DIFFERENT STROKES FOR DIFFERENT FOLKS: ONE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000382

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2014
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR MARR SNAR BM
SUBJECT: DIFFERENT STROKES FOR DIFFERENT FOLKS: ONE
GENERAL'S VIEW OF BURMA'S ETHNIC GROUPS

REF: RANGOON 131

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: While spending ten days in remote Shan State
with a senior military intelligence officer during the annual
USG-Burma opium yield survey, we were constantly told that
Prime Minister Khin Nyunt has undertaken a full-court press
to implement his "road map" to democracy. This focus has
interesting implications for General Khin Nyunt's
subordinates, who now carry much of the water on his regular
duties, including relations with Burma's ethnic groups. Our
principal interlocutor on the survey, Brigadier General Kyaw
Thein, underscored the political challenges of dealing with
the country's diverse ethnic groups and we observed him
interact with leaders of cease-fire groups ranging from SPDC
"vassals" to former adversaries who now enjoy considerable
autonomy. One measure of the SPDC's influence in the ethnic
areas of Shan State is the manner in which each ethnic group
treats poppy cultivation. For some, it is a fading
extracurricular activity, while for others it is a way of
life. End Summary.

General Kyaw Thein
--------------


2. (C) Our recent USG-Burma joint opium yield survey,
conducted throughout remote locations in Shan State March
3-12, gave us an extended opportunity to exchange views with
Brigadier General Kyaw Thein, leader of the Burmese survey
team and a senior official in the Office of the Chief of
Military Intelligence (OCMI). Gen. Kyaw Thein had oversight
of the entire Burmese portion of the opium survey, which
involved months of preparation, several Burmese military
aircraft, dozens of extremely remote survey sites, and
hundreds of military and government personnel.


3. (C) Kyaw Thein, who reports directly to deputy OCMI chief
General Kyaw Win and OCMI chief (and Prime Minister) General
Khin Nyunt, has long held the regime's lead on narcotics
issues, including oversight of the Central Committee for
Drugs Abuse Control (CCDAC),the GOB's principal
counternarcotics unit housed at the Ministry of Home Affairs
and staffed by police and military intelligence officers.
Kyaw Thein's working title is Chief of the OCMI Internal
Relations Division (IRD),within the military intelligence
directorate.

Life Under the Road Map
--------------


4. (C) Kyaw Thein confided to us that he and several of his
colleagues have picked up additional duties following the
appointment of his senior boss, Khin Nyunt, to the Prime
Minister position in August 2003. Contrary to general
speculation, he said, Khin Nyunt did not, and will not, lose
his existing military intelligence and ethnic relations
portfolios, nor did he simply take on ceremonial duties as
Prime Minister. Rather, General Khin Nyunt had taken on an
array of new responsibilities as head of government, yet
counted on his subordinates to carry much of the weight of
his existing "work requirements."


5. (C) As a result of Khin Nyunt's promotion, according to
Kyaw Thein, the deputy chief of OCMI (Kyaw Win) has
subsequently shouldered much of the burden for managing the
day to day operations of the SPDC's vast military
intelligence apparatus. Meanwhile, Kyaw Thein and several
other officers have taken on responsibility for managing many
of the regime's relations with Burma's ethnics, including the
coddling of cease-fire groups and courting of insurgent
hold-outs.


6. (C) BGen Kyaw Thein, who indicated that he relished the
opportunity to spend ten days in the field and away from the
burdens of his office, said that under the direction of PM
Khin Nyunt, life for senior OCMI officials had become "the
road map, all day and every day." Khin Nyunt is keen to
implement initial steps in the road map plan as early as
possible and, particularly for Kyaw Thein, oversight of
counternarcotics activities had become a secondary priority
in recent months.

A Convention Cast of Thousands?
--------------


7. (C) Kyaw Thein offered his view that despite the
full-court press on implementing the road map, reconvening
the National Convention would not take place before at least
the end of June. He said the regime was finding it a
challenge to accommodate all of the ethnic groups,
particularly those who had reached cease-fire arrangements
with the SPDC since the last ill-fated National Convention,
which lasted from 1993 until 1996 (Note: approximately 15
armed ethnic opposition groups and splinter organizations
have made peace with the SPDC since 1993. End note). The
SPDC, said Kyaw Thein, anticipated a vast increase in the
number of delegates participating in a new Convention,
perhaps as many as double or triple the 700-plus who
participated in 1993.


