Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ROME1278
2004-03-31 17:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

EUROPEANS MAY BE FROM VENUS, BUT PRODI IS FROM

Tags:  PREL PGOV IT EUN ITALIAN POLITICS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001278

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV IT EUN ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: EUROPEANS MAY BE FROM VENUS, BUT PRODI IS FROM
NEPTUNE


Classified By: POL M/C TOM COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (b, d)

1 (C) Summary: EU Commission President Romano Prod
demonstrated again March 27 why he rivals PM Berusconi in
polarizing Italian politics, this timewith an open letter
outlining the center-left oposition's Iraq policy. The
piece was vintage Prdi: convoluted and dense, it managed to
favor boh withdrawing Italy's 2700-man contingent from Iraq
and continuing the deployment. In a nod to the panish
Socialists, Prodi was clearly trying to ue lingering
opposition to Operation Iraqi Freedo to bolster support for
Italy's ever-fractious cnter-left opposition in the run-up
to June Euro-Parliament elections. Whether Prodi's position
relects his own tortured reasoning or an attempt to embrace
the divergent positions on use of force, the result was clear
as mud. Apart from his own conflict of interest in
campaigning from Brussels, Prodi's latest gambit did make one
thing clear to us: that the Berlusconi government remains a
steadier partner than any possible successor government from
the center-left. End Summary

Prodi's Bottom Lines: Bring Troops Home...
--------------


2. (C) Although he has still has a day job in Brussels,
Romano Prodi seems to be running full-time for Italian Prime
Minister (an election unlikely to occur before the end of
2005 at the earliest). Judging from the reactions to Prodi's
open letter, one would think the leader of Italy's
center-left commanded something beyond the loyalty of
hard-core supporters (like, say, military units). But in a
country where domestic political discourse often has more in
common with opera, Prodi's "manifesto" was the equivalent of
an aria -- loud, lengthy and kind of hard to understand.


3. (U) Prodi declared that a center-left government would:

-- draw inspiration from Italy's constitution on questions of
international security;

-- never accept use of force if it served solely to resolve
an international dispute or bring about regime change;

-- require UN authorization for virtually any military
intervention.

Operation OIF was and remained illegitimate, Prodi argued,
because it failed to obtain approval of the UN or any other

international entity. A center-left government would not have
participated in nor given its approval to OIF. By extension,
the current "occupation" was a continuation of an unjustified
and illegitimate war that was clearly incapable of restoring
peace and security to Iraq. An Olive Tree Coalition would
choose to bring Italian intervention to an end.

...unless, of course, they should stay
--------------


4. (U) Having declared an unequivocal bottom line, Prodi then
changed keys. "These are not the terms in which the problem
must be addressed." Because the Iraqi people were being
exposed to disorder and constant terrorist threat, the
international community's intervention was fully justified on
humanitarian grounds. Moreover, a military element was
necessary to help ensure its success. Such an intervention
needed to be legitimized by a new UNSC resolution. Since a
precipitate withdrawal would make the situation worse, Europe
had to seize the opportunity to work more closely with the
U.S. and establish an increasingly closer relationship in
support of the UN. In this context, an immediate withdrawal
of Italian troops would not make much sense.


5. (U) Prodi urged an immediate return to the "worldwide
coalition against terrorism" that was forged after September

11. Terrorism was "the single most important threat to the
free world since the Second World War." (Comment: We presume
he skipped over Soviet imperialism to avoid offending the
Olive Tree's red roots.) There was no alternative to credible
military deterrence if one wants to preserve, guarantee, or
impose the peace.


6. (U) Circling around to Europe, Prodi argued that European
citizens wanted their leaders to craft a "tool" to extricate
them from current insecurity. If a European constitution was
already in place, "we would already have been able to put in
place a common army," but in its absence common defense and
police cooperation activities were underway. A link-up among
intelligence services is still to come.


7. (U) Reactions were strong and largely predictable. The


leaders of the center-left parties comprising the Olive Tree
were supportive, though most appeared caught off-guard by
Prodi's timing. Leaders within the Berlusconi government
rejected Prodi's arguments; Deputy Prime Minister Fini
lambasted Prodi for "playing double-games" and FM Frattini
criticized his 'illegitimate' foray into Italian domestic
politics. Perhaps the most telling critique came from
European Affairs Minister Buttiglione: "I couldn't figure out
Prodi's exact position on the issue."

Comment: Prodi's Conflicts of Interest
--------------


8. (C) Prodi's manifesto was his attempt to rally the
faithful, and perhaps attract some swing support, by thumping
on the "illegitimacy" of OIF and the current transition in
Iraq. It's hard to tell if its opacity was a reflection of
Prodi's own logic, the difficulty of trying to reconcile
wildly divergent views among the center-left parties on
legiQmate useQf force, or both. (We agree with many
Italian commentators who believe that Prodi's nickname in the
headlines - "The Professor" - reflects a deliberate campaign
style of appearing eloquent and brilliant without actually
saying anything). At this point, it's too early to tell if
Prodi's manifesto will yield practical results in the June
Euro-Parliament elections -- results the center-left would
try to build on in the next national contest. But it
demonstrates how difficult it would be for a center-left
Italian government to grapple with the rapid, flexible
responses and imaginative thinking required in the global war
on terrorism. The mental gymnastics Prodi engages in --
trying to capture in theory the anti-war sentiments of his
coalition while simultaneously advocating a more realistic
set of criteria in practice -- are reminiscent of the last
center-left government's agonizing over NATO's use of force
in Kosovo. A center-left government wouldn't be disastrous
-- it would be a reliable partner on a wide range of issues
-- but it would complicate any operations or initiatives
involving use of force.


9. (C) Not lost to some Italian journalists was the hypocrisy
inherent in one of the strongest critics of Berlusconi's
conflicts of interest openly trying to influence a
member-state's internal politics while serving as Commission
President. And, to be fair to the center-left as a whole,
the leaders of the two largest parties (Democratic Left and
Daisy) have described to the Ambassador a much more
sophisticated position, a preference for keeping Italian
troops in Iraq with an expanded mandate for the UN on the
political side. Still, if Prodi's recent statements were to
determine the actual policy of a center-left government, we'd
better hope that the Berlusconi government succeeds in
becoming the first postwar Italian government to serve out
its entire term in office -- and is then reelected.
SEMBLER


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2004ROME01278 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL