RAZALI'S "MAN IN RANGOON" ON NATIONAL CONVENTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000611

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/17/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM NLD
SUBJECT: RAZALI'S "MAN IN RANGOON" ON NATIONAL CONVENTION
STATE OF PLAY

REF: A. RANGOON 600

B. 03 RANGOON 1431

C. RANGOON 601

D. RANGOON 544

Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: Leon de Reidmatten (LDR),UN Special Envoy
Razali's "man in Rangoon" told COM that up until May 12, NLD
leaders believed that an agreement had been reached to allow
the party to participate in the National Convention. Despite
the NLD's May 14 announcement that they would not
participate, LDR believes there is still a very faint
possibility of a compromise. LDR said that Prime Minister
Khin Nyunt is now "very weak" and unable to deliver on his
long-standing promises of a meeting between ASSK and the "Big
Three" of the SPDC. He said the current impasse demonstrates
that Senior General Than Shwe has a firm grip on power and
little or no intention to enter into a real dialog with the
opposition. On the subject of SE Razali, LDR believes Razali
still wants to travel to Rangoon soon and knows that the SE
will need to come prepared to overcome the NLD's perception
that he is asking more from it than from the SPDC in the way
of compromise. End Summary.


2. (C) COM met with UN Special Envoy Razali's "man in
Rangoon," Leon de Reidmatten, on the morning of Monday, April

17. De Reidmatten, a close confidante of Aung San Suu Kyi,
said he was surprised on Friday, May 14, when the National
League for Democracy announced (Ref A) it would not
participate in the National Convention (NC). According to
LDR, up until Wednesday, May 12, ASSK and the other NLD
leaders believed, based on their talks with SPDC
interlocutors (the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister
of Labor),that the following agreement had been reached
which would have allowed the party to participate in the NC:
the two remaining senior NLD party leaders, ASSK and U Tin
Oo, would be released from house arrest before the opening of
the NC; the NLD offices could reopen; and the NLD would be
allowed to select 54 delegates to the NC.


3. (C) However, LDR said he had not known before the May 14
press conference that the compromise fell apart on Thursday
night, May 13, when the SPDC interlocutors advised the NLD
that Senior General Than Shwe refused to approve it. The
regime's best offer would be for ASSK and U Tin Oo to remain
under house arrest and NLD branch party offices would remain
closed, but the opportunity for the NLD to name delegates to
the NC apparently remains on the table. LDR said that the
SPDC representatives tried to assuage ASSK by praising her
past cooperative attitude (saying she was "so dutiful") and
then tried to get her to instruct the NLD to participate
under these obviously unacceptable conditions.


4. (C) According to LDR, ASSK could not accept the terms
offered the night of May 13, and the NLD announced its
non-participation on the morning of May 14. Shortly
afterwards, LDR was approached by regime representatives and
asked to try and get the NLD to compromise and participate in
the NC. LDR said he told the regime representatives he would
not make an approach to the NLD unless he could propose the
following: the regime would set a date, preferably within a
few weeks, for the release of ASSK and U Tin Oo; the regime
would provide a firm timeline for the reopening of NLD branch
offices; and the NLD would be allowed to freely name 54
delegates to the NC. Only under these conditions would he
propose to the NLD the idea of participating in the NC while
ASSK and U Tin Oo remain under house arrest and the NLD
offices remain closed. The regime envoys agreed and then he
discussed the terms with NLD spokesman U Lwin on Saturday.
By that same evening U Lwin advised him that ASSK and the NLD
leadership were amenable to the compromise (terms of which
had apparently been floated before). However, as of the
morning of May 17, LDR says he has not been contacted further
by the regime and does not believe the NLD has received a
response to the compromise offer.


5. (C) LDR feels that there is still a very faint glimmer of
hope that the regime might see the light. He praised the
restraint shown in the Department's and the UNSYG's
statements over the weekend regarding the state of the NC
process. He feels there are still face-saving ways the
regime could accept the compromise offer and allow the NLD to
participate, despite missing the NC opening ceremonies today.
The regime could claim that the first week, or even two, was
being devoted to administrative and logistical matters, or
that the start of monsoon season had delayed the arrival of
other delegates, or could manufacture a host of other excuses
for allowing the NLD's late entry into the NC.


6. (C) LDR also said that ASSK was frustrated that the regime
did not believe her assurances that she would not press too
soon for an investigation of the May 30, 2003, Depeyin attack
(Note: ASSK told UN Special Rapporteur Pinheiro on his last
visit in November 2003 that there was a need for restraint on
this matter, see Ref B. End Note). LDR said that ASSK knows
there are those in her party that could be considered
"hardliners" who want to use May 30 against the regime, but
that she can control them and will take full responsibility
for the party's actions if she is released.


7. (C) In reference to the cease-fire groups that are
participating in the NC, LDR said that he thought the SPDC
would have a tough time handling them and keeping them in the
process if they stick to their demands for amendment of the
SPDC's six political objectives (Ref C). He felt the
cease-fire groups' demands were tougher than the three
"suggestions" the NLD conveyed to the SPDC in late April (see
Ref D).


8. (C) LDR said he had not spoken to SE Razali today, but he
felt that the SE still wants to come to Burma soon. LDR said
he was wrestling with developing recommendations for what
approach the SE should take if another visit is allowed by
the regime. COM reminded LDR that she, the Australian, and
the U.K. COM's had told LDR that the NLD felt like the
international community and the SE were asking the NLD to
make all the compromises and hoped that the SE understood
that the NLD needed to be reassured that equal pressure was
being placed on the SPDC. LDR said he was also aware of the
NLD's sentiments and would emphasize this to the SE.


9. (C) The meeting concluded on a down beat note - LDR said
that Prime Minister Khin Nyuent is "very weak" and unable to
deliver on his long-standing promise of a meeting between
ASSK and the "Big Three" - Senior General Than Shwe, General
Maung Aye, and the Prime Minister himself. In LDR's view,
the current impasse demonstrates that the Senior General has
a firm grip on power and little or no intention of entering
into a real dialog with the opposition.


10. (C) Comment: Although the recent events are highly
discouraging, we agree with LDR's assessment that there could
still be a very faint possibility of a compromise that would
allow NLD participation in the NC (FYI: COM was told by one
of the COM's that attended the opening of the National
Convention this morning that Deputy Foreign Minister Win Aung
told a small group of COM's at the ceremony that procedurally
it would be difficult for the NLD to participate at this late
date, but that a political decision to allow their
participation could be a possibility. End FYI). On the
subject of Razali, if he should be allowed back in by the
regime, he will need to come prepared to overcome the NLD's
perception that he is asking more than they can continue to
give in the way of further compromise with the SPDC. End
Comment.
Martinez