EU REPS MEET WITH BURMESE PM IN RANGOON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000252

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM
SUBJECT: EU REPS MEET WITH BURMESE PM IN RANGOON


Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: EU ambassadors resident in Rangoon and
Bangkok met recently with the Burmese Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister. The EU ambassadors assured COM that the
meeting was not for the purpose of delivering any new EU
policy message. COM cautioned them that they needed to be
extremely careful of letting the regime think it could expand
the comfort zone that it has been steadily building with
ASEAN, China, and India, into the EU, and urged them not to
let the regime spin the meeting as a public show of EU
support for the road map or as a follow-on to the "Bangkok
Process." The EU reps said that unless there was some
significant change in the political circumstances before
April 2004 there was no initiative afoot to either soften or
harden the EU Common Position. It seems that the EU
assemblage was careful not to send the signal that the
regime's current "democratization" efforts are being viewed
through the same rose-colored glasses worn by ASEAN, China
and India. The non-resident EU ambassadors seemed more
frustrated with the slow progress and lack of time frame for
the road map than those who are resident and used to "SPDC
time", especially when it comes to any commitment to the
release of ASSK. End Summary.


2. (C) On Monday, February 23, EU ambassadors resident in
Rangoon and Bangkok met with Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and
Foreign Minister Win Aung. As the FonMin emphasized during
the meeting, this was the first time that the PM had met with
a group of ambassadors since taking over his new position on
August 30 (FYI: in fact, for most, if not all, of the EU
ambassadors at the meeting, even those resident in Rangoon,
it was the first time they had met with Khin Nyunt in his
guise as Secretary 1 or as Prime Minister, except for those
few who had met him in a cursory protocol encounter when they
presented their credentials. End FYI.)


3. (C) The COM met with the EU ambassadors just prior to
their meeting with the PM. The COM urged the assembled group
to be very careful not to let the regime spin the meeting
with the PM as a show of EU support for the road map or as a
follow-on to the "Bangkok Process." The EU reps assured the
COM that the meeting was not for the purpose of delivering
any new EU policy message. The COM also cautioned them to be
extremely careful of letting the regime think it could expand
the comfort zone that it has been steadily building with
ASEAN, China, and India into the EU. The EU reps also said
that, unless there was some significant change in the
political circumstances before April 2004, there was no
initiative afoot to either soften or harden the EU Common
Position.


4. (C) The EU reps said they were taking advantage of the
presence of the assembled group to discuss the possibility of
establishing an office of the European Commission for
Humanitarian Assistance (ECHO) in Rangoon to oversee EU
funded humanitarian projects that are already underway in
Burma (FYI: It seems that many EU Ambassadors are unhappy
with the lack of input they have on project
funding/management as it is all managed, in a somewhat
high-handed manner, by the head of the European Commission in
Bangkok. End FYI). When the opportunity to meet with the PM
came up, of course they had to take advantage of it.


5. (C) The hour long meeting was mainly taken up with a 55
minute monologue by the PM on the cultural and political
history of Burma. However, as the PM arrived at "current
events" he did say that "everybody, and I mean everybody"
will be included in the National Convention. However, the
FonMin, in an unusually bold (for the FonMin) intervention,
corrected the PM to say that "everybody that is eligible to
participate will participate." The PM also said that the
National Convention would probably be convened in fall 2004.


6. (C) As the PM brought the meeting to a close, the Dutch
ambassador (the EU rep in Bangkok) was able to claim five
minutes to make a few points. He stated that the EU was
waiting to see what results the road map brings before
passing judgment. He also expressed EU support for Special
Envoy Razali and urged that the regime allow Razali to return
and carry out his mandate soon. He emphasized that the
National Convention could only be viable with the
participation of the democratic opposition and the ethnic
groups.


7. (C) The Dutch ambassador also asked the PM to clarify a
recent statement attributed to Thai Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra that Aung San Suu Kyi would be released from house
arrest in October, 2004. The PM did not give a definitive
response, saying instead "I am doing everything possible."
EU reps commented that at least the PM did not try to
continue the regime's farce that ASSK is not under house
arrest.


8. (C) COM was able to corroborate much of the readout of
the meeting later that evening in a conversation with the
FonMin at the Brunei National Day Reception. The FonMin, in
fact, gave COM a very slightly condensed version of the
history monologue and repeated that "everybody that is
eligible to participate will participate."


9. (C) Participating in the meeting with the PM were
ambassadors of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, and the Delegation of the
European Commission (all eight resident in Bangkok),along
with the ambassadors of Germany, France, Italy, and the
United Kingdom (resident in Rangoon). The Irish
ambassador-designate (accredited and resident in Malaysia)
was also present for the EU meeting on ECHO operations and
for the COM's meeting with EU reps. However, as Ireland has
not formalized diplomatic relations with the GOB he did not
attend the meeting with the PM (FYI: Irish ambassador told
COM he was excluded due to some bumbling but was told the
following day, at his meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister
Khin Maung Win, that the PM had been "expecting him" along
with the other EU reps. End FYI.)


10. (C) Comment: It seems that the EU assemblage was careful
not to send the signal that the regime's current
"democratization" efforts are being viewed through the same
rose-colored glasses worn by ASEAN, China and India. The
regime has not tried to reap any particular PR benefits from
this meeting as press coverage has been minimal. The
non-resident EU ambassadors seemed more frustrated with the
slow progress and lack of time frame for the road map than
those who are resident and used to "SPDC time", especially
when it comes to any commitment to the release of ASSK. End
Comment.
Martinez