Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04RANGOON563
2004-05-06 09:35:00
SECRET
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

NLD LOOKING AHEAD TO CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM?

Tags:  PGOV KDEM BM NLD 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T RANGOON 000563 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM BM NLD
SUBJECT: NLD LOOKING AHEAD TO CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM?

REF: RANGOON 544

Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ; REASON 1.4 (B & D).

S E C R E T RANGOON 000563

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM BM NLD
SUBJECT: NLD LOOKING AHEAD TO CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM?

REF: RANGOON 544

Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ; REASON 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) Summary: Post has received some indications from NLD
insiders that the party plans to focus its efforts on the
constitutional referendum phase of the SPDC's road map.
Rather than fight against terribly long odds at the
stacked-deck National Convention, the party may feel its
continuing mass appeal offers the best hope of turning back
the regime's plan to frog-march Burma to a
military-controlled "disciplined democracy." End Summary.


2. (S) Looking Ahead: At our early May meeting with two NLD
insiders and Aung San Suu Kyi confidants, the discussion did
not dwell at all on the National Convention, but revolved
around questions concerning constitutional referenda,
including an urgent request for information directly from
Aung San Suu Kyi. One of our interlocutors said, "What would
happen if the referendum on the constitution failed?
Wouldn't that be interesting?"


3. (SBU) Doing the Math: About thirty NLD members have
received invitations to participate in the National
Convention, as have six former members. When the National
Convention began in 1993 it had 702 participants. Between
700 and 900 invitations have been issued for May 17th,
although some speculate the number of participants could go
as high as 1,400. We have been told that there will be no
voting and all decisions will be by consensus. With a
maximum of 3.5% of the delegates, the NLD is not apt to carry
the day. The party must realize that the likelihood of an
SPDC-backed draft constitution being approved is very high.


4. (SBU) Why Bother to Attend, Then?: The NLD said it would
attend the National Convention if three "suggestions" (not
demands or conditions) were agreed to: A) release the two
senior NLD leaders still under house arrest, B) open 210
party offices, and C) set a firm timeline for the whole road
map, as reported reftel. Detailed concerns about National
Convention procedures, which scuttled the 1993-96 effort,
could be discussed in due course, the NLD allowed. These
three softball conditions have very little to do with the
National Convention per se. The NLD attended before when
ASSK was under house arrest and prior to the 2002-03 opening
of so many district offices. The opening date of May 17
seems firm. So why make these suggestions rather than just
attend or announce a boycott?


5. (C) Taking it to the People: All three suggestions are
vital for the NLD to have a chance of turning back the SPDC's
road map at the constitutional referendum phase. Aung San
Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo need to be out and able to fire up the
party faithful. District and provincial offices are
important for grass-roots coordination. A fixed date means
the SPDC can't procrastinate forever. Thus, the three
suggestions support the notion that the referendum, not the
National Convention, is where the NLD may chose to make its
stand. The NLD will not be able to control the convention,
but might hope to stun the regime with a show of support at
the ballot box. Will the regime allow a free and fair
referendum vote? Maybe so, maybe not, but if the junta
cheats on the referendum vote, what chance does the planned
general election have to be fair? Better to find out now,
perhaps.


6. (S) Comment: The NLD as an organization is in bad shape.
Some previously stalwart Youth Wing leaders recently fled
the country in despair. There is no good reason for the
regime to agree to the NLD's three suggestions, apart from a
minimal need to have the road map process appear at least
superficially inclusive. Encouragingly, the regime has
allowed the full NLD leadership to meet three times in the
past fortnight, but it has not yet responded to the NLD's
suggestions. If the NLD's suggestions are not agreed to,
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD will have to review their policy
of forbearance and patience. If the three suggestions are
agreed to, the party can gear up for a political fight on the
referendum, while perhaps sitting passively through the
National Convention. This has the added advantage of kicking
the NLD make-or-break point down the road another six months
or so. End Comment.
Martinez