ALL SMILES: PM KHIN NYUNT'S TRIP TO SINGAPORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001269

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON BM SN
SUBJECT: ALL SMILES: PM KHIN NYUNT'S TRIP TO SINGAPORE

REF: RANGOON 1237

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt made a
recent trip to Singapore--part official, part medevac--in
what the regime views as another successful effort to garner
ASEAN support for the SPDC's road map to democracy. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) On September 20 the COM and P/E chief called on the
Singaporean Ambassador to Burma, Simon Tesning de Cruz, to
discuss Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt's September 12-17
trip to Singapore. De Cruz joined the PM's high-level
delegation for the trip, which included then-Foreign Minister
Win Aung and sundry GOB senior officials, and participated in
all official events during the visit. (Comment: De Cruz said
that Win Aung, who was sacked the day after his return to
Rangoon (reftel),was noticeably "withdrawn and distracted"
during the Singapore trip. End Comment.)


3. (C) According to de Cruz, General Khin Nyunt's primary
reason for visiting Singapore was to undergo "keyhole
surgery" to remove gall bladder stones (Note: The Burmese
regime's official press did not address the medical aspects
of the trip. End Note). However, Khin Nyunt also conducted
official business, which included bilateral meetings with
President Nathan, Prime Minister Lee, and Senior Minister
Goh. PM Lee also hosted an official dinner for Khin Nyunt
and his entourage.


4. (C) General Khin Nyunt stuck to carefully crafted talking
points, said de Cruz, delivering a rote explanation of the
SPDC's road map to democracy. The Burmese PM was upbeat,
describing the National Convention as "off to a good start,"
but acknowledged that discussions with the cease-fire ethnic
groups were "delicate." Khin Nyunt said that Aung San Suu
Kyi (ASSK) and the NLD had refused to attend the Convention
(which Khin Nyunt said will reconvene in January 2005) and
"have been making problems ever since by discrediting the
road map process." De Cruz opined that Khin Nyunt's derisive
comments about the NLD, including a threat "to do something
about the party's contact with the ethnic groups," were an
ominous sign that the SPDC is prepared to crack down further
on the pro-democracy movement.


5. (C) Khin Nyunt also made a pitch for an increase in
Singaporean investment in Burma. According to Ambassador de
Cruz, Minister Goh replied that Singapore would like to
support greater economic investment, but observed that
regional competition and a poor business climate inside Burma
would continue to impede would-be investors. (Note: De Cruz
said that about only 125 Singaporean investors currently
operate in Burma, down from about 400 four years ago, and new
investment has dwindled to less than USD six million per
year. End Note.)


6. (C) Ambassador de Cruz said that senior GOS officials told
Khin Nyunt that Singapore supported the SPDC's road map
process, but urged the regime to develop a timeline and to be
more inclusive, particularly by ensuring ASSK and NLD
participation, in order for the international community,
especially the United States and the EU, to view the results
as credible. PM Lee also told Khin Nyunt that the SPDC
needed to work with the United Nations, particularly Special
Envoy Razali.


7. (SBU) Comment: The regime gave standard, high-profile
press coverage to Khin Nyunt's Singapore trip, highlighting
photos of the smiling Prime Minister with his new Singaporean
counterpart and emphasizing the latter's purported comments
that Singapore "understands the challenges and problems"
Burma faces with its democratization process. Regardless of
what was said behind closed doors, or even in a subsequent
GOS statement in which PM Lee noted that he had raised
international and regional concerns about the situation in
Burma, Khin Nyunt and the SPDC view the trip as another
successful effort to garner ASEAN support for the regime's
road map. Embassy Singapore observes that the visit,
characterized by the GOS as a perfunctory introductory call,
received minimal local press coverage and the GOS, in the
absence of any agreements or real substance, would not share
the Burmese regime's more glorified view of events. End
Comment.


8. (U) This message has been coordinated with Embassy
Singapore.
Martinez