ITALY/IRAQ; FIRM ON TROOPS; WORKING ON HOSTAGES

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001527

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2024
TAGS: IT IZ MARR MOPS OPDC PREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: ITALY/IRAQ; FIRM ON TROOPS; WORKING ON HOSTAGES

REF: STATE 86313

Classified By: POL MC THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Italian authorities expressed their strong
agreement with points in reftel demarche; they are determined
to stay the course with the Italian military deployment in
Iraq. With the Italian public still shocked by the brutal
murder of an Italian citizen taken hostage, the government is
also devoting efforts to secure release of three remaining
hostages. This topic will probably be raised during FM
Frattini's meetings at the White House and State Department
April 20. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Ambassador presented reftel demarche April 19 to
Defense Minister Martino, who enthusiastically agreed with
the logic of the demarche. (See Rome 1526 for full report).
PolMC also presented the points April 19 to Paolo Dionisi,
assistant diplomatic adviser to PM Berlusconi, and Claudio
Bisogniero, deputy Political Director at the MFA. Dionisi
confirmed that the Spanish decision will not shake
Berlusconi's determination to help build a secure Iraq.
Having just listened in on NSA Rice's conference call with
his boss, Amb. Castellaneta, Dionisi said Italy completely
agreed that we must deal with the Spanish gap in a practical
manner without overreacting. Both Dionisi and Bisogniero
said that an additional Security Council resolution,
expanding the role of the UN, would assist Italy in managing
public opinion and ease a Parliamentary vote in June-July on
renewing financing for Italian participation. Bisogniero
emphasized that the GOI considers UNSCR 1511 as legally
sufficient for the continued Italian presence; a new
resolution would improve the political cover.


3. (C) Dionisi described at length Berlusconi's efforts to
secure release of the three Italian hostages in Iraq.
Dionisi said that the issue is being worked intensively on
the ground in Iraq, through an interlocutor who (they
believe) has contact with the kidnappers. He expressed
appreciation for USG assistance on the ground in this effort.
The Italians believe that the three hostages have been
"taken over" from the original kidnappers by another group of
"more sophisticated criminals". Dionisi said that Berlusconi
would like to see the cease-fire in Falluja maintained as
long as possible, and the humanitarian corridor kept open,
because it would bolster the chances of securing the
hostages' release. In order to ensure that all avenues for
their release were being explored, Berlusconi dispatched his
Diplomatic Adviser Gianni Castellaneta (accompanied by
Dionisi) to Doha, Tehran and Damascus April 16-18. (Italian
press reports that Italy has also contacted Russia, Libya and
the Palestinian Authority to ask for any help they may be
able to offer on the hostages).


4. (C) In Doha, Castellaneta first went to the headquarters
of al-Jazeera, which was in possession of the videotape
showing the execution of the first Italian hostage. Dionisi
said that al-Jazeera had not broadcast the video clip (which
he and Castellaneta viewed several times) because it showed a
cold-blooded murder of a man not afraid to die: al-Jazeera
only shows Arabs being murdered, not acting as murderers.
Nor would al-Jazeera agree to give Castellaneta a copy of the
tape to assist in the Italian criminal investigation.
Castellaneta then pressed the Qatari FM to press al-Jazeera
for a copy, and the GOI was continuing to press. Dionisi
described the Qataris as very cooperative, and eager to be
more positively involved in Iraq as security conditions
permit.


5. (C) In Tehran, Castellaneta (a former Ambassador to Iran)
met with FM Kharazzi and Deputy FM Ali Ahani. He also used
some of his previous contacts to convey parallel messages to
Rafsanjani. The Italian appeal for assistance in freeing
their hostages was couched only in humanitarian terms, not
political, and the Iranians responded in the same vein.
According to Dionisi, they instructed their officials in Iraq
to be of help where possible. On the broader situation in
Iraq, Kharazzi described al-Sadr as a 'radical extremist'
without a substantial following among Iraqi Shi'a. Blaming
the Coalition (though without 'excessive rhetoric') for
mistakes in handling al-Sadr, Kharazzi said Iran is trying to
calm down the situation. The delegation it has sent to Iraq
is trying to reach al-Najaf and help arrange for a ceasefire
and stand-down of forces, including through direct contact
with al-Sadr.


6. (C) PolMC noted that the Iranians were denying Italian
press reports that Iran had asked Italy to help "mediate"
with the US, and asked if the US was even discussed in
Tehran. Dionisi said that there was no Iranian request nor
Italian offer of intermediation between the US and Iran. The
only point that Kharazzi said he "hoped the US would
understand" was that it would be a grave mistake for the
Coalition to bomb or shell al-Najaf. Dionisi said that
Castellaneta had already conveyed this point to Washington.
PolMC asked if there was any discussion of Iran's nuclear
program and the IAEA. Dionisi said that Kharazzi mentioned
it briefly, and that Castellaneta only replied that Tehran
must cooperate fully with el-Baradei. PolMC asked if there
were any developments between the April 16 meeting with
Kharazzi in Tehran, and Kharazzi's April 18 meeting with
Berlusconi in Rome. Dionisi said no, the second meeting was
a virtual replay of the first.


7. (C) In Damascus, Castellaneta's team got the full red
carpet and was received by President al-Asad, alone, in his
private apartment. They found al-Asad eager to talk,
forward-looking and (almost) free of rhetoric. (Al-Asad did
not even mention the just completed Israeli elimination of
Hamas leader al-Rantisi). He recalled his opposition to the
war in Iraq, but expressed his desire to see Iraq stable and
secure, with an expanded UN mandate as the first step. He
stated emphatically that Syria is not involved with or
encouraging the escalation of violence in Iraq. He was very
happy with the letter from Secretary Powell. According to
Dionisi, al-Asad accepted the Italian request "as a
humanitarian mission". Within hours, official Syrians in
Baghdad had contacted the Italians to offer their assistance.


8. Minimize considered

Visit Rome's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m

SEMBLER


NNNN
2004ROME01527 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL