Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04RANGOON1330
2004-10-07 01:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMA: RICE POLICY INDECISION

Tags:  EAGR ETRD ECON PGOV BM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001330 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB
BANGKOK FOR FAS
COLOMBO FOR ECON MANLOWE
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2014
TAGS: EAGR ETRD ECON PGOV BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: RICE POLICY INDECISION

REF: RANGOON 625 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001330

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB
BANGKOK FOR FAS
COLOMBO FOR ECON MANLOWE
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2014
TAGS: EAGR ETRD ECON PGOV BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: RICE POLICY INDECISION

REF: RANGOON 625 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: A surprising re-entry into the rice market by
the GOB's agricultural export arm adds another layer of
confusion to the government's rice policy. We don't see the
GOB remaining in the business long, though we cannot predict
the imminent return of the private sector either. However,
we are hearing that the future of the ten-month "temporary"
export ban may be decided one way or the other by the end of
the year. End summary.

The Old Bait and Switch and Bait


2. (C) The GOB's rice export "policy" continues to drift.
Though the government's "temporary" ban on the export of rice
continues into its tenth month, there are signs that the
embargo is beginning to crack. However, this has been no
boon for jilted private exporters as the initial hushed
contracts have benefited the old agricultural commodity
monopoly: Myanmar Agricultural Products Trading (MAPT).
According to a knowledgeable commodities trader, MAPT has
been tasked with providing the 130,000 tons of rice the GOB
has sold in recent months (though only 23,000 tons have been
shipped to date, with another 30,000-40,000 tons expected to
ship before the end of CY 2004).


3. (C) It's unlikely that this new arrangement will last.
According to the source, MAPT has been quietly brought off
the bench to sell off the GOB's warehoused stock that is
becoming valueless with age. Ironically, poor record keeping
and years of corruption by state warehouse managers, who sold
rice out the back door, have left MAPT about 65,000 tons
short of the amount contracted. This amount will have to be
made up from the private sector, as government
forced-procurement of rice from farmers ended this year.


4. (C) Another piece of evidence that the government's
re-entry into rice is short-term is the GOB's clear intent to
dissolve the state's agribusiness entities. Since the March
2003 decision to open the rice market, MAPT staff has been
cut from 14,000 to 3,000 employees (not enough to run a
massive procurement, storage, and export operation).
Additionally, the Ministry of Agriculture's export promotion
and agricultural research and education arm, the Myanmar
Agriculture Service, is reportedly being downgraded from a
state-owned enterprise to a department within the ministry.


5. (C) The GOB's move to eliminate its role in rice exporting
does not necessarily signal an imminent return of the private
sector. The initial justification for the export ban was
fear of rising rice prices and a weak grasp on nationwide
production and demand statistics. The latter problems have
not been touched, and recent flooding in agricultural areas
(plus a huge spate of buying earlier this year by the
military, see reftel) have been nudging up prices. However,
there is some good news. The government in August lifted the
ban, also in place since January, on exports of corn and
reliable sources tell us the senior SPDC leadership will
revisit the question of private sector rice exports in
December.

Comment: Believe it When You See it


6. (C) The result of this expected policy review is
impossible to predict, but we see three possible outcomes.
First, the SPDC could allow the private sector to resume its
pre-January operations freely buying and selling within the
new system. Second, the SPDC could re-open partially the
rice market, allowing such military-controlled "private"
firms like Myanmar Economic Holdings, Ltd. to take the lead.
Finally, the SPDC could decide the situation is still too
fragile to allow the market to prevail, and keep things at
the politically safe status quo -- with the attendant damage
to farmers, exporters, and foreign exchange reserves. End
comment.
Martinez