. End Summary.


2. (C) During a lunch hosted by the DCM, DAS Bradtke told an
Italian delegation headed by European Affairs
Director-General Giovanni Caracciolo that the next few months
would be critical for Iraq's future and would also be a test
of the strength of the transatlantic relationship. A number
of upcoming events, including the UNSC Iraq resolution
debate, the June 30 sovereignty transfer, PM Berlusconi's
meetings in Washington and the President's trip to Europe
next month, and the US-EU, G-8 and NATO summits, represented
challenges and opportunities for the USG to work together
with its European allies on crafting a solid foundation for a
stable Iraq.

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Balkans Stabilization
--------------


3. (C) DAS Stephens added that the next 18 months would also
be an important period for Balkans stabilization, noting that
the US, NATO, UN and EU would be working together on critical
issues such as SFOR-EU handover in Bosnia and decisions
relating to Kosovo status. She underlined that while the
recent lethal violence in Kosovo was a setback to our
efforts, it did serve to refocus attention on the need for a
more secure environment in which the political process could
advance, particularly in relation to the protection of Serb
and other non-Albanian communities. Bradtke added that while
the US was generally pleased with the EU-NATO negotiations on
the delineation of responsibilities in Bosnia, German/French
attempts to define the NATO presence as having less than full
Dayton authority would be problematic for the US. NATO
Office Director Giovanni Brauzzi assured Bradtke and Stephens
that Italy fully concurred with the US on this point.

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US-EU Cooperation
--------------


4. (C) Caracciolo agreed that there was no alternative to
transatlantic cooperation. The government was doing all it
could to overcome the "emotional" components distorting
reality in the internal political debate over Italy's
participation in Iraq. That debate is also being driven by
rhetoric related to the June 12 EP elections. He also said
that Europe has been absent of late from the MEPP, but he was
encouraged by the most recent GAC conclusions calling for
more robust EU participation in the process. He was also
optimistic that renewed US focus on Southeast Europe would
help overcome "Balkan fatigue" and noted that Belgrade was
starting to be more flexible on Kosovo's final status, on the
condition that the IC remains engaged in returns of Serb
refugees and IDPs.

--------------
Kosovo
--------------


5. (C) Caracciolo insisted that stability in the Kosovo
depended on steady IC pressure. "We can't rush" the process,
he underlined. The next important step was reforming UNMIK,
including identifying a strong successor to SRSG Holkeri.
The US and EU, perhaps through coordinated demarches, needed
to speak with one voice to Belgrade authorities on the damage
that a Radical party victory in upcoming elections would
cause to Serbia's integration process. DAS Stephens agreed
in principle to the suggested strategy, but said it should be
done quietly and make clear to Belgrade ramifications of a
Radical victory to its aspirations to join transatlantic

institutions. We should urge Kostunica to make clear that
for the good of SaM's future, a democratic candidate has to
prevail.

--------------
GAC Readout
--------------


6. (C) Director for EU Common Foreign and Security
Policy Luigi Mattiolo had attended the June 17 GAC, and noted
that there was growing awareness among the 25 EU Member State
Foreign Ministers that transatlantic relations must move from
their low point during the run-up to the Iraq war, to a
higher level of cooperation on a wide range of issues - "a
failure of one side is a failure for all sides" he said.



7. (C) Mattiolo said ministers at the GAC had agreed that a
UNSC Iraq resolution was essential for continued, expanded
and enhanced international cooperation in Iraq, but not
sufficient to secure lasting peace. The August 19 bombing of
the UN facility in Baghdad was "the UN's 9/11" averred
Mattiolo, and the organization was still coming to grips with
the fact that its operations can only be carried out
successfully in a secure working environment. The US can
count on the EU's support in this regard. Bradtke welcomed
this spirit of cooperation, and predicted that it would be
possible to work out a UNSCR that could gain unanimous
support.

