SPDC TRIES TO ENHANCE "UNDERSTANDING" OF BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000161

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB, DRL
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON BM
SUBJECT: SPDC TRIES TO ENHANCE "UNDERSTANDING" OF BURMA


Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: A two day seminar on "Understanding Myanmar"
on January 27-28 was certainly the first time we have seen
the government willing to discuss its policies in even a
reasonably open forum. However, few attendees took the
opportunity to publicly push important issues with the often
senior-level panelists. All sessions were characterized by a
lack of substantive presentations from the panels (expected)
and generally laudatory remarks and overwhelming support of
Burma's "recent efforts" by the non-diplomat conference
attendees. The seminar was useful in some ways: we received a
clearer picture of the purported mechanics of the roadmap; it
illustrated that the comfort zone that the regime has
constructed among its ASEAN neighbors and China, Japan, and
India extends deeply into the academe of the region and it
shows that in its own clumsy way, the regime sees the need
for greater public relations efforts. END SUMMARY.

Khin Nyunt - Ready for Prime Time


2. (C) Before an audience of diplomats and carefully selected
friendly academics from around the world, Prime Minister
General Khin Nyunt kicked off a two-day conference on
"Understanding Myanmar" on January 27. The PM spoke in
English, with a a TelePrompTer, and his message was heavy on
unbelievable statistics purportedly demonstrating Burma's
alleged advances in health care and higher education. The PM
also stressed the country's "steady course in its effort to
promote a market-oriented system in spite of the unilateral
sanctions instituted by some Western countries." The PM
(resplendent in his military uniform and surrounded by a
large entourage, many also in uniform) stressed familiar
themes, such as the importance of national unity and peace
and stability as prerequisites for a transition to a
democratic system. The PM took no questions after his circa
20-minute speech, although, in somewhat presidential fashion,
he remained in the meeting hall shaking hands and chatting
with diplomats and academics amidst the glare of camera
flashes (FYI: A reliable embassy contact with very good
access to the highest levels of the SPDC told the COM later
that the PM and his entourage had wanted to appear in
national dress rather than military uniforms, but after an
exhaustive attempt to convince Senior General Than Shwe of
the public relations benefit of this tactic, he insisted on
the military regalia).

We Have the Roadmap - Here's How to Read It


3. (U) Throughout the address on the regime's road map,
"Burma Road Map to Democracy: The Way Forward," presented by
Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win, there was no specific
mention at all of the NLD or its leader Aung San Suu Kyi
(ASSK). However, the DepForMin made what may have been the
only direct allusion to the NLD and ASSK, noting that the
previous National Convention had failed because of the
"activities of one person and one political party".


4. (U) The DepForMin mercifully did not read a prepared
paper, instead speaking extemporaneously in English for
around 40 minutes and smoothly, although superficially,
addressing questions such as the significance of the road map
("it is a demonstration of our commitment to democratic
principles"),timing for the National Convention ("this
year"),and what Burma means by "disciplined democracy" ("a
democracy that does not adversely effect historical
traditions or national unity"). The DepForMin provided an
outline of the envisioned future Burmese democratic state,
which will include an executive president limited to two,
five-year terms; a bicameral legislature, one elected by
national vote and the other comprised of equal numbers of
representatives from each of Burma's states; regional
legislatures headed by Chief Ministers; and judicial organs
at the center and in the regions. The DepForMin asserted
that Burma would not go back to a one-party state and would
have a multi-party system based on the "universal principles
of liberty, justice and equality." In regard to reconvening
the National Convention, the DepForMin said that it would be
a continuation of the previous one (a point he reiterated
several times) and that its composition would not change. In
terms of party delegates, it would be entirely up to the
individual parties to determine who to send to the reconvened
Convention.


5. (C) After the DepForMin concluded his presentation, there
were several interventions in which participants from several
ASEAN countries as well as China and Japan read universally
laudatory prepared statements regarding the road map. In the
ensuing Q and A session, the COM asked the DepForMin what
policies were being developed and what measures would be put
in place to give its citizens the knowledge and confidence to
express their needs and opinions in a free and open manner.
But he was spared answering when the panel chairman declared
the session closed. During the break between sessions, the
DepForMin told the COM he could not answer this publicly but
there would be programs to advise the citizens of their right
to express their opinions "as long as they did not adversely
affect the stability of the country."

Peace and Stability - What It Takes to Get Them Back In the
Fold


6. (U) During the session on "Efforts for the Prevalence of
Peace and Stability", Brigadier-General Kyaw Thein, the
Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence Head of
Department and chief interlocutor on drug issues, focused on
what he described as the indispensable role of "genuine"
peace mediators during the Government's negotiations with
Burma's various insurgent groups. In conclusion, Kyaw Thein
stressed that success depended on the commitment of both
sides and that the Government maintains an open door policy
in regard to talking to remaining armed insurgent groups.
One of the panelists, retired Professor U Htun Aung Chien, an
ethnic Karen who was identified as having played a
significant role in the KNU negotiations, made a number of
interesting albeit vague remarks about the importance of both
trust and "gentleman's agreements" in achieving positive
results. Neither the presenter nor the panelists mentioned
the importance of a tripartite dialogue to the achievement of
lasting peace or stability.

Suppression of Narcotic Drugs - It's a Myanmar Problem


7. (SBU) Perhaps the most professional and straightforward
presentation was that of Police Colonel Hkam Awng, Joint
Secretary of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse. Col. Hkam

SIPDIS
Awng is our key police contact and has worked closely with
DEA for many years. His presentation, in nearly flawless
English, relied on slides with statistics from the UNODC and
the joint US/Burma opium yield surveys that have been taking
place since 1993. He emphasized that precursor chemicals for
amphetamine and heroin production are not manufactured in
Burma and that cultivation and production were steadily
declining. The presentation was notable in its emphasis on
Burma's responsibility for the situation and for the detailed
explanation of its efforts to combat its narcotics problem.
There was little attempt to blame the US or other western
countries. The only reference to external influences was
that "...the much lower level of inflow of external
assistance has" not "diminished Myanmar's determination" to
overcome the problem, and he asked that "more and more
countries...join hands with Myanmar."

Foreign Relations -- Metaphors and Allusions


9. (SBU) Director General of the MOFA's Political Department
U Thaung Thun led the first session on January 28 on
"Priorities in Burma's Foreign Policy." In contrast to the
Deputy Foreign Minister's presentation the day before, the DG
did not stray from his prepared remarks and gave little more
than a historical overview of significant events in Burma's
recent history, beginning with its loss of independence to
the British. The highlight was the somewhat dated example
given to illustrate Burma's independent foreign policy -- the
stand Burma took in 1956 UN voting on the Hungarian issue
(pre-dating the military's seizure of power in 1962). The DG
did make several enigmatic and unscripted remarks during his
speech, including, "you can either have a beautiful mosaic or
a house of Babel" in regards to the national races issue and
"if it is true that whoever rules the heartland rules all,
Burma is the heartland," during his comments on the strategic
location of Burma between south and southeast Asia.

How Many Bridges Does it take To Build an Economy?


10. (C) The presentation on Burma's economic and development
situation was equally fatuous. The main speaker, the rector
of Burma's Institute of Economics, turned in a superb
performance as a talking head giving a stupefying 40 minute
regurgitation of the SPDC's propaganda (roads and bridges
equal development). He insisted the current government had
taken great strides in economic reform, but could only come
up with one example -- the loosening of restrictions on the
private sector for trading and exporting rice.
Unfortunately, the SPDC had "temporarily" suspended this very
liberalization not three weeks ago. The most useful
contribution came from one of the designated discussants who
gingerly proposed that the private sector in Burma needs
better "enabling conditions and more stability" and that
Burma's system needs to provide a social safety net for
people and for businesses that fail.

The United Nations - Cooperation Burmese Style


11. (SBU) The MOFA's Director General for International
Organizations and Economic Affairs U Win Mra gave a
presentation on "Cooperation with the United Nations." He
talked mostly about human rights rather than UN cooperation,
bemoaning the "undeserved" foreign criticism of Burma's human
rights record, clarifying for all that "the Government
protects human rights by providing food and shelter to the
people." U Win Mra proudly noted that Burma was the first
country to sign the 1949 Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, "which forever associates Burma with the values of
the declaration." He neglected to mention that the 1949
signature was made by a new democratic government. The DG
said globalization has brought exposure to human rights in
the country, that it was impossible to even hold a discussion
like this in the past, and that "we are trying to change,
step by step -- gradually." On forced labor, U Win Mra
announced the GOB has brought laws into line with
international expectations, and will carry out the ILO's plan
of action. On AIDS, he took umbrage with outsiders who say
"we aren't giving enough money to fight HIV/AIDS -- we are!"


12. (C) Conveniently, the DG spoke so long that there was
little time for real discussion or questions. However, a
Malaysian attendee managed to squeeze in a final word,
lauding the GOB on its labor practices, asking "why only now
do other countries care about using porters when Asian
militaries and the British used them for years." When
Emboffs buttonholed the DG after his presentation, U Win Mra
agreed that it would be better for Burma if the GOB allowed
diplomats and press to travel and report on what is really
happening in the countryside, instead of forcing total
reliance on Burmese exiles in Thailand for news. Regarding
the March release of the Human Rights Report on Burma, U Win
Mra seemed genuinely interested in updating the Embassy next
time around on positive actions the GOB has taken in reported
cases of rapes in ethnic areas, but cautioned that the
military doesn't want to be embarrassed by an international
investigation such as the one Special Rapporteur Pinhiero has
proposed.

Human Rights - Nobody Likes Me, Everybody Hates Me...


13. (C) The most disappointing and cliche'd performance was
that of Burma's Ambassador to the UK, Kyaw Win. Rather than
the theme of a Burma intent on pursuing an independent
foreign policy and reliant on its own resources as set out by
the Prime Minister and echoed in the presentations of the
DepForMin and others, Ambassador Kyaw Win presented an
endlessly detailed litany (complete with Power Point) of
Burma's victimization by the US and others through a
corruption of the mechanisms of the UN. He also
characterized political opposition to the regime as merely a
"reflection of the desires of western countries." At the end
of his presentation, a few very supportive interventions were
allowed (one by a British invitee who lauded the government's
strides in addressing the need for training in human rights,
labor rights, etc., and the other a garment factory owner
lambasting the US for the trade ban which he claimed
destroyed his business),followed by an attempt to close the
session quickly by eyeballing the audience and claiming there
were obviously no questions.


14. (C) However, the COM and the UK Ambassador in Rangoon
insisted on asking questions to the dismay of the session
chair. The COM asked Kyaw Win why his presentation, with its
portrayal of Burma as a victim rather than as a country
intent on pursuing an independent foreign policy, was so at
odds with the vision presented by the Prime Minister and
other members of the senior leadership. Kyaw Win at first
pretended he did not understand the question (he speaks
flawless English) and when the COM repeated her question, he
said he just wanted to "explain the evolution of the UN
process" and would say no more. The UK Ambassador then rose
to challenge his point about the democratic opposition being
a reflection of the West, pointing out that it was a
reflection of the will of the Burmese people as expressed in
the 1990 elections. The UK Ambassador also said she would
welcome the chance to continue this debate in the session or
in the press, noting that of course this would not be
possible as there is no free press. The session was
immediately brought to a close.

Comment


16. (C) This was certainly the first time we've seen the
government willing to discuss its policies in even a
reasonably open forum. However, few attendees took the
opportunity to publicly push important issues with the often
senior-level panelists. All sessions were characterized by a
lack of substantive presentations from the panels (expected)
and generally laudatory remarks and overwhelming support of
Burma's "recent efforts" by the non-diplomat conference
attendees (disappointing). Although several academics asked
questions and made minor suggestions which could have been
construed as being (at least a teeny, weeny bit) critical of
the regime there was no genuine dialogue or exchange of
ideas. Even the Indian Ambassador, who can be counted on to
be sympathetic to the regime's performances, remarked to the
COM how "inappropriate" it was for the PM and his entourage
to show up in uniform and behave as if it was a "state
occasion" when the event was purported to be an academic
seminar. He also remarked that a conference on Burma during
which no one mentioned the NLD or Aung San Suu Kyi was not a
real conference. Burma specialist Dr. Robert Taylor commented
that "he had learned little" from the seminar. Interestingly,
many of us were apparently in a a different seminar from
former UK Ambassador to Thailand Derek Tonkin, who made an
intervention praising the seminar as "the non-governmental
face" of the Bangkok Process, and as heralding a "new dawn
for democracy."


17. (C) The seminar was useful in some ways: we received a
clearer picture of the purported mechanics of the roadmap; it
illustrates that the comfort zone that the regime has
constructed among its ASEAN neighbors and China, Japan, and
India includes academia as well as governments; and it shows
that in their own clumsy way, the regime sees the need for
public relations efforts. It also shows that Senior General
Than Shwe can tell PM Khin Nyunt what to wear.
Martinez