8. (C) Regarding discussions involving a National Convention
and a new constitution, Kyaw Thein said the regime had to
approach each ethnic organization as a unique entity, as
every ethnic grouping had its own distinct "personality" and
identity. As an example, he noted that during the peak of
insurgent conflicts in the 1980s, the Burmese Army
categorized the major armed ethnic groups by their favored
battle tactics: the Wa preferred full frontal assaults, the
Karen favored ambushes, the Kachin used snipers, and the Chin
were well know for digging in and holding solid defensive
positions.

Friends, Former Foes, and Those In Between
--------------


9. (C) During our opium survey travels, we encountered
numerous cease-fire groups and observed Kyaw Thein take a
slightly different approach with each. He was clearly most
at ease with the so-called "vassal" groups, ethnic entities
which were among the first to cut mutually beneficial deals
with the SPDC in the late 1980s and early 1990s such as the
Pa-O National Organization (Special Region 6),the Kokang
(Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army-MNDAA, Special
Regional 1),and the Kachin Defense Army-KDA (Special Region
5). Kyaw Thein was also at home among the residents of a
unique tri-village region known as "Lon-Htan" in northern
Shan State, where locals gave early support to the Burmese
Army against the Burmese Communist Party and were rewarded
with limited autonomy, including the right to run their own
people's militia.


10. (C) Kyaw Thein's relations were less relaxed with the
more aggressive leaders of the Shan State Army-SSA (Special
Region 3) and the United Wa State Army-UWSA (Special Region
2). These cease-fire groups occupy the largest of Burma's
dozen-plus special regions and arguably have the greatest
autonomy. However, in exchange for self-rule, many observers
believe these regions have received little in terms of
assistance from the GOB and consequently continue to tolerate
and "tax" the drug business as a means of procuring
development funds. Kyaw Thein's last field command, before
his promotion to HQ positions in Rangoon, was on the front
lines against the UWSA.

It's My Poppy and I'll Grow If I Want To
--------------


11. (C) We visited several Shan and Wa villages where local
leaders were particularly defiant about their poppy
livelihoods. In one Shan village under SSA control, farmers
said they had no knowledge of the illegality of growing poppy
and declared that they would continue to produce opium for
the foreseeable future as their only source of supplemental
cash income. Kyaw Thein conceded that in many parts of Shan
State fully under central authority, the GOB had low
expectations for weaning "hold out" farmers off of poppy and
did not expect substantial progress until the GOB's goal of
becoming poppy-free in 2014.


12. (C) Wa territory is a different story, however. UWSA
authorities have declared a deadline of 2005 for ceasing the
cultivation of poppy, but not all Wa villages are on board
with this objective and several local leaders took advantage
of Kyaw Thein's presence, as well as the rest of our joint
survey team, to declare their own intentions.


13. (C) One example of local Wa defiance was the village of
Yaung Luhk, located in close proximity to the border with
China, where the entire population of 113 families cultivates
poppy and farmers fetch over $300 per kilo of opium, almost
three times the average market price in the interior of Shan
State. The local UWSA chairman belligerently declared to
Kyaw Thein, in our presence, that he and his villagers were
fully aware of the 2005 deadline but had no intention of
stopping poppy cultivation unless the Burmese and the
international community provided them with cash assistance.
In another Wa village we met up with Pao Yu Lian, younger
brother of UWSA Chairman Pao Yu Xiang, who encouraged local
leaders to press General Kyaw Thein for assistance in
exchange for ceasing poppy cultivation.

Comment: An Uneasy Peace
--------------


14. (C) The GOB has, since the augmentation of our bilateral
sanctions in July 2003, instituted a de facto
non-fraternization policy that prohibits most Burmese
military and civilian officials from unauthorized contact
with U.S. diplomats. Spending ten days in remote Shan State
with Brigadier General Kyaw Thein was a rare opportunity to
observe a senior military officer interact with foreign
diplomats, subordinates, local officials, and especially
diverse ethnic groups. Although he enjoyed the basic perks
of a one-star general, he was friendly and professional with
the ethnic groups and we did not see him exact a "visit tax"
like other senior officials we have observed in the field
(reftel).


15. (C) We took particular note in the hearty laughs he
shared with leaders of ethnic groups in the SPDC camp,
including a friendly exchange with KDA officials who pitched
him on revisiting the terms of their 1991 cease-fire
agreement to broaden their share of jade mining concessions.
As for relations with the Wa, it has been 15 years since the
UWSA reached a cease-fire with the GOB. However, it was
abundantly clear during our survey that, at best, an uneasy
peace exists between the two sides and Kyaw Thein was merely
a guest while in Wa territory. He appeared embarrassed by
our encounters with defiant Wa poppy growers, and privately
acknowledged that UWSA authorities will have a difficult time
meeting their 2005 poppy-free deadline. End Comment.
Martinez