--------------
Istanbul Summit
--------------


8. (C) Bradtke said that it was only natural that political
and military developments in Iraq would dominate the June
28-29 Istanbul NATO Summit. Leaders at the Summit must
pledge support for the UNSC Iraq resolution. After approval
of the UNSCR, we would need to look more closely at what NATO
might do. NATO must also be prepared to commit additional
military resources in Afghanistan, both to support PRTs and
the elections. The Summit should highlight the end of SFOR
as a success, and leaders will have to deal with the
disappointment of the &Adriatic Three8, especially Croatia,
that have high expectations for movement at the Summit on
their membership aspirations. Those aspirants must be kept
focused on progress through the Membership Action Plan (MAP)
process. Bradtke also noted the strong feeling in Washington
that until Sarajevo and Belgrade exhibit enhanced cooperation
with the ICTY and in apprehending PIFWCs, PFP membership for
Bosnia and SaM is out of the question.


9. (C) Bradtke noted that the US was now prepared to see
Ukrainian President Kuchma invited to Istanbul for a
NATO-Ukraine Commission, and the US would like to see Putin
come for a NATO-Russia meeting. The U.S. did not see
sufficient substance to warrant a NATO-EU Summit. Turkey's
position that Cyprus and Malta would have to be excluded also
made a NATO-EU meeting problematic for the US. Brauzzi
agreed with Bradtke's view, and emphasized that the Summit
should be seen as yet another mechanism for the US and Europe
to "rediscover" their shared vision. He also concurred with
Bradtke's proposal that the Summit conclusions should be
comprised of three separate documents: a "leaders
declaration" which would try to articulate a broader vision
of transatlantic relations; a statement on Iraq; and a
communique dealing with all other business.

--------------
Political Director's Views
--------------


10. (C) In a follow up meeting at the MFA, Political Director
Giampiero Massolo told Stephens and Bradtke, who were
accompanied by the DCM and PolMil Counselor, that Italy was
working hard, on the EU level, to get US-European relations
back on the right track - this work is one of PM Berlusconi's
highest priorities. He hoped that concrete results and
progress in Iraq after June 30, including a smooth transfer
of sovereignty and a clearer definition of the UN's role,
would help.


11. (C) Massolo agreed that the events of the past two weeks
made chances for a broad NATO role in Iraq less likely, but
he hoped the UNSC resolution would leave the door open for
more international participation, perhaps along the lines of
ISAF-3.


12. (C) Bradtke promised to consult with Italy on the

drafting of summit documents. Massolo opined that Putin
could be induced to come to the Summit if he could expect
Russia to be given a role in Iraq.


13. (C) To the DCM's query on whether an acceptable UNSC
resolution and productive Berlusconi/Bush meetings could sway
Italians to be more supportive of Italy's role in Iraq,
Massolo said that if these and other initiatives are
successful, it would make it harder for the "left of the
Left" to drive party policy, strengthening the hand of more
moderate players. The June 12 European Parliamentary
elections will be a somewhat accurate indicator of trends for
support of government policy.


14. (C) Director for EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
Mattiolo emphasized that "standards before status" in Kosovo
has to be implemented in a transparent, efficient manner. He
said that the IC must think creatively about final status -
something less than full independence may be the answer,
"perhaps an EU protectorate" but now is not the time to
address that issue.

--------------
Next SRSG Kosovo
--------------


15. (C) Massolo raised the possibility of former UN Special
Representative in southern Lebanon Steffan De Mistura as SRSG
in Kosovo when Holkeri leaves in July. Italy had not
formally nominated De Mistura, who according to Massolo, was
"a little bit Italian, a little bit Swedish, and a little bit
UN" but was interested in how he was viewed by the USG.
Massolo noted that Commission President Prodi's advisor (and
former Belgrade OSCE HOM) Sannino has also been suggested,
but that FM Frattini's current thinking was that he was "too
young." Stephens agreed to stay in touch on this issue.


16. (U) DAS Bradtke and DAS Stephens cleared this cable.

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2004ROME02091 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL