Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04RANGOON1149
2004-09-03 10:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

INSIDE BURMA'S NLD PARTY: YOUNG TURKS VS OLD LIONS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM BM NLD 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001149 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BM NLD
SUBJECT: INSIDE BURMA'S NLD PARTY: YOUNG TURKS VS OLD LIONS

REF: A. RANGOON 1090 AND PREVIOUS

B. RANGOON 1035 AND PREVIOUS

C. RANGOON 924

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001149

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BM NLD
SUBJECT: INSIDE BURMA'S NLD PARTY: YOUNG TURKS VS OLD LIONS

REF: A. RANGOON 1090 AND PREVIOUS

B. RANGOON 1035 AND PREVIOUS

C. RANGOON 924

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: The National League for Democracy (NLD) held
a series of recent meetings that pitted state and divisional
party officials (younger leaders who demand a pro-active
stance approach to the regime) against members of the NLD
Central Executive Committee (octogenarians who are
disinclined to stir the SPDC hornet's nest in the absence of
the NLD's detained senior leaders). The regime, meanwhile,
believes that it has rendered the NLD increasingly incapable
of mounting a serious threat, an assessment that may
underestimate the NLD's capacity to remain a thorn in the
thigh of totalitarian rule. Nonetheless, with Aung San Suu
Kyi (ASSK) under house arrest, most offices shuttered, and
lessening international pressure on the Burmese regime, the
NLD has hit an all-time low point. The growing chorus of
voices from among the NLD's younger members demanding party
action is one indication that the status quo is creating
considerable frustration within the pro-democracy movement.
Summary.


2. (C) From August 25-30 the NLD CEC hosted a six-day seminar
at Rangoon headquarters with several dozen of the party's
state and divisional leaders. According to party Chairman U
Aung Shwe, the session was a productive effort to address
numerous party issues, but he admitted that emotions ran high
during contentious discussions regarding potential party
actions and demands from the ranks for leadership changes.


3. (C) Seven members of the nine-member CEC (whom the SPDC
detained after the May 2003 Depeyin attack but subsequently
released between November 2003 and April 2004) began an
executive meeting on September 1 to analyze and discuss the
results of their seminar with local party leaders. However,
according to party sources, the CEC is not inclined to
implement any of the recommendations put forth by the
regional leaders while CEC members ASSK and U Tin Oo remain
under house arrest. Recommendations from the rank and file
membership included the following:

--Expand the Central Executive Committee: Local leaders

would like to see more diversity on the CEC, including women
and youth. However, the current CEC members say that an
expansion is not in the party's by-laws and, furthermore, is
impossible to undertake without the presence of ASSK and U
Tin Oo (Note: the CEC has nine members and one vacancy. U
Kyi Maung, who passed away on August 26, resigned in 1998
after a falling-out with ASSK and was not replaced).

--Expand the Central Committee: In theory, local NLD members
elect the 30 members of the Central Committee (CC) who, in
turn, appoint or elect the CEC. In practice, top party
leaders (ASSK, U Tin Oo, or U Aung Shwe) have hand-picked
members of the CEC and the CC. As with the CEC, NLD members
would like to see more women and youth on the Central
Committee. However, in 1989 the then-SLORC jailed or forced
the retirement of most CC members and the regime responded in
similar fashion after a 1998 reorganization by arresting all
members of the CC. The current CEC believes that
reinvigorating the CC now would provide no benefit to the
party and would simply provoke the SPDC.

--Convene a "Pyi Thu Hluttaw" (People's Parliament): The NLD
won 395 of 485 seats in the 1990 elections and party members
have always believed that the Parliament belongs rightfully
to the pro-democracy movement. In 1998, the NLD formed the
Committee to Represent the People's Parliament (CRPP),which
included participants from 14 political parties. However,
the SPDC responded with a massive wave of arrests, forced
resignations, and prolonged repression. The CEC will mull
over this recommendation, but is unlikely to take serious
action. The NLD, however, plans to lead efforts to
commemorate the sixth anniversary of the CRPP on September 16.

--A small, but vocal, number of NLD members apparently
demanded that the CEC "politicize" an ongoing petition
campaign to free party leaders and reopen party offices (ref
C),press the international community to introduce the Burma
question at the UN Security Council, and even consider moving
the party toward an armed struggle against the military
regime. The CEC reportedly rejected these suggestions out of
hand as being either impractical or against party objectives.

Comment: "We've Got Them Right Where We Want Them"


4. (C) According to a foreign diplomat in Rangoon, who has
close contacts with the SPDC's military intelligence, the GOB
recently completed a classified assessment of the NLD party
for the SPDC leadership. The GOB analysis reportedly
observes that the NLD has a rigid hierarchy that does not
adhere to democratic practices within the party structure,
has no tolerance for internal dissent, and is incapable of
mounting a serious threat against the regime. Such barbs
would sting the NLD leadership, which prides itself on
transparency, inclusiveness, and a long-term commitment to a
peaceful transition to democracy. However, the reported GOB
analysis would be music to the generals' ears, affirming that
the SPDC has successfully implemented a campaign of
harassment, intimidation, and repression that has rendered
the NLD harmless.


5. (C) We would maintain that the regime underestimates the
NLD's reserve of support among the Burmese people and the
capacity to remain a serious thorn in the thigh of
totalitarian rule. Nonetheless, it is clear that with party
leaders in detention, offices shuttered throughout the
country, and lessening international pressure on the Burmese
regime (especially on the part of ASEAN and other in the
region),the NLD has hit an all-time low point. The growing
chorus of voices from among the NLD's younger members
demanding party action is one indication that the status quo
is creating considerable frustration within the pro-democracy
movement. End Comment.
Martinez