Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04RANGOON612
2004-05-17 11:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

NATIONAL CONVENTION RECONVENES WITHOUT NLD AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV BM NLD 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000612 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM NLD
SUBJECT: NATIONAL CONVENTION RECONVENES WITHOUT NLD AND
ETHNIC PARTIES

REF: A. RANGOON 611

B. RANGOON 600 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000612

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM NLD
SUBJECT: NATIONAL CONVENTION RECONVENES WITHOUT NLD AND
ETHNIC PARTIES

REF: A. RANGOON 611

B. RANGOON 600 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: The Burmese regime's National Convention
reconvened on May 17 with over 1,000 hand-picked delegates in
attendance, but without the participation of the NLD and the
UNA nor the presence of the U.S. and EU missions. The NLD,
on the basis that its existing demands are reasonable and
that SPDC Chairman Than Shwe shows no signs of relenting on
the release of ASSK, sees little room for a late compromise
that would allow NLD participation in the Convention. The UN
Special Envoy has not abandoned hope, however, and we should
continue to support UN efforts aimed at a compromise.
However, if by the end of this week the SPDC continues to
charge ahead without the democratic opposition, we should
call a spade a spade and denounce the Convention process.
End Summary.


2. (U) On May 17, the SPDC reconvened the National Convention
for the purpose of drafting, as attempted without success in
1993-1996, a "firm and enduring Constitution." Noticeably
absent from opening ceremonies at the isolated "Nyaunghnapin"
(Two Banyon Trees) Camp north of Rangoon were the NLD and
members of the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA) ethnic
party coalition (ref B). The GOB also invited diplomatic
missions to participate in the opening ceremonies; those who
declined the invitation included the U.S., EU members, and
Israel missions.


3. (SBU) The opening day of the Convention was devoid of
substantive discussions and invited dignitaries were
shepherded around the Convention site, a tightly-controlled
USDA training center, to view the recently refurbished
facilities, including gift shops and a golf driving range.
According to several participants, 1,076 registered delegates
were present to kick off the Convention. Military
intelligence transported most delegates by bus on May 13-14
and authorities advised delegates that they would stay at the
Convention site for at least two months and would only be
allowed to depart on weekends with "special permission."


4. (U) In an unusual statement issued on May 14, the GOB

acknowledged the NLD non-participation and observed that the
party had decided not to attend because the NLD "has no faith
in the National Convention" and because "U Tin Oo and Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi are not able to travel freely and the NLD is
still unable to reopen its offices." In that same statement,
the GOB said it had asked the NLD leaders to "wait patiently"
(under house arrest) while the government gave "priority to
stability and peace."


5. (C) We met with NLD spokesman U Lwin on May 17 at NLD
headquarters, where authorities had apparently cut the
party's phone lines earlier in the day. U Lwin affirmed that
UN Special Envoy Razali, through his Rangoon-based
intermediary Leon de Riedmatten, had approached NLD leaders
with a view to helping continue negotiations between the SPDC
and the NLD (ref A). U Lwin said that there was little to
discuss, given: a) that the NLD had already demonstrated
great flexibility, even to the point of being willing to
begin the Convention on the basis of promised dates from the
regime for the future release of ASSK and U Tin Oo and for
the future reopening of NLD offices; and b) that SPDC envoys
had indicated Senior General Than Shwe was dead set against
releasing ASSK (ref A).


6. (C) U Lwin welcomed the Department's May 14 statement, and
noted the party's ire over the regime's desire to accommodate
the cease-fire groups, "who used to shoot at the Burmese
army," but not negotiate with the peaceful NLD. U Lwin said
that the real focus should now be on the United Nations and
Kofi Annan. The UNSYG, U Lwin said, "is the man for the
moment and he has the responsibility to follow through on his
pronouncements (that Burma should be democratic by 2006)." U
Lwin said that the UNSYG needed an effective envoy for the
job, observing that "Razali, like (senior UN official and
former envoy) de Soto before him, has failed."


7. (C) The NLD and others must now contend with a possible
regime crack down on parties which are boycotting the
Convention by invoking "Law Number 5/96," a decree issued by
SPDC Chairman Than Shwe in 1996 following the departure of
the NLD from the first Convention. Under that draconian law,
individuals and organizations are prohibited from delivering
unauthorized speeches or statements about the National
Convention or the draft Constitution. Violators, including
those who refuse an invitation to attend the Convention, are
subject to up to 20 years imprisonment and their
organizations can be declared unlawful. SNLD leader Hkun
Htun Oo declined to speak with Emboffs on May 17 and an
intermediary said the UNA chairman was "laying low" over fear
of arrest.

Comment: What Next?
--------------


8. (C) The Department's statement of May 14 effectively
brought attention to the NLD's (and the UNA's) decision to
boycott the Convention, the regime's failure to improve the
political environment, and the need for substantive
discussions. We note that UNSYG Kofi Annan took a similar
approach and also allowed that there may be additional time
for the parties concerned to reach an agreement. As of May
17, the opportunity for further negotiations appears to be
very slim, although the next few days will likely be reserved
for little more than logistical housekeeping at the
Convention. Given that the UN has not yet abandoned hope for
a compromise, the most helpful role for the U.S. may be to
protect what little space exists by continuing to draw
attention to the regime's long-standing promise to release
all original Depeyin detainees (only ASSK and U Tin Oo remain
in detention) and to reopen NLD party offices (returning to
the status quo prior to May 30, 2003).


9. (C) However, if by the end of this week there are no signs
that the SPDC intends to budge, we would advise a
hard-hitting statement that dismisses the utility of a
constitutional-drafting process that excludes representatives
who have a legitimate claim to represent the majority of the
Burmese people (the NLD and the UNA member parties won a
combined 89% of the seats in the 1990 legislative elections).
Without an open, deliberative, and participatory National
Constitution, the regime's road map lacks any credibility as
a plan for a transition to democracy. End Comment.
Martinez