RAZALI REP SAYS UNSYG WILL PURSUE BURMA MEETING AT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000914

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM
SUBJECT: RAZALI REP SAYS UNSYG WILL PURSUE BURMA MEETING AT
UNGA

REF: A. RANGOON 862


B. KUALA LUMPUR 2765

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Leon de Riedmatten, UN Special Envoy
Razali's representative in Rangoon, says that UNSYG Kofi
Annan hopes to organize a consultative group meeting on Burma
on the margins of the upcoming UNGA to discuss next steps and
strategies. The UNSYG will most likely invite traditional
consultative partners on Burma--including the U.S., EU
members, and Japan--as well as other "influential" countries
such as China. An invitation to the GOB is being considered,
but is not certain. Meanwhile, de Riedmatten says it is
highly unlikely that the GOB will allow Razali to return to
Burma in the near future, perhaps not even before the end of

2004. De Riedmatten, usually a source of optimism and
energy, says he is frustrated by the unresolved stalemate in
Burma and has run out of potential solutions. End Summary.


2. (C) Following a July 19 Martyr's Day commemoration at NLD
headquarters (septel),COM and P/E chief met with Leon de
Riedmatten, local representative for UN Special Envoy for
Burma Razali Ismail. De Riedmatten had recently returned
from a trip to Bangkok where he joined Razali for
Burma-related meetings on the margins of the international
AIDS conference.


3. (C) De Riedmatten said that he and Razali had met with
UNSYG Kofi Annan in Bangkok to discuss developments in Burma
and to consider a U.N. strategy for next steps. According to
De Riedmatten, the SYG was "very well briefed" on Burma and
used the meeting to press Razali to be more proactive with
his diplomatic efforts, rather than simply react to
SPDC-controlled events inside Burma. Implementing this
advice, Razali and de Riedmatten flew to Vientiane to meet
with the GOL and found the Lao "well informed about the SPDC
version of events, but nonetheless inquisitive about all
developments in Rangoon."


4. (C) The UNSYG also encouraged Razali to support Thailand's
diplomatic efforts to engage the regime. Razali subsequently
met with PM Thaksin and found the RTG enthusiastic about
pursuing the Bangkok process, despite being "burned" by the
regime in April when the GOB pulled the plug on the Bangkok
II meeting.


5. (C) According to de Riedmatten, UNSYG Annan was receptive
to Razali's pitch to organize a Burma meeting among
interested foreign ministers in late September on the margins
of the upcoming UNGA (ref B). In fact, de Riedmatten said,
the UNSYG committed to using UN Secretariat resources to pull
the consultative meeting together. The UNSYG would likely
invite not only traditional participants in previous Burma
meetings--including the U.S., EU members, and Japan--but
would also reach out to other "influential" countries such as
China and perhaps others in the region. De Riedmatten said
that an invitation for Burmese participation was not yet
certain.


6. (C) Turning to the Burmese political stalemate, de
Riedmatten said it was unlikely the SPDC would allow Razali
to visit Burma anytime soon, perhaps not even before the end
of 2004. He observed that the generals are "very
comfortable" with the status quo and are not feeling any
particular international pressure. To the contrary, de
Riedmatten said, ASEAN's tepid statement at the ARF had given
the GOB a free pass (Note: De Riedmatten said he had seen an
early draft of the ASEAN statement which was "fairly hard
hitting" until the GOB succeeded in getting a watered-down
final version. End note.)


7. (S) De Riedmatten said he continued to be perplexed by the
lack of communication from Aung San Suu Kyi, who remains
under house arrest but has an ongoing, proven ability to
communicate clandestinely. De Riedmatten, a long-time
confidant of ASSK's, said he regularly sends in briefing and
background papers, but in recent months has rarely heard
anything in response. "She shows no sign of impatience or
frustration," said de Riedmatten, "and perhaps I even detect
resignation." He noted that he had at one point in the last
few months recommended that ASSK consider civil disobedience
as a tool to apply internal pressure on the regime. ASSK
turned down the option because in her view the NLD would not
be able to secure widespread support for any acts of
disobedience.


8. (C) Comment: De Riedmatten, usually optimistic about new
possibilities and options, was unusually downbeat during our
July 19 meeting. "I've completely run out of ideas," he
said, "and I am at a loss about we can do next." He was
particularly frustrated with the NLD CEC, observing that
their decision to take a pass on the National Convention was
"perhaps a sound and strategic decision, but in the interim
they have done nothing and have failed to present any
alternative strategy to the NC process." He opined that the
consultative meeting in New York could "help to reinvigorate
an international consensus" but quickly added that such a
meeting would not likely produce any meaningful results
inside Burma. End Comment.
Martinez