ITALY ON ANTI-COALITION VIOLENCE IN IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001343

SIPDIS


STATE FOR PM/RSAT AND PM/PMAT; JCS FOR J-5 INMA COALITION
AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2019
TAGS: IT IZ MARR MOPS PREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: ITALY ON ANTI-COALITION VIOLENCE IN IRAQ

REF: A. (A) STATE 74537


B. (B) FBIS EUP20040405000110

Classified By: DCM EMIL M. SKODON, REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D)


1. SUMMARY: (C) Italian officials agree on the need to
respond firmly to al-Sadr's challenge to the Coalition's
authority. MFA noted the importance of not allowing Jaysh
al-Mahdi to establish a "territorial presence." The Italians
also believe that Iran should share our interest in
containing al-Sadr; FM Frattini was seeking as of Monday
night to contact Iranian FM Kharazzi with that message. END
SUMMARY


2. (C) Early April 5, Embassy delivered reftel points to high
officials in the Italian Foreign Ministry, Prime Minister's
office, and Defense Ministry. We accompanied this with an
expression of sympathy for the three Italian Carabinieri who
had been injured in responding to the demonstrations. MFA
Political Director Massolo told DCM that Italy understood the
need for coalition unity. He pointed to the statement of FM
Frattini in an Italian newspaper that morning (Ref B)
reiterating "no change" in the Italian military mandate.
Massolo said that Italy is also worried, especially about the
prospect that al-Sadr could come to control the situation on
the ground, or establish certain territory under his
exclusive control, without a coalition presence. (Massolo
also took the opportunity to express concern about Senator
Lugar's comment that the June 30 date for transfer of
sovereignty might slip. DCM replied that we have no
indication that Sen. Lugar's comment reflects any change in
our firm plans for June 30).


3. (C) Paolo Dionisi, Deputy Diplomatic Adviser to PM
Berlusconi, told PolMC that al-Sadr's actions increase the
importance to the coalition of working with other Shi'a
leaders, particularly al-Sistani. Al-Sadr's followers,
though devoted to their leader, did not enjoy a good
reputation among most Iraqi Shi'a. It would be important to
convince the Shi'a that al-Sadr's strategic choice was the
wrong one for them. In this, al-Sistani would be important,
but the Coalition should also reach out to al-Hakim and
SCIRI.


4. (C) Dionisi also noted that Tehran should share our
interest in preventing a violent showdown between a Shi'a
faction and the coalition. He repeated the offer that
Berlusconi's chief dip adviser, Gianni Castellaneta, made
during his March 19 meetings at the White House: to convey
directly to Iran messages of particular concern to the US.
PolMC agreed that Iran should share our interest in Iraqi
stability, and noted that the USG has the capability of
conveying such messages reliably to the Iranian government.
Dionisi thought that Lebanese Shi'a groups could also play a
positive role in calming the situation in southern Iraq,
listing Fadlallah and the younger Shams al-Din as two who
would have some influence with al-Hakim and other Iraqi Shi'a
leaders. (COMMENT: Dionisi is something of an expert on
Shia' politics, having served last in Beirut. In November,
he undertook a mission to Baghdad and Basra on Berlusconi's
behalf to consult with Shi'a leaders and prepare a report on
the situation. End comment).


5. (C) Late in the day, MFA Director-General (A/S equivalent
for the Middle East) Ricardo Sessa confirmed to PolMC that FM
Frattini was seeking to place a call to Iranian FM Kharazzi
to urge Iran to contribute to calming the situation. Sessa
also asked whether Ref A points contained any specific action
request for the Italian military, given the late afternoon
announcement of an arrest order being issued for al-Sadr.
PolMC replied that any request that concerned actions on the
ground by the Italian contingent would be passed through
Coalition military authorities in Iraq. The non-paper was
instead a general statement of what we had done, and a
request for Coalition solidarity on the ground and in public
statements.


6. (C) Defense Minister Martino has been in Brussels for an
EU meeting, and has not seen the full text of Ref A demarche.
However, his Dip Adviser, Francesco Trupiano, was informed
by MoD of our points and contacted PolMilCouns. Trupiano
said only that Martino is deeply concerned about the safety
of the Italian contingent in Nasiriya, and especially
interested in any information the Coalition may have that
could affect the contingent's assignment.


7. Minimize considered.

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2004ROME01343 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL