CWC: COORDINATING WITH ITALY ON RABTA CONVERSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001459

SIPDIS


THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL
STATE FOR AC/CB ROBERT MIKULAK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2014
TAGS: PREL PARM IT CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: COORDINATING WITH ITALY ON RABTA CONVERSION

REF: A. SECSTATE 77352


B. ROME 0735

C. ROME 0777

Classified By: A/POLMINCOUNS GARY ROBBINS FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. Italy is concerned that using a technical
change to the CWC to help Libya with its conversion request
(as described ref A) could result in an overly lengthy
process. Italian officials, after consulting with the OPCW
Technical Secretariat, are recommending that an attempt be
made to partition Rabta into three areas: a "clean" section
that was never used for CW production, a "dirty" contaminated
section, and a "grey" section that was only indirectly
involved in CW activity. Italy believes such a division
could allow Libya to move ahead with pharmaceutical
production in the clean area while the grey section would be
subject to a conversion request (the dirty section would be
destroyed under the Italian plan). To assist Libya in moving
forward with conversion of what Italy hopes would be a
relatively small section of the Rabta facility, Italian
officials suggest that a technical fix be applied to the CWC
so that the imposed six-year time limit on submitting a
conversion request would start from the date a country
accedes to the Convention (instead of April 29, 1997, when
the CWC entered into force). End summary.

Concerns about Timing
--------------


2. (C) On April 8, Polmiloff and UK Embassy DCM Scott
Wightman conveyed ref A points and non-paper to Giovanni
Iannuzzi, head of Italy's CWC National Authority. General
Tracci, an MoD CW expert assigned to Iannuzzi's office,
participated in the tripartite meeting. Iannuzzi appreciated
US/UK interest in consulting with Italy on Libya's conversion
request for Rabta and efforts to develop a solution to the
potential stumbling block described in ref A. He generally
agreed with the arguments set down in the non-paper as to why
options 1 and 3 were problematic. After exchanging views
with OPCW Secretary General Pfirter on the margins of the
March Executive Council meeting Iannuzzi had nevertheless
concluded that option 2 alone did not necessarily represent
the best way forward.


3. (C) Italy, Iannuzzi said, was particularly concerned that
a pure technical change to the CWC could result in a
lengthy--perhaps years long--process before conversion could
take place. Italy is worried that if Libya gets frustrated
with delays in having a conversion request approved, it could
abandon the prospect of transforming Rabta and decide to
build another industrial pharmaceutical plant elsewhere that
would not be subject to any international controls. Tracci,
taking issue with the statement in our non-paper that the CWC
"establishes an abbreviated procedure for making changes to
the Annexes", cited the one precedent where a technical
change to the Convention was applied--Canada's interest in
producing Saxitoxin for the world market--as indicative of
why Italy was concerned about timing. He argued that it took
three years for CWC States Parties to approve Canada's
request, despite the fact that there was, according to
Tracci, no political opposition to what was fundamentally a
"technical issue".


4. (C) Iannuzzi acknowledged that the fix sought for Rabta
could prove to be non-controversial, but Tracci said he would
be surprised if at least one state didn't raise objections.
Polmiloff suggested that this was the reason why the U.S. was
committed to developing an effective diplomatic strategy to
overcome any dissent to a technical change. Wightman weighed
in to emphasize that working together at three
(U.S.-UK-Italy) in consultation with Libya would be key to
convincing CWC States Parties of the merits of whatever
solution was finally agreed upon.

Another Way Forward?
--------------


5. (C) Iannuzzi described what he considered a potential way
forward. He proposed working through the OPCW Technical
Secretariat to partition as precisely as possible the "three

SIPDIS
sections of the Rabta facility". These he defined as the
"clean part" which had never been used in the production of

chemical weapons or their precursors, the "dirty section"
which had been used for those purposes, and the "grey area"
which had been peripheral to actual production but not
necessarily "clean". His hope was that a thorough analysis
of Rabta could result in a partitioning of the clean area
where pharmaceutical production could begin even before
Libya's conversion request was approved. The request would
apply to the grey area while the dirty section could simply
be destroyed.


6. (C) Iannuzzi thought that after an effort to segregate the
three sections was complete, a technical adjustment to the
Convention would be appropriate. He suggested that the words
"for it" (Note: referring to the acceding state) could be
added to the end of Verification Annex, Part V, Article 72 so
that the imposed six-year time limit on submitting a
conversion request would start from the date a country
accedes to the Convention. This would be an additional
incentive for countries potentially interested in joining,
such as Syria, to make the leap, Iannuzzi said. Polmiloff
assured Iannuzzi that his views would be conveyed to
Washington, but noted that the readout by U.S. officials of
the situation at Rabta provided to Italy in February (ref B)
raised questions as to how feasible a "partition plan" would
be.


7. (C) Iannuzzi concluded by suggesting that the U.S., the
UK, and Italy consult further on the way forward. He said
Italy could agree on approaching other countries in general
terms about the need for a positive attitude toward
conversion, without at this point going into details about
proposed workarounds to the Article 72 language. Italy will
broach the matter again with its EU partners at the next
Disarmament Working Group meeting (CODUN) slated for May 11.
Iannuzzi indicated that he would be looking to the OPCW
Technical Secretariat to provide an update on its analysis of
Rabta, but clarified that he did not expect it to render an
opinion on the merits of any particular approach to the
conversion issue. Rather, he suggested that its views be
taken into account because the Secretariat had the "pulse of
the situation" at Rabta.

Training Offer
--------------


8. (C) Iannuzzi confirmed that Italy had invited Libya to
send a delegation to the Italian chemical weapons destruction
facility in Civitavecchia. Italy was hoping that a one day
introduction to the facility and Italian private sector CW
destruction capabilities could be held by the end of April,
but was still waiting on a Libyan response.

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2004ROME01459 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL