Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ROME1526
2004-04-19 17:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

ITALIAN DEFENSE MINISTER SEEKS DEPUTY COMMANDER

Tags:  MOPS PREL AF IZ IT IRAQI FREEDOM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001526 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2014
TAGS: MOPS PREL AF IZ IT IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: ITALIAN DEFENSE MINISTER SEEKS DEPUTY COMMANDER
SLOT IN POST JUNE 30 IRAQ, AGREES WITH NEED FOR
STEADFASTNESS

REF: STATE 86313

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5(B)(D)

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001526

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2014
TAGS: MOPS PREL AF IZ IT IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: ITALIAN DEFENSE MINISTER SEEKS DEPUTY COMMANDER
SLOT IN POST JUNE 30 IRAQ, AGREES WITH NEED FOR
STEADFASTNESS

REF: STATE 86313

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5(B)(D)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Italy expects to be a top candidate for a deputy
commander position in the post-June 30 Iraq mission, Italian
Defense Minister Antonio Martino told Ambassador Sembler on
April 19. During the meeting, which Martino requested,
Martino reaffirmed Italy's commitment to the mission in Iraq
and said Italy agrees completely with reftel talking points
on Spanish troop withdrawal; leaving would mean abandoning
Iraq to terrorists. He noted that another UNSC resolution
will be politically useful, given Italy's constitutional
limitations, but vowed that the government will continue to
work creatively within existing constraints. On Afghanistan,
Martino said that Italy is discussing the logistics of a
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and a Forward Support
Base (FSB) with SHAPE and other military planners. Italy
would prefer to contribute a PRT under ISAF, Martino said,
but he did not rule out other possibilities. END SUMMARY.

ITALIAN DEPUTY COMMANDER?
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador Sembler, accompanied by DCM and Pol-Mil
Counselor, met with DefMin Martino on April 19 at Martino's
request. Martino led off by telling Ambassador Sembler that
it would be appropriate for an Italian to serve as a deputy
commander in the post-June 30 Iraq mission. Martino had
heard that the operation was to be led by a US commander,
with three deputy commanders - US, UK and a third to be
determined. Given Italy's sizable contribution to Iraq's
reconstruction, both militarily and financially, assigning an
Italian to the third position seemed reasonable and
appropriate, Martino said. Rumors that the job might go to a
Canadian were hard to believe, particularly since Italian
forces have been responding capably and professionally -
often under fire - for almost a year.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador used the opportunity of the meeting to
deliver reftel demarche on Iraq. Italy agrees completely
with reftel talking points on the need for steadfast
determination in the wake of the Spanish decision to withdraw

troops from Iraq, Martino said. As he recently told a
journalist, it is no longer a question of how or why the war
happened. Either Iraq achieves success and stability or we
leave and abandon the country to become a haven for
terrorists, he recounted.


4. (C) Martino reaffirmed Italy's commitment to hold firm in
Iraq, but emphasized that parliament authorized sending
troops as part of a "humanitarian" mission. While the
Italian government has interpreted that language broadly,
Martino said, the limits are real. Therefore, he wanted the
Ambassador to know that Italy may need to take a creative
approach to achieve the goals set out in CJCS General Myers'
April 15 letter to CHOD Admiral Di Paola. (NOTE: a copy of
the letter, which asked for an ROE review to allow for use of
deadly force against forces declared to be hostile, has been
faxed to EUR/WE. END NOTE.) Martino said he plans to approve
a proposal Di Paola suggested (NFI) that "would achieve the
same result" sought in Gen. Myers' request, but in a manner
consistent with the Italian legal and constitutional
requirements.

UNSCR
--------------


5. (C) Martino noted that parliament will need to approve the
extension of Italy's Iraq mission beyond June 30. Such
authorization will be much easier politically if an
additional UNSC resolution is in force and a new Iraqi
government asks Italy to stay, he said. DCM commented that
consideration of an additional UNSCR is still in the early
stages, and asked about the outcome of the April 14 Supreme
Defense Council meeting chaired by President Ciampi (who is
known to strongly favor a UN role). Martino confirmed that
the Supreme Defense Council had focused in large part on

Iraq. Ciampi used the occasion to emphasize that, for legal
and constitutional reasons, Italian participation in Iraq is
directly tied to UN authorization, specifically UNSCR 1511.
Martino reassured the Ambassador that PM Berlusconi's
administration is fully prepared to work creatively within
existing constitutional constraints but indicated that a
broader UNSCR would be politically useful.


5. (C) After the meeting, Martino's diplomatic advisor,
Trupiano, specified that parliamentary approval would ideally
come after such a UNSC resolution but must in any event be
before the June 30 transition. Accordingly, early UNSC
action would be better, so the government could prepare the
parliamentary ground. For the same reasons, continued
Trupiano, a "broader" UNSCR would be welcome. Comment: We
understand this to refer to the actual UN role in post-June
30 Iraq. End comment.

AFGHANISTAN PRT/FSB
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador said he was encouraged to hear that
the CHOD and SACEUR have been discussing an Italian PRT and,
possibly, an FSB for Afghanistan. He urged Italy to take on
the FSB in western Afghanistan and noted that SACEUR has
assured that Italy will not have to go it alone. Martino
said decisions have not yet been made but added that he
agrees with the direction of the discussions underway in
military channels. If Italy agrees to stand up an FSB, it
will be essential that other Allies pitch in, he said. When
probed about contributing a PRT under OEF or ISAF command,
Martino said Italy would prefer to do an ISAF PRT, although
he did not rule out other options.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Martino has kept a wary eye on post-June 30 command
structure in Iraq and is now laying down a marker that Italy
has earned a top slot, through actions as well as words. His
meeting with the Ambassador was as much to underscore that
message as to reassure the US that the government's
commitment is not wavering. Berlusconi's administration is
determined to structure Italian participation to avoid a
constitutional standoff with Ciampi - a legal battle they
might not win. For Ciampi, UN authorization is the key to
Italian participation and UNSCR 1511 could use some
bolstering. The Supreme Defense Council meeting was a subtle
caution to Berlusconi to avoid provoking a constitutional
confrontation by interpreting Italy's "humanitarian" mission
in Iraq too liberally. Martino has made it clear that
Ciampi's boundaries still leave sufficient room to maneuver
but will require careful handling. END COMMENT.


8. (U) Minimize considered for CPA Baghdad and Embassy Kabul.

Visit Rome's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m

SEMBLER


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2004ROME01526 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL