GETTING TO YES ON AN ITALIAN-LED AFGHAN FSB

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001229

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2014
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL AF IT AFGHANISTAN IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: GETTING TO YES ON AN ITALIAN-LED AFGHAN FSB

REF: A. ROME 960


B. ROME 927

C. ROME 860

D. ROME 798

E. ROME 668

F. MULTIPLE E-MAILS

Classified By: DCM EMIL SKODON, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Government of Italy, at very high levels, has
indicated a willingness to contribute more to Afghanistan and
to support ISAF expansion beyond Kabul. The Italians concur
that rapid action to stabilize Afghanistan is of the highest
political priority; they also share our conviction that
succeeding in Afghanistan is key to the war on terrorism,
regional security, the battle against narcotics, and support
for democracy and human rights. They have been consistently
willing to contribute a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT),
since our first request they lead one in Ghazni in November

2003. They are considering the request to stand up a Forward
Support Base (FSB),but have concerns. If we can help them
address those concerns, working in coordination with SHAPE
and the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC),and be
specific (and sure) about what we want and where, it
increases the likelihood that they can make the significant
contribution we -- and they -- want. END SUMMARY.

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HISTORY
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2. (C) In November 2003, the U.S. asked Italy to lead a PRT
in Ghazni. In February, the day before Defense Minister
Martino was to announce Italy's leadership of the Ghazni PRT,
we abruptly asked Italy to steer clear because we determined
Ghazni was not ready for transfer to ISAF command. The
Italians then coordinated with SHAPE -- as we asked -- to
find a new PRT site. As a result of those consultations,
they focused on Herat. This week, we told them the Herat PRT
should remain under OEF command -- fortunately with a bit of
notice. At a March 25 meeting originally called to make a
firm decision on the Herat PRT, Prime Minister Berlusconi,
Defense Minister Martino, and Foreign Minister Frattini
instead determined that Italy would not/not pursue the Herat
PRT due to USG concerns.

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TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT: IMPEDIMENTS TO AN FSB
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3. (C) Italy understands the political and historical
imperative of success in Afghanistan. The GOI has been with
us in Afghanistan from the outset of OEF, and is determined
to continue. The GOI at a very high level wants to make a
still more significant contribution; the MFA Special Envoy
for Afghanistan told us Secretary General Vattani had
instructed the MFA to be as forward-leaning on the NATO
(SHAPE) request as possible. Under Secretary for Asia
Boniver has repeatedly assured us of her Government's
political will to do as much as possible in Afghanistan, and
specifically to lead a PRT. The political side of the MFA
has been cautiously forward-leaning on the FSB, as well --
but they do not control military assets nor maintain the
mil-mil relationship with SHAPE. In the end, the Defense
Ministry must decide if Italy has the resources to lead an
FSB. DefMin Martino is solid politically; he is a stalwart
pro-NATO and pro-U.S. member of the Berlusconi Government.
But he is also an astute politician, and understands that
putting Italian soldiers at risk has to be done in a way that
portrays the Government in the best possible light to the
electorate.


4. (C) The GOI, however, faces political and resource
constraints. In Afghanistan, the political constraints are
fewer then in Iraq. The Italian public largely supported the
war against terrorism and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and
continues to do so. The majority in the center-left has not
questioned renewal of funding for the continued Italian
support to Afghanistan. (In fact, during the recent debate
over funding for Italy's military missions abroad, the
center-left sought to vote on funding for the Iraq mission
separately, so that they would be free to support the
remaining missions, including in Afghanistan.) However, the
approach the Government uses toward Parliament and the public
emphasizes the civilian aspects of the Afghanistan mission --
nation building, democracy building, institution building,

reconstruction. A civ-mil PRT fits perfectly within this
scenario. A purely military FSB is more of a stretch. We
may need to emphasize the role the FSB plays in support of
PRTs.


5. (C) A more difficult hurdle for the GOI is resources,
human, material and financial. A PRT would be financed
jointly from MFA and MOD coffers. An FSB, according to
Martino's diplomatic adviser, would likely be funded
exclusively by the financially-strapped MOD. The Italians
are also concerned about the manpower needed for an FSB. The
military is near the limit on the number of forces it can
deploy abroad. Finally, the GOI has questions about what
specific assets are needed for an FSB, and how flexible the
requirements on the lead nation are. They have repeatedly
worried about their ability to provide enough helicopters and
aircraft, for example. These concerns need to be addressed
with the Italians. The March 24 meeting between Italian
Embassy DCM Stefano Stefanini and DASD Collins may have begun
to allay some of the Italian concerns, as we understand
Collins reassured Stefanini that the U.S. did not expect a
lead nation to be singly responsible for an FSB. Rather,
that nation would identify what it could provide and work
with SHAPE to identify others to bring additional capability.


6. (C) Perhaps paradoxically, given the greater resource
requirement, we think it might be easier for Italy to stand
up both a PRT and an FSB, rather than an FSB alone. As
noted, civilian-focused reconstruction and democracy building
are far more palatable to the Italian public than straight
military operations. They are, in general, an easier
political sell. A PRT would, we think, bring with it more
MFA involvement (and therefore MFA money). We do not suggest
that it is guaranteed the Italians would agree to do both,
but suggest we remain open to any Italian linkage. We do
question whether Italy would be willing to lead a PRT and an
FSB in separate locations. For reasons both of economies of
scale and security, we presume they would prefer to co-locate
any such efforts.

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GETTING TO YES
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7. (C) The Italians want to do more in Afghanistan. They
had planned to announce an Italian-led PRT in Herat at the
March 31-April 1 Berlin Conference; it was to be the keystone
of Italy's package of deliverables. We think they are
disappointed that they will bring to the table "only" a
continuation of their approximately 45 million Euro annual
financial contribution and ongoing leadership of judicial
reform efforts. If an FSB is what Italy could best
contribute, we think it's doable. It means, though, that the
USG, in coordination with SHAPE and the ESC, must be specific
on what we want, what flexibility an FSB lead nation would
have, what support the U.S. and/or NATO can give -- and
where, precisely, we want the Italians to set up shop. On
this last point, in particular, we must give advice that is
specific and timely. Delaying action or failing to
communicate will only set the stage for failure to get the
Italian contributions we want. As it now stands, the
Italians understand that an eventual FSB would be based in
Herat. We have seen suggestions that SHAPE might prefer a
different location. We need to be clear with the Italians on
location, the sooner the better.


8. (U) Kabul Minimize Considered.
SEMBLER


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2004ROME01229 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL