Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04RANGOON1425
2004-11-04 08:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

INDIAN AMBASSADOR RATES THAN SHWE VISIT AN

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM BM IN 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001425 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BM IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN AMBASSADOR RATES THAN SHWE VISIT AN
"IMPORTANT SUCCESS"

REF: A. NEW DELHI 6983 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)


B. SECSTATE 225960 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)

C. RANGOON 1374 AND PREVIOUS

D. 03 RANGOON 1452

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001425

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BM IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN AMBASSADOR RATES THAN SHWE VISIT AN
"IMPORTANT SUCCESS"

REF: A. NEW DELHI 6983 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)


B. SECSTATE 225960 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)

C. RANGOON 1374 AND PREVIOUS

D. 03 RANGOON 1452

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: India's Ambassador to Burma concludes that
the SPDC Chairman's October 24-29 visit to India was "a very
important success" that addressed Burma's domestic situation,
secured GOB support for an Indian UNSC seat, and yielded
progress on bilateral security and trade issues. The
Ambassador acknowledges an important role for ASSK and the
NLD, but believes that the party's importance will diminish
if it can't influence the political situation. Citing recent
high-level meetings in Washington, the Ambassador viewed the
U.S. as accepting that India's Burma policy has higher
priorities than democracy and human rights. Despite GOI
assurances that India pressed Than Shwe to make forward
movement on democracy (including freeing ASSK),we see no
signs in Rangoon that the Indian Government intends to pursue
these issues in any meaningful way with the Burmese regime.
End Summary.


2. (C) On November 3, COM and P/E Chief called on the Indian
Ambassador to Burma, Rajiv Kumar Bhatia, to discuss SPDC
Chairman Senior General Than Shwe's October 24-29 visit to
India. Ambassador Bhatia was closely involved in the
planning for the visit and participated in most events during
the trip. According to Bhatia, Monday October 25 was
essentially "Myanmar Day" in New Delhi as a "significant
portion" of the GOI was devoted to Than Shwe's schedule as
well as to numerous bilateral meetings conducted with the
eight Burmese ministers and two junta members who were part
of the delegation.


3. (C) The COM raised the joint India-Burma statement issued
upon conclusion of the visit and inquired how and when the
language had been negotiated. Bhatia said he "would not
question the wisdom" of his headquarters on this issue and
demurred when asked if the text had been agreed upon prior to
the trip, but intimated that this was probably the case.
Bhatia described the statement's language on democracy as one

of the most important aspects of the trip, particularly when
viewed in the context of Former Defense Minister Fernandes'
parallel conference on Burma and the concurrent visit of UN
Special Envoy to Burma Razali. "Allowing such events to
occur during the visit of a head of state shows the
flexibility of the Indian system," said Bhatia. When the COM
noted that the GOI had refused a visa for NCGUB "Prime
Minister-in-exile" Sein Win to attend the Fernandes event,
Bhatia replied "We only denied one person, and we have
consistently denied entry to that person for the past 15
years."


4. (C) Bhatia said that from the GOI's perspective, Than Shwe
and his delegation successfully demonstrated that the Burmese
regime is "determined and sincere about effecting a
transition to democracy." However, he said, the GOB makes a
compelling case that stability and economic development must
be achieved before the regime hands over power. The COM
replied that the SPDC shows no desire to relinquish control
and, in the absence of a timeline or freedom for democracy
leaders, the "road map" lacks any credibility. The COM also
observed that official SPDC media photos of Burmese Embassy
staff in New Delhi prostrating themselves on the ground
before Than Shwe (a custom that does not exist in Burma) was
symbolic of the broad control over the Burmese people that
the generals seek to gain and maintain.


5. (C) The COM noted reports that the GOI views Aung San Suu
Kyi and the NLD as having lost their opportunity to effect
political change (ref A). Bhatia (who claims to "stay in
touch" with the NLD) was less dismissive, saying that the
"ASSK and NLD dimension" is an important one and
acknowledging that ASSK still enjoys immense popularity among
the Burmese people. He insisted that the GOI had "very
clearly" raised the ongoing detention of the NLD leadership
with Than Shwe (but added that ASSK's international influence
seems to grow the longer she is in detention, suggesting that
house arrest is helpful to the democracy leader). However,
Bhatia said, the key issue for the NLD will be the party's
ability to marshal support and influence the political
process; if the NLD can't influence, then its importance will
be diminished. The COM replied that it is unrealistic to put
the onus on the NLD while the party's leaders are still in
detention, observing that "all SPDC promises about a
transition ring hollow if ASSK and U Tin Oo are not freed."


6. (C) Ambassador Bhatia concluded that the Than Shwe visit
was "a very important success" that had addressed Burma's
domestic situation, secured GOB support for an Indian seat at
the UN Security Council, and yielded progress on bilateral
security and trade issues. He added that as a result of
recent senior-level meetings at the NSC and elsewhere in
Washington, the GOI had concluded that "the United States now
has a much better understanding of India's perspective on,
and policy toward, Myanmar" -- suggesting that he believes
the U.S. accepts that India has higher priorities than
democracy and human in dealing with Burma. The COM
immediately reiterated that GOB promises mean nothing unless
ASSK is freed, the NLD is allowed to play a meaningful role,
and there is a credible timeline for next steps.


7. (C) Comment: Ambassador Bhatia, as well as others in New
Delhi (ref A),gave assurances that India pressed Than Shwe
to make forward movement on democracy and human rights
(including freeing ASSK). However, we see no signs in
Rangoon that the Indian Government intends to pursue these
issues in any meaningful way with the Burmese regime. Vice
President Shekhawat's 2003 visit to Burma (ref D) was the
beginning of an ongoing charm offensive that has only the
thinnest veneer of support for democratization. According to
senior NLD officials in Rangoon, no Indian official, or even
locally-based Indian diplomat, has attended an NLD function
or visited an NLD office in nearly 16 years. The October 29
joint statement envisions reciprocal visits by President
Kalam and Prime Minister Singh to Burma (and a visit by new
Burmese PM Soe Win to India). By all appearances, the GOI's
security and economic goals will likely dominate such prime
opportunities to press the SPDC to make meaningful political
changes. End Comment.
Martinez